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ABSTRACT
The Hoover Papers at West Branch, Iowa, recently- 
opened to scholars, contain invaluable material on politics, 
policies, and personalities of the 1930's. Through an exten 
sive examination of the ex-President's papers and those of 
his chief lieutenants, Ogden Mills and John Callan 0 'Laugh- 
lin, I have attempted to reconstruct Hoover's political 
activities during the period, 1933-1940.
Although Hoover's correspondence, speeches, and 
publications underline his devotion to the ideology of 
American Individualism, they also expose a man of political 
sensitivity, motivation, partisanship, and ambition. Hoover 
spent the entire decade of the 1930's embroiled in opposi­
tionist politics.
The ex-President's retirement in Palo Alto was a 
screen which permitted him time to study issues, evaluate 
personalities, and plot strategy. He opened an extensive 
correspondence, advised supporters, dabbled in local politic 
and maneuvered for control of the Republican Party organiza­
tion.
As his lieutenants pointed to accumulating "evidence" 
of New Deal tyranny and the need for a more aggressive role 
from their "Chief," Hoover restated his ideas concerning
government in society in The challenge To Liberty. He 
denounced what he saw as an abridgement of individual 
liberties, an increasing bureaucratization, and regimentation 
of society.
In his efforts to rally a dispirited party and to 
vindicate his own record, Hoover returned to the political 
stump and lambasted the New Deal. Too often, he ignored the 
harsh realities of the time and dwelt on ideas. Yet, he 
gained conservative support. He accelerated local activity 
through grass roots conventions and the enrollment of young 
Republicans. Although the GOP rejected his suggestions for 
a statement of principles, he was making a political come­
back.
In 1936, anxious for vindication and a chance to 
"debate the issues," Hoover hoped a deadlocked convention 
would turn to him. He maintained an active schedule, 
denounced the New Deal, and delivered one of the best speeches 
of his career at the GOP Convention. The party, however, 
nominated a more available candidate and, as Hoover expected, 
lost the election.
Convinced that his party must exert a more aggressive 
role and defend its record, Hoover attempted to reorganize 
it in 1937. He allied with conservatives in organizing a 
Program committee to draw up a statement of principles and 
outline policies. He developed a close working relationship 
with the National Chairman and the Executive Committee and
v
encouraged opposition to the New Deal. Despite the defeat 
of his mid-term convention proposal, Hoover's drive for 
party leadership was widely recognized as serious.
1938 was the crucial year for Hoover's political 
comeback. Despite his own activity and increased following, 
his lieutenants lost key positions inside the party organi­
zation. Only the Republican Party's sweeping congressional 
victories kept alive his glimmering hopes.
Sadly, Hoover exhausted the last of his political 
strength in a futile effort to capture the 1940 presidential 
nomination. He openly courted delegates and advertised his 
willingness to run. He ignored reality. He failed even to 
endorse a more available candidate of his own views. 1940 
was his political curtain call. Defeat, age, and death had 
decimated his political legion. The only door left open was 
that of elder statesman. Reluctantly, he looked toward it.
INTRODUCTION
Herbert Hoover was a man with strong psychological 
needs. Early in life he developed a set of principles which 
he categorized as "American Individualism.1' Throughout his 
professional and political careers he reaffirmed his devotion 
to that ideology. Not even the greatest depression in 
American history undercut his faith in his ideas. On leaving 
office, discredited, maligned, and heartsick, he felt need 
for vindication— both for his ideas and himself.
This dissertation is not a biography, it is not a 
complete record of his career, it is not a study of the New 
Deal, nor is it an effort to show any continuity or relation­
ship between the Hoover Administration and the New Deal. It 
is primarily an examination of Herbert Hoover's political 
activity and his opposition tactics to the New Deal during 
the 1930's. It is an attempt to show why Hoover acted as he 
did. It focuses on his personal correspondence, his publica­
tions, and his speeches, all of which aimed at persuading 
the public to reject the New Deal. It is only one piece of 
a gigantic puzzle.
The New Deal of the 1930's challenged many of Hoover's 
basic ideas concerning the role of government in the economy 
and society. With sincerity and with bitterness, he
vii
returned to the political arena after 193 2 in an effort to 
halt "the challenge to liberty." In his mental framework, 
the New Deal became synonymous with evil. Hence, his 
charges were dipped in extreme emotional and political 
hyperbole. At times his accusations and his failure to even 
admit the possible sincerity of his opponents are unreason­
able. Although he was often misquoted, often misled, and 
often misunderstood, he was his own worst enemy. He rarely 
exercised restraint in his analysis of the New Deal.
Erroneous New Deal methods hardly proved conspiracy, 
un-Americanism, or totalitarian motives on the part of his 
opponents. Nor did the failure of certain New Deal policies 
invalidate their humane objectives or prove the soundness of 
his American System. His ideas, after all, had been 
thoroughly tested in his own administration. Notwithstand­
ing, his speeches, articles, and books evoked constructive 
debate and uncovered genuine flaws, potential dangers, and 
inefficient methods. Too, some of his charges were proven 
true in the long run.
Despite the ex-President's blemished reputation, he 
commanded a significant following throughout the 1930's. He 
made the most of his influence. Of all the New Deal's 
critics, he alone held a national audience, he alone was 
consistent in opposition, and he was the most sincere 
opponent. Other men would have arrived at many of his con­
clusions concerning the inefficiency, unconstitutionality,
viii
and revolutionary nature of the New Deal, but it was Hoover 
who first saw, first denounced, and first demanded termina­
tion of many of the new proposals.
He was a self-appointed "conscience'1 for the nation. 
At times he underlined a tragic as well as negative element 
of the 1930’s. He sincerely thought that an alien philoso­
phy was destroying American traditions and values. Perhaps 
the afternoon of life overtook him. He was a seasoned actor 
who remained onstage long after the play had ended. He read 
his lines with a remarkable consistency and overrated his 
experience. He never realized that experience can be mis­
leading. He was a minority spokesman, an individualist in a 
rapidly advancing collective society, a conservative during 
a cataclysmic era, an abstract thinker and an ideologue who 
saw an image and denied reality. He predicted numerous 
trends but ignored the harshness of his times. Tragically, 
he refused the role of elder statesman and, in an effort to 
gain vindication, turned to political activity. Again he 
drank deeply from the cup of bitterness.
ix
CHAPTER I
SHAPING OF AN AMERICAN INDIVIDUALIST
Thoreau once said: "If a man does not keep pace with
his companions, perhaps it is because he hears a different 
drummer. Let him step to the music he hears, however mea­
sured or far a w a y . H e r b e r t  Hoover attuned his senses to 
the theme of American Individualism in his early youth and 
professional training. It was then he formed a social and 
political creed which he continually saw fulfilled in his 
own professional successes. In any evaluation of Hoover, 
these ideas and some related character traits are essentials 
to grasp. What forces, therefore— familial, environmental, 
educational, and professional— shaped Herbert Hoover?
The thirty-first President was born on August 10, 1874, 
in a two-room cottage at West Branch, Iowa. His father 
Jesse Clark Hoover, was the village blacksmith. His mother, 
Huldah Minthorn Hoover, an ardent prohibitionist, was a 
frequent speaker at the community's Quaker meetings.^
1Henry Davxd Thoreau, Walden: Or, Life xn the Woods
New York, 1961), 272.
2will Irwin, Herbert Hoover (New York, 1920), 1-10. 
Hereinafter cited as Irwin, Hoover. Harris G. Warren,
Herbert Hoover and the Great Depression (Oxford, 1959), 19- 
20. Hereinafter cited as Warren, Great Depression. Herbert 
Hoover, A Boyhood in Iowa (New York, 1931), 3-5. Hereinafter 
cited as Hoover, Boyhood.
1
Hoover's recollections of his parents were misty. Although 
remembering few childhood experiences, he did recall a "stern 
but kindly discipline." The loss of his parents at an early 
age constrained his personality so that he tended "to hold 
things in, to resist displays of emotion in himself, or 
others.
Environment and religion played a major role in
5shaping Hoover's character. Always conscious of his own 
experiences, Hoover recalled that nineteenth-century Iowans 
conquered a vast domain through individual initiative and 
enterprise. As a youth, he performed a variety of menial 
chores and observed that most farm families were largely 
self-sufficient. The Hoovers bought only a few outside 
essentials.® Despite the hard work, Hoover often escaped to
ÔHerbert Hoover, Memoirs of Herbert Hoover (New York, 
1951) , X, 1. Hereinafter cited as Hoover, Memoirs. Claude 
R. Cook, "Herbert Hoover's Notable Career," Annals of Iowa, 
XXXII (October, 1954), 460-69. Walter F. Dexter, Herbert 
Hoover and American Individualism (New York, 1932), 3, sees 
an impoverished youth, a humble origin, and a village environ­
ment as shaping the attitudes of a young, impressionable 
Hoover.
^Erwin C. Hargrove, Presidential Leadership: Person­
ality and Political Style (New York, 1966), 98. Hereinafter 
cited as Hargrove, Presidential Leadership.
5Hoover, Memoirs, I, 1; Dexter, American Individualism, 
3; David Hinshaw, Herbert Hooveri American Quaker (New York, 
1950). Hereinafter cited as Hinshaw, American Quaker.
^Hoover, Memoirs, I, 5-6; Hoover, Boyhood, 23-24;
Claude R. Cook, "Herbert Hoover's Notable Career," Annals of 
Iowa, XXXII (October, 1954), 460-469. Hoover recalled "the 
dime was hard to come by." Memoirs, I, 3.
3
the virgin forest or to the swimming hole by the willows,
7where he stalked pigeons, tracked rabbits, fished, or swam.
In maturity, he frequently returned to such natural scenes. 
Possibly he sensed certain spiritual values in the wilder­
ness. Certainly, he spoke of enriching the soul through this 
8medium.
Hoover's intelligent and loquacious mother impressed 
her idealism on the young boy. After her death, relatives 
saw that Hoover retained her religious ideas. A fellow 
Quaker noted that religion was a key ingredient in Hoover1s 
character and that his "most distinctive qualities and traits" 
were spiritual, moral, and mental.^® One recent student of 
politics believes that Hoover's religion explained his dis­
taste for exhibitionism, his need for harmony, his desire to 
serve the public, his basic trust in man's goodness, and his 
insistence on cooperative e f f o r t H o o v e r  parted at times 
from the peripheral signs of his faith, but he kept the deep 
spiritual and moral tone. His religion accentuated his
7Hoover, Boyhood, 3; Hoover, Memoirs, I, 2.
^Herbert Hoover, Fishing For Fun and to Wash Your 
Soul (New York, 1964).
^Irwin, Hoover, 21; Hoover, Boyhood, 16, 17, 25.
"'"^Hinshaw, American Quaker, vii, 5, 34.
-'--''Hargrove, Presidential Leadership. 98, notes that all 
of these characteristics greatly influenced H. H . ’s political 
values and leadership techniques. David Hinshaw discusses 
the same traits and their relation to Hoover's Quaker reli­
gion. Hinshaw, American Quaker, 35-38.
12optimism, individualism, and stubbornness.
Hoover's religion stressed the use of "plain language" 
and a reliance on logic rather than emotion in attempts to 
persuade others to accept facts. J Quakers continually 
sought consensus and harmony. If they could not act in 
unison they postponed decisions until everyone had an "oppor­
tunity to search their hearts for the right answer.
Quakers frequently reiterated their devotion to certain 
sacred principles. They carried their extreme religious 
individualism over into the economic sphere. Hoover recalled 
a Quaker emphasis on education, thrift, and individual enter­
prise, but he could not remember an example of Quaker 
poverty.^® This would be significant for a future politician 
who judged all mankind by his own experiences.
Following their mother's death in 1883, the Hoover 
children were parceled out among the relatives. This marked
l^Ibid.. 3 9 . Hoover's religion gave him an air of 
moral superiority which he constantly displayed in his 
political career.
l^Hoover, Memoirs, I, 8 ; Hinshaw, American Quaker, 39.
^Dexter, American Individualism. 43-44. This Quaker 
trait was a decisive political weakness in Hoover's career, 
for he continually displayed difficulty in making key deci­
sions if his advisers disagreed.
■*-5 Ibid., 46. Hoover, Memoirs. I, 9. Hoover not only 
reiterated certain principles throughout his post-presiden­
tial career, but he also defined each issue in moral terms 
and overused such words as principle, service, justice,
'truth-, and r i g h t r r " — -v -~
^Hoover, Memoirs. I, 8 .
5
an abrupt break with old associations. For three years,
Hoover "was passed on from relative to relative, " always
17working for his bread. By the close of 1885, he arrived
in Newbe.rg, Oregon, where his maternal uncle. Doctor Henry
John Minthorn, headed Pacific Academy, a Quaker school. His
religious heritage, his self-reliance, and his independence
bloomed in his new Oregon home. Under the strain of hard
work, the orphan learned the lessons of industry, thrift,
1 ftand determination. ° The doctor also preached many homilies 
to his young nephew, but the most often repeated one was: 
"Turn your other cheek once, but if he smites it, then punch 
him. ,|19
When Doctor Minthorn entered the real estate business 
in 1888, Hoover ran the Salem office, kept books, typed, and 
promoted sales.20 aiso enrolled in night sessions of the
local business school and read the classics in his spare 
time. At the office Hoover debated political issues b u t ’
-^Warren, Great Depression. 20; Hoover, Boyhood, 
foreword.
■*-%oover, Memoirs, I, 10-11; Irwin, Hoover, 29-35. 
H.H. recalled saving the money for a long time. Memoirs, I, 
10-11.
1 9 Ibid.. 1 2 .
20Ibid.; Drew Pearson, Washington Merry-Go-Round (New 
York, 1931), 62-63, states that H.H. was a born promoter.
As his uncle's sales declined, he "conceived the idea of 
meeting newcomers at the station, settling them in private 
boarding houses, thus giving his uncle's salesmen an oppor­
tunity to talk to them without competition. 11 H.H. used his 
commission for renting the rooms to help finance his college 
education.
21noted "the obstinacy and low intelligence of his opponents."* 
In 1890, Hoover gained conditional admittance to Stan- 
ford University. Throughout his tenure in Palo Alto, he held 
down numerous jobs in offices, and had laundry and newspaper 
routes. He acquired summer employment with the U. S. Geo­
logical Survey.^ At college, he displayed an energy, deter­
mination, and ability that would assure future success. He 
also developed organizational skills and a knack of inspiring 
loyalty and service among his colleagues.^3
Like most college students of the late nineteenth
century. Hoover was probably exposed to the ideas of the
24.Social Darwinists. Due to his personal experiences, his 
religion, and his fierce individualism, he was an ideal con­
vert for Conservative Darwinism. Herbert Spencer's applica­
tion of the biological scheme of evolution to society, with 
its note of inevitability, individualism, and cooperation,
^Hoover, Memoirs, I, 13-14.
^^Harold Wolfe, Herbert Hoover, Public Servant and 
Leader of the Loyal Opposition (New York, 1956), 17-19. Here­
inafter cited as Wolfe, Hoover. Hoover, Memoirs, I, 15-18, 
18-19.
^Wolfe, Hoover. 17-18; Irwin, Hoover. 62-67; Joseph 
S. Davis, "Herbert Hoover, 1874-1964: Another Appraisal,"
South Atlantic Quarterly, LXVIII (Summer, 1969), 296. Will 
Irwin, a Stanford contemporary, notes Hoover's organiza­
tional talent and his ability to inspire loyalty. Hargrove, 
Presidential Leadership, 99.
24^arren, Great Depression. 33. Richard Hofstadter, 
Social Darwinism in American Thought (Philadelphia, 1944),
8.
p cexplained much in Hoover's own p a s t / 3 William Graham 
Sumner of Yale was even more influential. It was Sumner who 
saw the Protestant ideal in the persevering, thrifty, deter­
mined individual who inevitably rose to the top in a free 
competitive order. To Sumner, the progress of civilization 
depended on the selective process of "nature" and hence he 
preached unrestricted competition. He defended inequality 
as inevitable. Yet, he thought that progress was possible. a 
It was the influence of Conservative Darwinism, as advocated 
by Spencer and Sumner, that Herbert Hoover reflected and 
espoused throughout his career.
^ Ibid.j 21, 25-29, 35; Eric F. Goldman, Rendezvous 
With Destiny {New York, 1956), 90-93, contains the most 
succinct explanation of Conservative Darwinism. Henry 
Steele Commager, The American Mind (New Haven, 1950), 86-90, 
shows how Spencer's ideas blended with progress, individual­
ism, defense of the existing order, and with natural or 
divine law.
^^Hofstadter, Social Darwinism, 37-38, 43, 44-49. 
Sidney Fine, Laissez Faire and the General-Weifare State 
(Ann Arbor, 1956), 81-91, discusses Sumner's belief that 
everyone was entitled to a chance (to Hoover, this meant 
equality of opportunity) , that the man of industry, frugality 
and patience would succeed, that natural law must take its 
course, and that the 11 forgotten man" inevitably paid for the 
hasty mistakes of reformers who interferred with natural law. 
On the latter point, see Goldman, Rendezvous With Destiny,
91. Also see Commager, The American Mind, 201-202. Although 
Reform Darwinism was in the air by the 1890's, HoOver escaped 
its influence or else rejected it. The great spokesman for 
Reform Darwinism, Lester Frank Ward, promoted the idea of a 
planned society. To Ward, man was a social engineer who 
could regulate much of his environment, direct and mold 
progress, and affect change through experimentation. Ralph 
Henry Gabriel, The Course of American Democratic Thought (New 
York, 1940), 204-209. Goldman, Rendezvous With Destiny, 93- 
97. Commager, The American Mind. 212-216. Hofstadter,
Social Darwinism, 52-58.
8
Upon graduation from Stanford in 1895, amidst the 
worst depression of the nineteenth century, Hoover took a 
“pick and shovel" job at two dollars a day in the Sierra 
Nevada mines.^7 jn the following months, Hoover ascended 
the ladder to a clerical post, to mine scout, and to “tech­
nical adviser" for the Chinese Engineering and Mining Company.
28In the Orient, he fashioned a brilliant engineering career.
On a stateside visit in 1899, he married Lou Henry— his col­
lege sweetheart. Accompanied by his bride, Hoover returned 
to China to supervise the construction of harbors, railroads, 
and mines. During the Boxer Rebellion of 1900, he helped to 
provision the beleaguered foreign colony and its refugees. ^
In 1902, he became a partner and General Manager of the newly- 
created Oriental Syndicate.38
As a free-lancing, international engineer, Hoover was 
a globetrotter. He acquired an extensive knowledge of 
foreign governments, their economies, and histories. He 
became obsessed with efficiency and organization as the keys 
to their critical economic and political problems. Too, he
^Hoover, Memoirs, I, 25-28; Warren, Great Depression,
20.
38Ibid.; Hoover, Memoirs, I, 25-34; Wolfe, Hoover,
20-25.
29Hoover, Memoirs, I, 35-72; Warren, Great Depression,
21-22.
3 0Ibid., 2 1 .
-aiconcluded that the American way was uniquely superior. ^ ,
The Great War, beginning in 1914, opened new doors to 
Hoover's creative talents, and his organizational, adminis­
trative, diplomatic, and judicial abilities were severely 
tested. Many of his ideas crystallized during his war 
experience. It was then that he thought through his ideology 
of "American Individualism." Although he did not formalize 
his views until his publication of American Individualism in 
1922, his ordeal as diplomat and food administrator in World 
War I confirmed his basic beliefs.
From his London headquarters, in 1914, Hoover assumed 
responsibility for repatriating stranded tourists and, at 
the request of the American Ambassador Walter Hines Page, he 
organized a Commission for the Relief of Belgium. Hoover 
exhibited diplomatic and organizational talents in securing 
permission to send supplies through the blockade of the 
belligerents.33 He rose steadily in the rank of Wilson's
3lHoover, Memoirs, I, 75-125? Herbert Hoover, The 
Ordeal of Woodrow Wilson (New York, 1958), v; Herbert Hoover, 
American Individualism (Garden City, 1922), 7-8. Herein­
after cited as Hoover, American Individualism.
3 ^Hargrove, Presidential Leadership, 100.
3 3Hoover, Memoirs. I, 141-148; Burton J. Hendrick,
The Life and Letters of Walter Hines Page (3 vols.; New York, 
1925), II, 311; Warren, Great Depression, 22. Hoover's 
administrative methods maximized voluntary cooperation, and 
his successes reinforced his idea that all goals could be 
obtained with moral methods.
10
advisers.^
During the war years, Hoover embellished and elabo­
rated his ideology of individualism without changing its 
basic tenets. His wartime experience turned him toward 
public service. When the United States entered the war in 
April, 1917, Hoover became chief of the United States Food 
Administration.35
As Food Administrator, Hoover exercised direct control 
of food production, of farm policies, and of prices, 
rationing, processing, and distribution of foodstuffs in the 
United States.36 Hoover defended these extraordinary powers
34william A. Williams, The Contours of American His­
tory (New York, i=>61) , 427. Several of H.H.'s wartime 
associates noted his penchant for seeing the dark side of 
every problem. Bernard Baruch, Public Years (New York, 1960), 
88-89, 232-233; William White, Autobiography (New York, 1946), 
515; Charles Seymour (ed.). The Intimate Papers of Colonel 
House (New York, 1928), IV, 268; Arno Mayer, Politics and 
Diplomacy of Peace Making (New York, 1967), 21, 24-27. Here­
inafter cited as Mayer, Politics and Diplomacy.
35gong. Rec., 65 Cong., 1 Sess. (May, 1917), 4947- 
4950; Hoover, Memoirs. I, 240-25-. Davis, "Hoover: Another
Appraisal," 305, depicts Hoover's "genius for recruiting 
competent men and women . . . during and after the war, and
[winning] their devoted loyalty." The war-relief activities 
led to life-time friendships with Edgar Rickard, Mark Requa, 
Lewis Strauss, Robert A. Taft, Ben S. Allen, Ray Lyman 
Wilbur, Vernon Kellogg, and Lawrence Richey. Hoover, Memoirs.
I, 253, 295. Thereafter, these men served as part of 
Hoover's political "inner circle" and affectionately referred 
to him as "Chief."
36ibid., 240-250; Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., 1 Sess. (May, 
1917), 4947-4950; Editorial, "How Hoover Will Help Win," 
Literary Digest, L (June 2, 1917), 1689. See William C. 
Mullendore, History of the United States Food Administration 
(Stanford, 1941), 7-19, 27-34, 77-79, 115-117, 131-194, 
226-359.
11
by citing their emergency and temporary nature. Each agency 
that he created in order to implement his ideas stressed the 
cooperative and voluntary nature of his program. His unparal­
leled successes in economizing, accelerating production, and 
curtailing waste only reinforced his ideology.^
As a result of his relief experience, Hoover was 
named head of the American Relief Administration in post-war 
Europe.^® President Wilson elevated him to an advisory role 
at the Versailles Conference. Hoover responded with economic 
and political advice. Although deeply disillusioned with the
*5 Qfinal peace treaty. Hoover promised to support it publicly.
The war had crystallized his ideas. Xt was time to formalize 
the beliefs that his familial, environmental, educational, 
and professional experiences had created.
For Hoover, ideas, values, and experience were 
supremely important. His heritage had included an inculcation
^ Ibid.; Irwin, Hoover. 189-244. Also see Louis 
Filler (ed.), The President Speaks (Hew York, 1964), 178; 
Hoover, Memoirs, I, 240-244.
^®H. H. Fisher, The American Relief Administration in 
Russia, 1921-1923 (Washington, 1943), 3-27; Hoover, Wilson, 
75-76, 8 8 ; and Hoover, Memoirs, I, 334-352; Papers Relating 
to the Foreicrn Relations of the United States, 1919 (Paris 
Peace Conference), II, 627-728, contains the diplomatic 
details involved in food relief implementation and explains 
Hoover's disillusionment with the Allies' obstruction; Mayer, 
Politics and Diplomacy. 266-273, 474-485, 510-514.
^Hoover, Memoirs, I, 334-352; Hoover, Wilson. 75, 83- 
89, 183-184; 234; and Woodrow Wilson, War and Peace Presi­
dential Messages, Addresses and Public Papers, 1917-1924 (New 
York, 1927), I, 635. See New York Times. February 24, 1920, 
1 .
12
of concepts lauding the self-made man, opportunity, self- 
reliance, thrift, mobility, and the sacredness of tradition. 
His ideology involved an indiscriminate mixture of ideas 
while appealing to deep emotions and promoting an assortment 
of values. Because of his religion he rationalized all 
issues in moral terms. Although he embellished and elabo­
rated his views during the presidency and the years that 
followed, he articulated the basic premise of his creed in 
1922, in a small book entitled American Individualism. ^  
Hoover possessed complete confidence in what he 
called American traditions, American individualism, the 
"American system, 11 and America's future. He believed in the 
uniqueness of the American way with its emphasis on "equality 
of opportunity."^-*- By this doctrine, he meant the right of 
equal opportunity "to pursue happiness" in the Jeffersonian
^The New York Times. December 17, 1922, 1, praised 
H.H.'s personal interpretation of America's economic, social, 
and political system as "among the few great formulations of 
American political theory." Other observers found it less 
momentuous. Robert H. Ferrell, American Diplomacy In The 
Great Depression (Hew Haven, 1957), 10, castigates Hoover's 
prescription for success as a collection of "homely maxims 
inculcated in countless nineteenth century Americans."
^Herbert Hoover, American Individualism (Garden City, 
1922) , 7-8. Hereinafter cited as Hoover, Individualism. 
Myers, State Papers, I, 1, 398. Boyd C. Shafer, "The Ameri­
can Heritage of Hope, 1855-1940," Mississippi Valley Histori­
cal Review, XXXVII (December, 1950), 425-450, says that 
Hoover looked beyond the distant horizons to a time when 
poverty would end and all men would enjoy the abundant life.
13
s e n s e . 42 g y  insuring equality of opportunity, the American 
system allowed individual initiative to take one to "that 
position in society to which his intelligence, character, 
ability and ambition entitled him.11 Hoover's own experience 
proved this to his own satisfaction. Too, he thought the 
system minimized class structure, stimulated motivation, 
enlarged the sense of responsibility, and forced man to 
"stand up to the emery wheel of competition."^
Individualism was more than legalistic justice based 
on contracts, property, and political equality. By the 
1920's, America had "long since abandoned the laissez faire
4^Edward 0. Guerrant, Herbert Hoover, Franklin p . 
Roosevelt: Comparisons and Contrasts (Cleveland, 1960), 6 .
Hereinafter cited as Guerrant, Comparisons and Contrasts. 
Hoover often expressed admiration of Jefferson's views on 
individual rights.
43noover, Individualism, 9. In a modified Puritan 
ethic, he assimilated equality of opportunity and the service 
state. To H.H., individual initiative operated in the 
humanities, business, and politics. Milton Viorst, Fall From 
Grace; The Republican Party and the Puritan Ethic (New 
York, 1968), 8 , 165-166, describes Hoover as "the Puritan 
larger-than-life," a man of conviction, fidelity, and 
orthodoxy. Hoover wanted a "higher order of society for the 
United States" and believed in the Puritan ethic as God's 
blessing on those who helped themselves. Even the depres­
sion did not alter his conviction that it was each man's 
duty to make himself secure. See Mayer, The Republicans,
411; and Albert U. Romasco, The Poverty of Abundance: Hoover, 
The Nation, The Depression (New York, 1965), 12. Herein­
after cited as Romasco, Poverty of Abundance. Hargrove, 
Presidential Leadership, 100, notes that Hoover saw federal 
power as a constant threat and a limit to individual liberty. 
Hence, he championed voluntary restraint or a minimum of 
local and state regulation. After construing a system in 
his mind, he attempted to shape society by his intellectual 
model. As Commager, The American Mind, 344, notes, Hoover 
followed the Sumnerian example of constructing an abstract 
set of principles and "deducing from them some ideal course of 
action."
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of the eighteenth century— the notion that it [was] every man 
for himself and the devil take the hindmost." The nation's 
laws reflected that abandonment and Hoover was aware of the 
f a c t . ^  concerning national wealth, he wrote in 1922 that 
Americans had "learned that fair division can only be obtained 
by certain restrictions on the strong and dominant." Ameri­
cans had developed a social conscience and embraced "service 
and responsibility to others as part of individualism."1̂®
Hoover stressed the uniqueness of the American system 
by describing it as "not capitalism or socialism, or syndi­
calism, nor a cross breed of them." It was more enduring, 
since it sprang "from the one source of human progress— that 
each individual shall be given the chance and stimulation 
for development of the best with which he has been endowed 
in heart and mind." To Hoover, the "sole source of progress" 
was American individualism.^®
What was the motivating factor in this American
^Hoover, Individualism, 10. Herbert Hoover, Chal­
lenge to Liberty (New York, 1934), 49. Hereinafter cited as 
Hoover, Challenge to Liberty. Carl N. Degler, "The Ordeal 
of Herbert Hoover," Yale Review. LII (Summer, 1963), 564, 
noted the departure from laissez-faire and the "capitalism 
of Adam Smith." See also Mayer, The Republicans. 411.
^Hoover, individualism, 10-11. By 1934, in Challenge 
to Liberty, 49, Hoover pointed to public education, public 
health, public works, public stimulation of scientific 
research, and even public action to combat depressions.
^Hoover, Individualism, 12-13. He described American 
individualism as a "special social system." For the simi­
larity between Hoover's creed and that of William Graham 
Sumner, see Fine, Laissez-Faire. 81-91.
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system? "Intelligence, character, courage, and the divine 
Sj_ ark of the human soul are alone the property of individ­
uals." Each individual must be individually moved. "The 
most potent force in society is its i d e a l s . F o r  Hoover, 
ideas would always impede his perception of reality at the 
very time that they gave it shape and meaning.
To Hoover, great ideas could be realized only through
education, freedom, humaneness, service, and a reduction of
individual selfishness:
The will-o’-the wisp of all breeds of socialism is 
that they contemplate a motivation of human animals 
by altruism alone. It necessitates a bureaucracy 
of the entire population, in which, having obliterated 
the economic stimulation of each member, the fine 
gradations of character and ability are to be arranged 
in relative authority.49
Hoover concluded that only fools thought men were equal in 
ability, character, intelligence, and ambition. The govern­
ment, however, could insure "li. ^rty, justice, intellectual 
welfare, equality of opportunity and stimulation to 
service. & crucial responsibility of government was to 
guarantee competition and the right of individuals to achieve 
their destinies. Economic freedom was as important as the
4?Hoover, Individualism, 14, 16. Hoover's creed pro­
vided an opportunity for individual planning.
4 8 Ibid., 16-17. t 17>
5 0Ibid., 19. Shafer, "Heritage of Hope," 444, notes 
that to H.H., biological inequality made economic equality 
impossible; thus competition was natural. Spencer's bio­




Leadership was another important principle in the 
American system. Here quality found expression through a 
"free rise of ability, character, and intelligence." Hence, 
"progress of the nation [was] the sum of progress in its 
individuals. ll̂ 2 jn contrast to the individual. Hoover char­
acterized the mass as emotional, mindless, and credulous.
"It destroys, it consumes, it hates, and it dreams but it 
never builds."53 paradoxically, Hoover was to reject this 
idea of an emotional electorate in his political career.
American Individualism possessed a spiritual side, 
for "men do not live by bread alone." Individualism admitted 
"the universal divine inspiration of every human soul." It 
placed a premium on service to one's fellow man. Permanent 
spiritual progress depended on each individual. Economics 
was only one phase of American individualism. It also aimed 
at providing "opportunity for self-expression spiritually." 
Unlike European individualism, the American variety was 
selfless.
Concerning property, Hoover noted an increasing 
tendency on the part of Americans to see the "right of
^Hoover, Individualism. 19.
5 2Ibid., 23-24. 53jbid.
S^Ibid., 7-8, 26-28, 31. To Hoover, all progress
depended on individual self-expression and creativity.
55ibid., 37-38.
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property not as an object in itself, but in the light of a 
useful and necessary instrument in stimulation of initiative 
to the individual.” Equality of opportunity checked unre­
strained capital.^ Sensible taxation reduced "excessive 
individual accumulations."^ Too, in Hoover's mind, the 
people were beginning to dominate the economy through stock 
investments, thus promoting the "spirit of community respon­
sibility. "5S
Cooperation, another key factor, was evidenced within 
the business community and in public acceptance of service 
and responsibility. These qualities, if added to construe-
C  Qtive leadership, would assure progress. Yet, as Hoover 
recognized with dismay, "the Government [by 1922, had] 
become through its relations to economic life, the most 
potent force for the maintenance or destruction" of his 
American individualism.88
8 8 Ibid. Romasco, Poverty of Abundance, 12, demon­
strates H.H.'s optimism that America was virtually classless, 
that labor possessed social and economic mobility, and that 
labor and capital had achieved harmony in a "concert of 
interests."
^Hoover, Individualism. 39.
5 8 Ibid.. 40. 5 9 Ibid.. 43-47.
8 8 Ibid.. 52. Guerrant, Comparisons and Contrasts. 8 , 
notes Hoover's cautious ideas about government-business rela­
tions. To H.H., there were three options: unregulated
business or true laissez-faire, which had long been dis­
carded; government regulation of business, which was the 
"American system" and Hoover's course of action; and finally, 
government-dictated business direction or involvement. To 
H.H. the New Deal took the third road.
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Hoover admitted past mistakes, especially the concen­
tration of power in monopolies. But regulatory legislation 
had preserved equality of opportunity. Thus, he accepted 
some regulation as necessary but warned against government 
participation within the economy at the productive or 
distributive end.61 He was optimistic about progress, 
education, public opinion, business morality, and public con­
science.^ Yet, he admitted the need for certain reforms.
He condemned long work days, the uncertainty of employment, 
inequality in bargaining power, child labor, and unfair 
competition.63 He reaffirmed his belief in the inevitability 
of progress which was attained through a traditional American 
effort. ’’Progress must come from the steady lift of the 
individual.”6 ^ As he expressed it in 1922, "The failures 
and unsolved problems of economic and social life can be 
corrected: they can be solved within our social theme and
under no other system.”66
SlHoover, Individualism, 52-54. Guerrant, Comparisons 
and Contrasts, 9, 18, notes H.H.'s acceptance of limited 
regulation and his warning that the "laws of economics" were 
as "inexorable as Newton's law of gravitation." Warren,
Great Depression, 34-35, speaks of Hoover's willingness to 
regulate in order "to preserve individual competition, con­
serve natural resources, prevent abuses, and protect 
liberties.” Federal regulation should occur, however, only 
where state and local governments could no longer protect 
public interest. See Romasco, Poverty of Abundance, 13, 16.
^Hoover, Individualism, 58,
6 3Ibid., 59. 64.1bid., 60-67.
-6 5 Ibid., 71.
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Hoover's smorgasbord of ideas encompassed the tradi­
tional American values: efficiency, enterprise, opportunity,
individualism, energy, success, and progress.66 He knew 
what he believed and why. His credo was based on certain 
fundamental ideas about the nature of man. American indi­
vidualism was, to him, time tested and proven. To Hoover, 
there was a certain sacredness, even a mysticism, permeating 
it. Moreover, he rationalized the contradictions or failures 
within his system as atypical, abnormal or temporary. He 
always arrived at the same conclusion: the American system,
with its emphasis on individualism, equality of opportunity, 
freedom, and service, explained America's greatness. This 
idea of individualism became the driving force that shaped 
his course as long as he lived.
During the 1920's, as a member of the Harding cabinet, 
Hoover demonstrated the potential of his ideas. He spurred 
the Commerce Department to a course of fuller participation 
in the American economy. He advised business concerning its 
domestic and international opportunities. The federal 
government.served business by reporting on the stability, 
resources, needs, and requests of foreign g o v e r n m e n t s . ^ " ?
^Guerrant, comparisons and Contrasts, 2. Richard 
Hofstadter, The American Political Tradition (New York, 1948), 
286. Hereinafter cited as Hofstadter, American Political 
Tradition.
67Herbert Feis, The Diplomacy of the Dollar, 1919- 
1932 (Baltimore, 1950), 6-18. Joseph Brandes, Herbert Hoover 
and Economic Diplomacy, 1921-1928 (Pittsburgh, 1962), 7-15,
42. Hereinafter cited as Brandes, Economic Diplomacy.
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Hoover, seeing expansion as essential for continued pros­
perity, championed business interests. To him, each invest­
ment accelerated the opportunity for individuals to improve 
their living standards.®8
As Commerce Secretary, Hoover fostered trade associa­
tions and fair trade codes. He emphasized a maximum of 
cooperation, voluntarism, and local initiative. Although he 
endorsed the right of the federal government to umpire, 
regulate, stimulate, and even coerce, he preferred muted 
actions, by degrees, and his was a modified laissez-faire 
policy.®® His attitude was manifested in his views on unem­
ployment. Typically, in the recession of 1921-1922, he 
called a series of conferences, prodded and mobilized local 
and state agencies, urged public works, and pleaded with the 
business community to maintain, even expand, production 
levels. He thought state and local governments could 
encourage business-labor accord and minimize federal bureau­
cratization.^® The pattern that Hoover followed in 1922 was
®8William A. Williams, The Tracredv of American Diplo­
macy (Cleveland, 1959), 58-59. William A. Williams, "Latin- 
America: Laboratory of American Foreign Policy in the
Nineteen-Twenties," Inter-American Economic Affairs, II 
(1957), 3-30. Brandes, Economic Diplomacy, 65, 214-215.
See Eugene O. Golob, The "Isms”; A History and Evaluation 
(New York, 1954), 119-120. Hereinafter cited as Golob, The 
"Isms."
®®Brandes, Economic Diplomacy, 217-220; Hoover, 
American Individualism, 9-12; Warren, Great Depression. 
34-35.
7®Warren, Great Depression, 26-27; Hoover, Memoirs,
II, 46.
one he would adhere to the rest of his life.
As a dominant and active cabinet member, Hoover prac­
tically became ”a folk hero, the embodiment of the national 
values of prosperity and efficiency.'1 As in the past, he
trained his subordinates "to dramatize their activities,"
71consequently reflecting credit on their c h i e f . T h r o u g h o u t
the 1920’s, he basked in the sunshine of a friendly news
media.^ Convinced of the rightness of his ideology, and
determined to advance the nation to a "new day, 11 the
philosopher of American individualism decided to seek the
presidency. On August 2, 1927, when President Coolidge
7 *3issued his famous ”1 do not choose to run,"' the flood 
gates were opened.
^Mayer, Republicans, 402-403. See also Hofstadter, 
American Political Tradition, 291.
72claire Nelsen, "The Image of Herbert Hoover as 
Reflected in the American Press" (unpublished Doctor's disser­
tation, Stanford University, 1956)', 199, 205. Hereinafter 
cited as Nelsen, "Hoover Press Image."
73New York Times. August 3, 1927, 1.
CHAPTER IX
POLITICS AND POWER
Throughout his political career, Herbert Hoover 
encouraged the myth that he was "above politics." His heavy 
correspondence consistently reflects his sincerity in think­
ing he was apolitical. His lieutenants encouraged him in 
this belief.1 Too, his political mistakes seemed to under-^ 
line his disinterest. Much of his erroneous political judg­
ment, however, was due to the inflexibility of his ideas.
He preferred defeat to a compromise on his principles.
Although he had a natural aversion to politics, never learning 
to enjoy it, he displayed on occasions a knowledge of the 
fundamental rules and even maneuvered for political advantage.
At politics. Hoover was an anachronism: shy, sensitive
to criticism, addicted to worry, unable to admit an error, and
■^■Subsequent chapters will verify this contention. The 
Herbert Hoover Papers, Post Presidential Individual Pile, 
Herbert Hoover Presidential Library, West Branch, Iowa, 
abound in such references.
^Hicks, Republican Ascendancy, 217. Hofstadter, Ameri­
can Political Tradition, 293, describes Hoover as "a prisoner 
of his economic views [who was] handicapped by his philosophy." 
Rexford G. Tugwell, "The Protagonists: Roosevelt and Hoover,"
Antioch Review, XIII (December, 1953), 421, sees Hoover im­
mersed "in an ideology completely immune to events."
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3 . . . .• weighted by a "vein of arrogance." His political liabili­
ties would greatly affect his record as President.^ He 
would never become an astute politician, partly because he 
viewed politics as of secondary importance. Ideas molded 
his course.
One contemporary charges Hoover with nursing presi­
dential ambitions "for over a decade" before 1928.^ At 
least by 1920, his political aspirations and liabilities 
surfaced. As beneficiary of an extensive press promotion, he 
emerged from World War I as a legendary hero.^ Consequently,
^Hofstadter, American Political Tradition, 293-294; 
Moley, After 7 Years, 26; and Moos, The Republicans, 383. 
Lippmann, "The Peculiar Weakness of Mr. Hoover," 3, sees 
Hoover's distaste for "politicians and their countless accom­
modations." Too, he was indecisive, especially in contro­
versial matters. Drew Pearson, Merry-Go-Round, 57-59, 63,
70, thought that Hoover was cold, vacillating, indecisive, 
autocratic, and unforgiving.
^Davis, "Hoover: Another Appraisal," 295; William
Allen White, Selected Letters of William Allen White (New 
York, 1947), 293. White, Letters, 311-312, discusses H.H.'s 
liabilities and concludes that every President must recog­
nize politics even if it is "one of the minor branches of 
harlotry." See White, Autobiography. 634-635, and Burton K. 
Wheeler, Yankee From The West (Garden City, 1962), 275, for 
additional recognitions of Hoover's political inability. As 
Thomas A. Bailey, Presidential Greatness, 218, 317, notes,
"If a man cannot lead his party he cannot lead his people."
^George Creel, Rebel At Large (New York, 1947), 266.
^Lippmann, "The Peculiar Weakness of Mr. Hoover," 1, 
calls H.H.’s reputation a "work of art." He was over- 
publicized, over-idealized, and over-sold. As examples of 
H.H.'s press coverage, see Edward E. Hunt, "Herbert Hoover,” 
New Republic, VIII (September 30, 1916), 213-215; Editorial, 
New York World. September 2, 1919; Editorial, "Herbert 
Hoover, Master of Efficiency," Independent, LXXXIX (March 19, 
1917), 447; and Editorial, "How Hoover Will Help Win," 
Literary Digest. LIX (June 2, 1917), 1689.
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both major political parties were forced to recognize his 
a v a i l a b i l i t y A f t e r  months of indecision, he announced his 
GOP leanings and faded to favorite-son status.^ Hoover, 
desiring a cabinet post, permitted the boom to run its course 
in order to maximize his bargaining powers after the elec-
Qtion. He utilized this political maneuver time and again 
during the 1920’s and 1930's.
From his 1920 e:xperience, Hoover learned that "an 
amateur organization, led by close friends, was no match for 
the professionals." Too, he concluded that his independence 
worried party politicians.'*'® He decided to construct a base
^Louis B. Wehle, Hidden Threads of History (New York, 
1953), 81-86, discusses the support of a Hoover-Roosevelt 
ticket and the popularity of the Food Administrator within 
Democratic circles. Paul Glad, "Progressives and the Busi­
ness culture of the 1920's," Journal of American History,
LIII (June, 1966}, 75-89, says that Hoover, like most poli­
ticians, used the progressives' rhetoric and gained their 
support because "he talked like one of them." See H.H's 
Memoirs, II, 40-56.
^C. H. Cramer, Newton D. Baker (Cleveland, 1961), 213, 
notes Baker's depiction of H.H. as "a political schizophrenic" 
who barely decided which party to join.
^Warren, Great Depression, 25.
1®Davis, "Hoover: Another Appraisal," 303. French
Strother, "Herbert Hoover," World's Work. XXXIX (1920), 578, 
notes that the loyalty of Hoover's lieutenants was "almost a 
form of worship." This loyalty would be significant in the 
future. Walter E. Edge, A Jerseyman's Journal (Princeton,
1948), 121, 145, notes that H.H. represented the "independent 
voters." Alice Roosevelt Longworth, Crowded Hours (New York,
1933), 306, 377, recalls that "no big league politician" 
supported him because of his irregularity and his League 
views. Theodore Burton, an Ohio Republican leader, admired 
H.H. because of his apolitical stance. Forrest Crissey, 
Theodore E. Burton: American Statesman (Cleveland, 1956), 325.
Warren, Great Depression, 25, 256, points to the opposition of 
Watson, Fess, and other Old Guard politicians.
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in the center of the party for his future operations . ̂  As 
one veteran observer recalls, "it was probably not chance 
that placed so many enthusiastic backers in the gallery" in 
1920.12
"Unlike most defeated candidates, [Hoover] revived
his political availability by serving in the Harding and
13Coolidge cabinets." He continued to enjoy a popular 
p r e s s . A s i d e  from his activist role as Secretary of Com­
merce, Hoover gained invaluable publicity through the efforts 
of George Akerson, an astute political reporter who served as 
his private secretary. Akerson embellished the Hoover image 
and aided in the construction of a personal machine. In 
this latter effort, Walter F. Brown, "the former Toledo
political boss" and Bull Mooser, who served under Hoover in
1 Rthe Commerce Department, emerged as a permanent ally.
With President Coolidge's August statement, the
■^Davis, "Hoover: Another Appraisal," 306-307, empha­
sizes H.H.’s middle position. Warren, Great Depression, viii, 
labels H.H. a "terrapin Progressive" who was "too progressive 
for the conservatives and too conservative for the radicals.” 
For similar conclusions, see Moos, Republicans. 382, and 
David Burner, The Politics of Provincialism (New York, 1967), 
193-197.
-^Warren, Great Depression, 25.
James W. Davis, Presidential Primaries (New York, 
1967), 100-101. For Hoover's maneuvers to gain a cabinet 
post, see Shannon, Between the Wars, 34-38; Selig Adler, The 
Uncertain Giant (New York, 1965), 48; Murray, The Harding 
Era, 98-99; and H.H., himself, in Memoirs, II, 36.
l^Nelsen, "Hoover Press Image," 199-205.
-*■ ̂ Warren, Great Depression, 31.
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coterie of Hoover disciples burst into public activity.
Brown and Theodore Burton of Ohio, Ogden Mills, Edgar Rickard,
and Alan Fox of New York, and Mark Requa of California
mobilized Hoover forces at the state level. ^  Professionals
like Colonel R. G. Creager of Texas, as well as Perry Howard,
the Negro boss in Mississippi, and national committeeman Ben
J. Davis of Georgia, all played key roles. C. Bascom Slemp
of Virginia, a onetime Coolidge secretary brought blocs of
17Southern delegates into the Hoover camp. Although Old 
Guard leaders attempted to impede the Hoover drive, it was
l^Hoover, Memoirs, IX, 191. With the exception of 
Burton, all these war-relief associates remained close to 
their Chief throughout their lives.
•^Moos, The Republicans, 370-371; Mayer, The Repub­
licans. 404. Hoover's Southern strategy attempted to soft- 
pedal his Negro support and win the endorsement of Democratic 
dissidents who resented Al Smith's urban, "wet,” and Catholic 
associations. Paul Lewinson, Race, Class and Party (New 
York, 1932), 154-175, credits Hoover with objectively work­
ing both sides of the street. Hoover, as a moderate, urged 
a lowering of white primary restrictions and fully recog­
nized the "black and tan" organizations in dispensing 
patronage. Yet, not content with Negro support alone, he 
tried to broaden the base of the Dixie GOP. William E. 
Leuchtenburg, Franklin p. Roosevelt And The New Deal, 1932- 
1940 (New York, 1963), 185, points to H.H.'s popularity with 
Negro voters and his maintenance of their support even in 
1932. Ernest M. Collins, "Cincinnati Negroes and Presiden­
tial Politics," Journal of Negro History. XLI (April, 1956), 
132-133, shows that H.H.'s totals in Negro districts swelled 
to a record high of seventy-one per cent in 193 2. See 
Elbert Lee Tatum, The Changed Political Thought of the Negro, 
1915-1940 (New York, 1951), 101-104. Other observers have 
castigated Hoover's 1928 strategy because it sacrificed the 
Negro on the political altar. Viorst, Puritan Ethic. 164- 
166; Schlesinger, Old Order, 427; and Richard L. Watson, Jr., 
"The Defeat of Judge Parker: A Study in Pressure Groups and
Politics." MVHR. L (September, 1963), 213-234.
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too late.18
In spite of the leaders' qualms over Hoover's politi­
cal abilities, he adroitly played their game as evidenced by 
his belated endorsement from Pennsylvania's "Boss" Vare and 
Treasury Secretary Andrew Mellon.1^ Too, Hoover tried to 
entice George Norris of Nebraska into the vice-presidential 
spot. When the liberal wing failed to rally around Hoover, 
he turned to the conservative Senate cabal and selected 
Charles Curtis of Kansas as his running mate.^8 Hoover's 
selection of Hubert Work as National Chairman demonstrated 
his intention to lead the Party.^1
In his 1928 campaign, Hoover held to the center of 
the political spectrum. It was "neither progressive, nor
l^Mayer, The Republicans, 402, 414; Moos, The Repub­
licans , 382; and Degler, "Ordeal of Hoover," 580.
•L^Hicks, Republican Ascendancy, 201. Although H. L. 
Mencken, Making A President (New York, 1932), 23-25, exag­
gerates H.H.'s political ability, he underlines the can­
didate's success in corralling the Negro vote, the support 
of the Ohio Gang, the Anti-Saloon League, and the Mellon and 
Vare machines. For Vare's role, see William S. Vare, My 
Forty Years in Politics (Philadelphia, 1933), 184-186, and 
Morton Keller, In Defense of Yesterday (New York, 1958), 
123-135, 200. Thomas L. Stokes, Chip Off My Shoulder 
(Princeton, 1940), 224, 291, sees Mellon’s endorsement of 
H. H. as the turning point. Stokes describes H.H. as a 
"poor politician" who "swept vainly against the tide. The 
smart politician rides with it." Hereinafter cited as 
Stokes, Chip Off My Shoulder.
9f)Roy V. Peel and Thomas C. Donnelly, The 1928 Cam­
paign (New York, 1931), 21-30. Hereinafter cited as Peel 
and Donnelly, 1928 Campaign.
^Moos, The Republicans, 373-374. Work, the Secre­
tary of Interior, was a minor figure even in Coolidge's 
undistinguished cabinet.
28
n pconservative."^  Although Hoover's campaign included the 
usual chicanery and ambivalence, at times he revealed a sur­
prising candor concerning his beliefs and intentions. His 
"New Day" addresses promised constructive legislation on the 
tariff, agriculture, conservation, and public works. Sig­
nificantly, he reaffirmed his devotion to "American Individ­
ualism."23
On June 14, 1928, at the Republican National Conven­
tion, Hoover spoke optimistically of the future. He called 
for moral leadership. Regarding the role of government he 
said: "[It] is more than administration; it is power for
leadership and cooperation with the forces of business and 
cultural life m  the city, town, and countryside." ^ He saw 
the Presidency as "the inspiring symbol of all that is 
highest in America's purposes and ideals.”25
In a most revealing speech at West Branch, Iowa, the 
Republican nominee said: "We must accept what is inevitable
in the changes that have taken place. It is fortunate indeed 
that the principles upon which our government was founded 
require no alteration to meet these changes."25 Despite this
^Edgar E. Robinson, The Roosevelt leadership, 1933- 
1945 (Philadelphia, 1955), 36-37. See Glad, "Progressives 
and the Business Culture of the 1920's," 87-89.
^^Warren, Great Depression, 43; Robinson, Roosevelt 
Leadership, 36-37, 53-54; and Herbert Hoover, The New Day 
(Stanford, 1928).
24 Ibid.. 3, 5. !̂5ibid., 43.
25Hoover, New Day, 50-51.
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notion. Hoover was not entirely inflexible. He saw pros­
perity and employment as national concerns "which government 
may contribute to solve."^  por a decade, he had championed 
efficiency and economy as means to higher living standards.
He sincerely believed that his program steered a middle
28course between business and labor.
Hoover expected national progress to be attained "by 
voluntary action assisted with co-operation by the govern­
ment." The test of the American system was "its capacity to 
cure its own a b u s e s . H o o v e r  recognized the existence of 
abuses and the need for reform in his repeated warnings of 
future centralization, government competition with business, 
bureaucratic excesses, regulation, and challenges to the 
American system.^0
2 ?Ibid., 64, 182-183. Hoover thought that the govern­
ment could legitimately promote public works, public educa­
tion, and assist in the fulfillment of general economic 
goals. He doggedly stuck to these areas during the depres­
sion .
2 ^Ibid., 77-81. On page twenty-six of his acceptance 
speech, H.H. praised labor as a "staunch supporter of Ameri­
can individualism and American institutions." Labor had 
"steadfastly opposed subversive doctrines from abroad.”
^ % e w  York Times, October 7, 1928, 1. Even the 
depression did not alter H.H.'s belief in this principle.
3 0Hoover, New Day, 155-157, 161, 167, 171-178. H.H. 
said that proposals "in the winds" would lead to "state 
socialism" with its ensuing economic intervention, marked by 
fixed prices, regulated purchases and sales, and the loss of 
"equality of opportunity." He warned that an expanding 
bureaucracy would "comprise a political machine at the dis­
posal of the party" in power. He also expressed fear that 
legislatures might delegate too much power to the executive 
branches.
During the 1928 campaign, Hoover enunciated firmly 
held convictions regarding the relation of international 
economies and social systems to continued prosperity at 
home.31 He said: ’’Government co-operation in promoting
foreign trade is even more important for the future than it 
has been for the past.”32 He defined the relation of Ameri­
can prosperity to international good times and, characteris­
tically, stated that both were "due to the hard-working 
character and increasing efficiency of our people, and to 
sound government policies."33
By the close of the campaign, Hoover's inherent opti­
mism was shining brightly'as he spoke of a golden land of 
opportunity, a country "where [men] enjoy the advantages of 
wealth, not concentrated in the hands of the few but spread 
through the lives of all,” a land where people, "free from 
poverty and fear, have the leisure and impulse to seek a 
fuller life.”34 In urging national harmony, he stated, "We 
are a nation of progressives; we differ as to what is the 
road to progress." Only time revealed the degree of
3iibid., 125 ff. Hoover adopted the international 
line at Boston, on October 15, 1928. Throughout the 1930’s 
he would define the depression as global.
3 2 Ibid. 33Ibid., 126, 139.
3^Hoover, Hew Day. 176. See Robinson, Roosevelt 
Leadership, 36-37, 47.
35noover, New Day, 213. See New York Times, November 
5, 1928, 1.
31
difference dividing the nation in its selection of a means 
to progress.
Although Hoover had revealed much in his 1928 campaign,
he had also concealed certain views. He showed political
adroitness in skirting the prohibition issue. Partly, this
was due to the fact that "his public utterances were in sharp
contrast to strong opinions that he held and expressed in
private."3® He was a reluctant "dry" and although he labeled
prohibition a "noble experiment," at least in private, he
17doubted the effort to legislate morality. ' His public 
stance won him the support of Progressive Senators William 
E. Borah of Idaho and Smith Brookhart of Iowa.3® Undoubtedly, 
Hoover's equivocation expanded his November victory margin.3® 
Although religion influenced many voters in 1928, it 
did not determine the final verdict. Smith's Catholicism 
even proved an asset in some urban a r e a s . T h e  main issues
3 ®Davis, "Hoover: Another Appraisal," 301.
3^Warren, Great Depression, 45-46. For Hoover1s public 
expressions see his New Day, 29, 104.
38warren, Great Depression, 43.
3®William F. Ogburn and Nell S. Talbot, "A Measurement 
of the Factors in the Presidential Election of 1928," Social 
Forces, VIII (December, 1929), 175-183.
^Richard A. Watson, "Religion and Politics in Mid- 
America: Presidential Voting in Missouri, 1928 and I960,”
Midcontinent-American Studies Journal, V (Spring, 1964), 33- 
55. Watson denies the alleged significance of religion in 
the 1928 campaign and proves that religion even helped Smith 
in some areas. The Happy Warrior gained 16 per cent in St. 
Louis and ran better than his two predecessors, even carrying
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were Hooverism and prosperity. The majority of the country 
was Republican in the 1920's, and a dry, rural, dynamic 
Protestant Democrat could not have defeated Hoover in 1928.
To millions of voters, Hoover was the symbol of a new 
economic opportunity. He encouraged this false notion and 
momentarily capitalized on it as he crushed Smith by a popular 
vote of 21,385,413 to 14,980,778. The electoral vote was 444 
to eighty-seven.^-*- The election concluded. Hoover prepared 
to implement the program he had outlined in his campaign.
In the months ahead his principles would be severely tested.
In his inaugural address, Hoover reiterated his
fundamentalist, supposed anti-Catholic rural Missouri. V. 0. 
Key, Southern Politics {New York, 1949), 318-329, found that 
in heavy black areas, Democrats stayed with Smith, and Key 
suggests it was from traditional fear of Republicans and 
their racial views. Paul A. Carter, "The Other Catholic 
Candidate: The 1928 Presidential Bid of Thomas J. Walsh,"
Pacific Northwest Quarterly, LV (January, 1964), 1-8, denies 
the importance of the religious issue by showing that many 
Democrats who opposed Smith favored Catholic Tom Walsh for 
the nomination. Carter concludes that Smith's ties with the 
city and his "wet" stance alienated many Democrats.
41-Elmer Davis, "Hoover the Medicine Man," Forum 
(October, 1930), 198, says that H.H. won "for the same reason 
that would have led Americans under the age of ten to elect 
Santa Claus." Samuel Lubell, Revolt of the Moderates (New 
York, 1956), 34-35, 40-41, 50, 130, 169, 212; Peel and 
Donnelly, Campaicm of 1932. 71, 121-124, review the 1928 
issues; Richard Hofstadter, "Could a Protestant Have Beaten 
Hoover in 1928?" The Reporter (March 17, 1960), 31-33, says 
that religion worked both ways. To Hofstadter, the fact that 
Smith outgained H.H. by a million votes minimizes the impor­
tance of the religious issue. Burner, Politics of Provin­
cialism. 193-197, notes that H.H. hogged the middle of the 
road. GOP business policy assured conservative support, 
while H.H. appealed to progressives as noted in his public 
endorsement by forty-five of the nation's best-known sixty- 
six social workers.
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determination to maintain the American system, to economize 
on public expenditures, to reorganize executive agencies, to 
broaden public works, and to promote equality of opportunity. 
He indicated that his administration would seek a middle 
path responsive to all economic interests, controlled by
none.^2
Hoover's honeymoon as President was short. Six months 
after he assumed the presidency, the stock market crashed, 
and soon thereafter, business stagnated and unemployment 
lines elongated. The Great Depression was a new problem in 
its complexity, its depth, its duration. The poverty it 
evoked was also new. J The times demanded an aggressive, 
practical politician, whereas Hoover was a cautious, ideal­
istic, political neophyte. His disdain for politics, 
politicians, and the political traditions surfaced at the 
very moment he needed the support of his congressional and 
party leaders. He not only refused to recognize the basic 
political amenities, he insisted on drafting detailed depres­
sion policies and then submitting them to Congress without 
even elucidating his own congressional leaders.^ Possibly
4 2 Concf. Rec., 71 Cong., Spec. Sess. (March 4, 1929),
4-7.
4.3Romasco, Poverty of Abundance, 3. Harris G.
Warren's Herbert Hoover And The Great Depression is the best 
study on Hoover's depression policies.
^Hargrove, Presidential Leadership, 98-116. Har­
grove's is a superb analysis of H.H.'s executive assets and 
liabilities. See Viorst, Puritan Ethic, 165-170; Warren,
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his professional training, his years in war relief activi­
ties, and his power as Commerce Secretary had accustomed him 
to handing down orders.
Although his ideological framework severely limited 
his actions, Hoover pursued what at times must he called an 
activist policy.^ His legislative proposals invariably 
emphasized "voluntary compliance rather than government 
coercion" and involved state and local direction.^ He not 
only offended Congress, he also alienated the press. Since 
he deeply resented criticism, he played favorites among the 
reporters and on occasions tried to muzzle various topics. 
His efforts to minimize the depression were carried to an 
extreme and stirred serious doubts concerning his program. 
His failure to mold public opinion proved to be his most
Great Depression, 60-62, notes the GOP division in Congress 
and H.H.'s failure to recognize the threat the insurgents 
posed for his political control; Dixon Wecter, The Age of the 
Great Depression, 1929-1941 {New York, 1948), 40-45, notes 
that H.H. lacked "political comaraderie, communicable per­
sonal warmth [or] thrilling leadership." As Hargrove, Presi­
dential Leadership, 107-108, says, H.H. refused "to employ a 
strategy of manipulative leadership in Congress" because such 
action conflicted with his values.
^Hargrove, Presidential Leadership, 98.
4^Ibid.. 100-101. See Warren, Great Depression, 53, 
114; Victor L. Albjerg, "Hoover: The Presidency in Transi­
tion," Current History, XXXIX (October, 1960), 213-219, sees 
H.H. as gradually moving toward an activist role, expanding 
federal power and assuming responsibility for solving the 
depression. To Albjerg, Hoover was "the last of the old- 
type chief executives, and the first of the new."
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4.7serious mistake.
Even when Hoover found positive solutions to the 
nation's problems, the necessity of political action or an 
infringement on his ideology would result in an impasse. A 
typical example was his Research Committee on Social Trends. 
As the epitome of his convictions and experience, this group 
of distinguished economists, sociologists, psychologists, 
and political scientists met as a committee, exchanged a 
magnitude of information, exhibited a cooperative spirit, 
related facts, and proposed a variety of reforms in their 
monumental Recent Social Trends of the United States. As 
their reforms relied on a forceful federal implementation 
and would necessitate political action, Hoover neglected to
AO.capitalize on thexr efforts. °
In a series of conferences, Hoover called on the 
nation's economic leaders, its agricultural experts, and its 
policy advisers. Despite his energy and his sincerity, his 
insistence that all agreements and programs be cemented by a
^Hargrove, Presidential Leadership. 103-107. To 
Hargrove, H.H.'s inability to dramatize his efforts led to 
an inevitable conclusion that he was doing nothing. He 
failed to elicit either party or public loyalty because he 
spoke of facts and figures and ignored the emotional or 
personal side of the public.
^Barry D. Karl, "Presidential Planning and Social 
Science Research: Mr. Hoover's Experts," Perspectives in
American History, III (1969), 347-409.
*
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voluntary cooperation and self-regulation assured defeat. ^  
Hoover’s inflexibility and ideological imprisonment 
were repeatedly reflected in his policies. Since he viewed 
the farmer as an individualist who could control his own 
destiny with a minimum of federal assistance, Hoover's Agri­
cultural Marketing Act of 1929 established a Federal Farm 
Board with limited powers, dependent on the voluntary coop­
eration of individual farmers. The Board could purchase 
surpluses thus stabilizing prices during abnormal periods. 
The fallacy was evident when surpluses continued to mount 
and prices continued to fall.
^Hargrove, Presidential Leadership, 111-112, 115.
As Degler, ’’Hoover Ordeal," 566, 573-575, points out, H.H. 
was acting positively in pressing business-labor leaders to 
freeze wages, prices, and jobs at existing levels. The 
voluntary codes served as blueprints for the NRA. On this 
latter point, see Wecter, Great Depression, 55; Hargrove, 
Presidential Leadership, 112; and Walter Lippmann, "The 
Permanent New Deal," Yale Review, XXXV (June, 1935), 649- 
667. Also see Hofstadter, American Political Tradition,
301; Warren, Great Depression. 118-119; and Paul Conkin, The 
New Deal (New York, 1967), 28.
SOQuerrant, Comparisons and Contrasts. 32-37; Warren, 
Great Depression. 168-172; Wilbur and Hyde, Hoover Policies. 
154-157, 167, 182-187; Hargrove, Presidential Leadership. 
109-110; Hofstadter, American Political Tradition, 305-306. 
Fusfeld, Origins of The New Deal, 225, and John D. Hicks and 
Theodore Saloutos, Agricultural Discontent in the Middle 
West. 1900-1939 (Madison, 1951), 452, 556-557, conclude that 
H.H. 's farm program furnished the base for the New Deal 
agricultural program. Hoover himself, in State Papers. I,
34, reaffirmed the importance of methods in seeking recovery. 
He said that bureaucratic domination of farmers would be a 
disaster and that voluntarism was a necessity. He never 
accepted the idea of regulation. See James H. Shideler, 
"Herbert Hoover and the Federal Farm Board Project, " MVHR. 
XLII (Fall, 1956), 710-729. For the rest of his life, H.H. 
never deviated from his belief that agriculture was basically 
sound.
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Hoover's political liabilities surfaced in the fight 
to revise the tariff. He split his party ranks, lost con­
trol of his Congressional majority, and then fell silent at 
the crucial moment. The Hawley-Smoot Tariff Act of June 15, 
1930, a most controversial bill, reflected a selfish nation­
alism in raising duties on limitless items and negating 
international trade to an extent that other countries 
followed suit.^ The President ignored the pleas for a veto 
and signed the bill.5  ̂ Newspapers began to talk of a "weak 
and indecisive" President.
In an effort to expand credit, Hoover approved the 
establishment of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation to 
loan money to banks, railroads, and insurance companies. In 
his mind, the RFC's aim was assistance, not substitution, 
for private enterprise. Too, the program was consistent 
with his philosophy, for the loans were to be repaid and it 
was assumed they would lubricate the economy through increased
i
___________________
^^-Hargrove, Presidential Leadership, 109-110, ana 
Walter Lippmann, "The Peculiar Weakness of Mr. Hoover," 3, 
agree that the President was at his worst on the tariff 
fight and that he allowed the Old Guard to outmaneuver him. 
Also see George E. Mowry, "The Uses of History by Recent 
Presidents," MVHR. LII (June, 1966), 8-9; Warren, Great 
Depression, 84-97; Wilbur and Hyde, Hoover Policies, 167, 
182-187; and Thomas A. Bailey, Presidential Greatness (New 
York, 1966), 142, 152.
52jjargrove, Presidential Leadership. 110; Warren,
Great Depression, 88-91.
5^Hargrove, Presidential Leadership, 110.
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works projects, home loans, and agricultural credits.^ The 
President also insisted on a reduction in government expen-
c cses and a new effort to balance the budget. 3 Although 
Hoover recommended tax increases and a manufacturing tax. 
Congressional amendments negated his plan.^ Reluctantly, 
the President stretched his ideology to the point of
57approving federal loans to the states for relief purposes.
As federal plans began to transgress the invisible lines of 
state and local powers, even on a temporary basis, Hoover 
reached the end of his string. Although he had promised 
"the aid of every resource of the Federal Government" should
5%)egler, "Hoover Ordeal," 558-573, 582. Degler notes 
the influence of the War Finance Corporation of World War X 
in the creation of the RFC. It should be pointed out that 
Hoover saw even the RFC as a temporary establishment which 
would pass from the scene with the termination of the 
depression. As Hofstadter, Political Tradition, 303, and 
Golob, The "Isms, " 122, note, H.H. expected the RFC to 
facilitate business recovery, but on its own initiative.
The best analysis of the "trickle-down" theory is found in 
Warren, Great Depression, 34-37, 67-71, 143-147, 155-158.
Two observers thought the RFC marked the beginning of the 
New Deal. Davis, "Hoover: Another Appraisal," 309, and an
article, "New Deal's Seeds," Literary Digest, CXVII (June 23,
1934), 12. On the RFC, see Eugene Meyer, "From Laissez 
Faire With William Graham Sumner to the RFC," Public Policy,
V (1954), 3-27, and Gerald Nash, "Herbert Hoover And The 
Origins of the RFC," MVHR, XLVI (December, 1959), 455, 468. 
Both observers conclude that H.H. reluctantly agreed to the 
creation of the RFC.
^5Degler, "Hoover Ordeal," 568-569, 582.
5£»Ibid., 573; Warren, Great Depression, 158-162.
^ T h e  Emergency Relief and Construction Act of 1932 
created a fund of $300,000,000 which the RFC loaned to the 
states to relieve the unemployed. Degler, "Hoover Ordeal," 
571-572; Warren, Great Depression, 141-147, 206-207.
the emergency necessitate it, he expressed confidence that 
such a day would never come.^  In Hoover's mind, it never 
did.
In the field of labor, Hoover spoke of individuals 
searching for their own destiny. He bitterly opposed "closed 
shops" and reluctantly signed the Norris-LaGuardia Act of 
1932 which outlawed yellow-dog contracts and curtailed the 
power of the courts to issue injunctions in labor disputes. 
Yet, he defended the necessity and right to unionize. He 
hoped for a cooperative and classless labor spirit and 
praised unions for stabilizing "our institutions in their 
fight against red radicalism.
On the positive side. Hoover repeatedly demonstrated 
his administrative skills. His federal court appointments 
were commendable. He effected a thorough reorganization
^®Wilbur and Hyde, Hoover Policies. 376. Concerning 
H.H.'s fear of destroying individual initiative, emasculating 
state and local agencies, and politics in relief, see 
Guerrant, Comparisons and contrasts, 20-24; Degler, "Hoover 
Ordeal," 573-575; Wilbur and Hyde, Hoover Policies. 375; and 
Hofstadter, Political Tradition, 307.
S^Guerrant, comparisons and Contrasts. 60-64. See 
Wilbur and Hyde, Hoover Policies. 118, 121, and Milton 
Derber (ed.), Labor and the Mew Deal (Madison, 1957), 182- 
183, for varying evaluations of H.H.'s labor policy. Degler, 
"Hoover Ordeal," 565, 575, concludes that the New Deal did 
not better H.H.'s record since unemployment remained around 
ten million while production levels of 1939 were even lower 
than in 1929.
^Hargrove, Presidential Leadership. 115. Arthur B. 
Tourtellot, An Anatomy of American Politics (New York, 1950), 
140. H.H. appointed Charles Evans Hughes, Benjamin Cordozo, 
and Owen Roberts to the Supreme Court.
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of the White House secretariat.^ He elicited cooperative 
action by the economic and political elite during the 1930 
drought in the Southwest.^ president, Hoover promoted
an international moratorium on war debts. In a rare moment, 
he obtained Congressional approval of his plan.®^ He scored 
victories in his conservation policy and his record-breaking 
public works programs. Yet, he refused to move beyond cer­
tain boundaries.^
More and more, he came to play a negative role through 
his vetoes, his inflexible opposition to direct relief, and 
his vehement denunciation of public power and social 
security.^ As his pique at Congressional insubordination
61-Hargrove, Presidential Leadership, 114-115.
62ibid.
^%arren, Great Depression, 131-136; Wilbur and Hyde, 
Hoover Policies, 408-410; Davis, "Hoover: Another Appraisal,”
315-316. As an internationalist in his economic thinking,
H.H. saw the complexity and interdependency of war debts, 
credits, bond issues, and other economic ties. The mora­
torium was to last for one year, July, 1931, to July, 1932. 
Congress refused to consider cancellation. Warren, Great 
Depression, 132-136.
64on conservation, see Franklin L. Burdette (ed.), 
Readings For Republicans (New York, 1960), 177; Warren, Great 
Depression. 63-65; Hicks, Republican Ascendancy, 216; and 
Noggle, Teapot Dome, 209-210. In Origins of the New Deal,
225, Daniel Fusfeld sees H.H. breaking with his philosophy 
in pushing the federal government's involvement in conserva­
tion. In public works projects, Hoover spent over two 
billion dollars and secured employment for a million men. 
Warren, Great Depression, 66-67, and Degler, "Hoover Ordeal," 
566-567.
^Romasco, poverty of Abundance, 231-232, 229.
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accelerated, he pulled the most unpardonable faux pas and 
accused Congress of irresponsibility.8 8 with a careless 
disregard for restraint, he attempted to create a psychology 
of confidence at the worst possible moment during the depres­
sion.^^ Once he lost the public, his admonitions that the 
nation's greatest problem was fear passed unheard.8 8 Time 
was running out.
Bonus Expeditionary Force veterans of World War I 
marched on Washington in the summer of 1932. Accompanied by 
their families and unemployed dissidents, the veterans poured 
into the capital city and insisted on the long-promised 
bonus payments. When Congress refused, some stragglers 
settled in the slummish Anacostia Flats. Fearful of the 
security risk, Hoover decided to remove the temporary resi­
dents and sent in federal troops to implement his plan. The 
army was over-zealous in its task and violence occurred. As 
Hoover feared, the incident with its political overtones left
88Hargrove, Presidential Leadership, 111.
8 ^Davis, "Hoover: Another Appraisal, " 301. Davis
notes that H.H.'s "public utterances were in sharp contrast 
to strong opinions that he held and esqpressed in private." 
Warren, Great Depression, 114, agrees.
88Warren, Great Depression, 114; Degler, "Hoover 
Ordeal," 575, 589; Hofstadter, Political Tradition, 301.
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a decided bitterness in the minds of many voters.
Although Hoover's attitudes on public power and
social security conformed to his ideology, they did not
increase his political appeal. Moreover, his insinuations
concerning the patriotism of his opponents added no lustre
to his own image. In vetoing the Muscle Shoals Bill, he
called it "the negation of the ideals on opportunity upon
70 «which our civilization has been b a s e d . " A s  to social 
security, there were "no short cuts." This individual matter 
must be resolved "upon a cult of work, not a cult of
6^a recent study of the Bonus Army episode and its 
political significance, based on manuscript materials, 
holds General Douglas MacArthur responsible for the initial 
blunder but points to H.H.'s political insensibility as the 
cause for the enlargement and detonation of the situation. 
Donald J. Lisio, "A Blunder Becomes Catastrophe: Hoover,
the Legion, and the Bonus Army," Wisconsin Magazine of His­
tory, LI (Autumn, 1967) , 37-50. See Warren, Great Depres­
sion, 227-236; Schlesinger, Old Order, 257-267; Hoover, 
Memoirs, III, 225-232. Douglas MacArthur, Reminiscences 
(New York, 1964), 94-97, defends the BEF expulsion, whereas 
Paul Y. Anderson bitterly denounces the President in "Tear 
Gas, Bayonets, and Votes," Nation, CXXXV (August 17, 1932), 
138-139; "Wanted: Strong Men and Radical Measures," Nation.
CXXXVI (March 15, 1933), 386-387? and "The End of Herbert 
Hoover," Nation, CXKXV (November 16, 1932), 470-471.
7°Wilbur and Hyde, Hoover Policies, 317; Davis, 
"Hoover: Another Appraisal," 309; Warren, Great Depression.
72-83. H.H. continually opposed government competition with 
business in the area of public power. The most critical 
contemporary article on "Hoover and Power," Nation, CXXXIII 
(August 12, 1931), 151-152, by Amos Pinchot, holds the 
President with encouraging exploitation of public power 
resources.
l e i s u r e . T h e  President had exhausted every traditional 
method of checking the slump. By failing in so many areas, 
by proving the inadequacy of his voluntarism and individ­
ualism, he had prepared the way for a New Deal.*^ For months 
ideas and images, rather than realities, had shaped his 
thought and action.
Hoover alienated his party and the public. Aware of 
the President's handicaps, professional politicians exhibited 
"low morale, if not mutiny."^ Only a small clique prepared
1Ato defend him. Notwithstanding, the President's forces 
controlled the Republican Convention which convened in 
Chicago in June, 1932. Senator Simeon Fess of Ohio was the 
Convention Chairman. Senator Lester Dickinson of Iowa was
^Hoover, Memoirs, II, 312-319; Guerrant, Comparisons 
and Contrasts, 80-82. Although Hoover continued to see 
social security as an individual matter, his Research Com­
mittee on Social Trends outlined most of the 1935 Social 
Security Act. Warren, Great Depression, 168.
^ R o m a s c o ,  poverty of Abundance, 229-231-232. Golob, 
The "Isms, 11 122, says Hoover was a trail blazer for the New 
Deal.
^Frank Freidel, Franklin D. Roosevelt: The Triumph
(Boston, 1956), 323-325. See Hargrove, Presidential Leader­
ship, 115-117.
74lbid. f 365. See Henry L. Stimson, On Active Service 
In Peace and War {New York, 1948), 284-285; Ogden Mills, "In 
Defense of Hoover Policies, 11 Review of Reviews, LXXXVI 
(August, 1932), 39-40; Vernon Kellogg, "The President As I 
Know Him," Atlantic Monthly, CL (July, 1932), 1-12; and Mark 
Sullivan, "The Case for the Administration," Fortune, VI 
(July, 1932), 34-39, 83-84, 8 6 -8 8 . One observer concludes 
that the professionals wanted Hoover to serve as scapegoat 
while they gained control of party machinery. Walter Lipp- 
mann, Interpretations, 1931-1932 (New York, 1932), 290.
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the keynoter. Mark Requa, Harrison Spangler, Assistant 
Secretary of the Navy Ernest Jahncke, and Colonel R. G. 
Creager, all Hooverites, dominated the National Committee. 
Finally, six cabinet members, including Postmaster General 
Walter F. Brown, accentuated the Hoover tone of the conven­
tion. They readily renominated the President. ^ 5
Although Hoover had hoped to ignore the campaign, the 
results of the September election in Maine awakened him to 
his precarious position.^ Thereafter, he not only defended
his record but launched an aggressive effort to point up the
7 7vacillations of his opponent.''
The 1932 campaign was unusually vituperative. Both 
parties and both candidates exercised little restraint in 
their personal attacks. Roosevelt stigmatized the Presi­
dent's record as "The Four Horseman— Destruction, Delay,
Deceit and Despair."^® He accused Hoover of being "indeci-
7 9sive, incompetent, and lacking in leadership." In his most
7 5Twentieth Republican National Convention (New York, 
1932), 7, 18-20, 226, 327. For Hoover1 s acceptance speech see 
pp. 247-263. H. L. Mencken, Making A President, 45-48, says 
Larry Richey guarded the convention for H.H., while Dickinson, 
the Iowa keynoter, "an old-time political hack of the cow 
state model, " howled "his canned speech in a loud and hearty 
manner."
76preidel, FDR. The Triumph, 325, 365. H.H. informed 
Stimson that the GOP would lose every state west of the 
Alleghenies. Stimson, On Active Service, 284-285.
^Warren, Great Depression. 256.
7®Samuel I. Rosenman (ed.), Public Papers and Addresses 
of Franklin D. Roosevelt (New York, 1938), I, 831.
79warren, Great Depression, 260.
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ironic speech, FDR denounced Hoover's "novel, radical and 
unorthodox economic theories" and promised to reduce federal 
expenditures by twenty-five per cent if he were elected. He 
dubbed Hoover's policies as "the most reckless and extrava­
gant . . .  of any peacetime Government, anywhere, any 
time.
Hoover, remembering his uncle's sagacious advice, had 
turned the other cheek and now determined to give as good as 
he would receive. By September his bitterness surfaced when 
he denounced the opposition for advocating "a social philos-
Q]ophy different from the traditional o n e . H e  called FDR 
"a chameleon on plaid" and publicly questioned the nominee's 
p a t r i o t i s m . F o l l o w i n g  his example, Republican orators 
said that the "new deal" was a "shuffle," a deal "from the
Q Obottom of the deck," and so many "stacked cards." Both 
candidates would well remember this campaign.
Despite Hoover's warning that the contest was one 
"between two philosophies of government" and that his defeat 
would lead to the destruction of "the very foundations of
^Rosenman (ed.), FDR Papers, I, 795-812. H.H.’s 
pique accelerated at the zealous character assassination by 
Charley Michelson's well-oiled propaganda machine. Irwin, 
Propaganda And The News (New York, 1936), 290-300? Allen, 
Since Yesterday, 31.
^Burns, Lion and Fox, 139-145.
S^Moley, After 7 Years. 64.
8 ^Ibid.; peel and Donnelly, 1932 Campaign, 147-148; 
Don Lohbeck, Patrick J. Hurley (Chicago, 1956), 127, 133, 
136.
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84our American system,,10̂  the voters were more impressed by
their meager pay checks, the soup kitchens, and bread lines;
they yearned for change.88 To them, Hoover symbolized the
depression, its incongruity, its confusion.8 8 rejection
was decisive. Only six states with fifty-nine electoral
votes sustained the incumbent President. He polled 15,759,930
popular votes to FDR's 22,815,539. The Democrats gained
87control of both houses of Congress. In his congratulatory 
telegram to Roosevelt, the President promised "every
QDpossible helpful effort." The Interregnum had begun.
The battle scars of the campaign were deep and open.
84uew York Times, November 1, 1932. See Fusfeld, 
Origins of the New Deal, 249-250. To H.H., the election 
would determine the direction of American society for "over 
a century to come." Hoover, Memoirs, III, 343.
85Elmer Davis, "Hoover and Hubris," New Republic, 
LXXIII (November 16, 1934), 7-9; Wecter, Great Depression,
51. See Walter Lippmann, "A Reckoning: Twelve Years of
Republican Rule," Yale Review, XXI (Summer, 1932), 647-660.
As Peel and Donnelly, 1932 Campaign, 122, 179, note, anyone 
could have beaten H.H.
86 Burns, Lion and Fox, 144; Louis Adamic, My America, 
1928-1938 (New York, 1932), 304.
8^New York Times. November 9-10, 1932, 1. E. Francis 
Brown, "Roosevelt's Victorious Campaign," Current History. 
XXXVII (December, 1932), 257-265; Peel and Donnelly, 1932 
Campaign, 215-225; Samuel Lubell, Future of American Politics 
(New York, 1951), 34-35, 42-43, 49-51, 169-170, 176, 212. 
Samuel J. Eldersveld, "The Influence of Metropolitan Party 
Pluralities in Presidential Elections Since 1920," Political 
Science Review, XLIII (December, 1949), 1189-1206. Accord­
ing to Eldersveld, metropolitan pluralities were the 
decisive factor in 1932 and thereafter. Also see James M. 
Cox, Journey Through My Years (New York, 1946), 340-341.
S^New York Times, November 9, 1932, 1.
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Yet, the President pressed Roosevelt for a conference.
Whether motivated by personal, political, or nationalistic 
reasons, the two men met and discussed the nation's prob­
lems. After gaining no satisfaction from the President­
elect, Hoover submitted his own program to Congress in 
December. When the Lame Duck Congress failed to act, he 
accused it of playing politics.®^1
In January, the nation struck a new nadir. The Lame 
Duck Congress, inclined toward obstruction, accelerated its 
negative action by overriding the President's vetoes and by 
forcing publication of the RFC loans. Roosevelt denounced 
the President's sales tax proposals and the second Roosevelt- 
Hoover conference failed to accomplish anything tangible. As 
unemployment, labor strikes, and farm revolts accelerated,
®^Henry Esli Everman, "The Hoover-Roosevelt Interre­
gum: November,. 1932-March, 1933" (unpublished Master's
thesis, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, 1965), 24, 
38-64, 152-153. Hereinafter cited as Everman, "Hoover- 
Roosevelt Interregnum." Hoover hoped to enact his anti- 
depression ideas by working through the President-elect.
FDR's noncommittal attitude incensed Hoover. Concerning the 
November meeting, see Moley, After 7 Years, 68-77; Hoover, 
Memoirs, III, 178-183; New York Times, November 13, 15, 18, 
and 23, 1932, 1; and Time. XX (December 5, 1932), 9-10.
^Everman, "Hoover-Roosevelt Interregnum, 11 64-87, 
152-153. For H.H.’s proposals to Congress, see House Journal, 
72 Cong., 2 Sess. (December, 1932), 40-43; Wilbur and Hyde, 
Hoover Policies, 338-340; Literary Digest, CXIV (December 17, 
1932), 1-2; New York Times, December 5-8, 1932, 1; and E. 
Pendleton Herring, "Second Session of the Seventy-Second 
Congress," American Political Science Review. CCLXXI (1933), 
404-421. Also see Hoover, Memoirs. IXX, 185-193; Rosenman 
(ed.), FDR Papers, X, 879-884; Timmons, Garner of Texas, 172; 
and New York Times, December 21-23, 30-31, 1932, 1.
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the nation approached paralysis.
Before Hoover escaped his ordeal the Senate Finance 
Committee's exposure of scandalous banking practices des­
troyed the remnant of confidence in financial institutions. 
The banking system collapsed and the economy touched 
b o t t o m . B o t h  Hoover and Roosevelt must share the respon­
sibility for the failures of the Interregnum. '’They were 
like two small boys— selfish, suspicious, and guilty."
While FDR seemed perfectly willing to allow the nation to 
hit bottom, Hoover was equally determined that any recovery 
would be in line with his own ideological views. As the 
President informed Senator Dave Reed, FDR's acquiescence in 
the Hoover proposals would have amounted to the ratification 
of "the whole major program of the Republican Administra­
tion" and assured the abandonment of "90% of the so-called 
New Deal.
91Everman, "Hoover-Roosevelt Interregnum," 76-93, 134. 
See Moley, After 7 Years, 95-96; New York Times, January 19- 
22, 27-28, 1933, 1; Hoover, Memoirs, III, 198; and Concr. Rec., 
72 Cong., 2 Sess. (January 4, 1933), 1361-62, 1372.
92Everman, "Hoover-Roosevelt Interregnum," 109, 143, 
154-156. New York Times. February 2-9, 16-26, 1933, 1; com­
mercial and Financial Chronicle. February 18, 1933, 1133-1139, 
and February 25, 1933, 1244; Moley, After 7 Years, 140-144; 
and Lawrence Sullivan, Prelude to Panic (Washington,1936), 
91-117.
9^Everman, "Hoover-Roosevelt Interregnum," 161.
^Hoover to Reed, February 20, 1933, K-107, Herbert 
Hoover Papers, Post-Presidential Individual File, Herbert 
Hoover Presidential Library, West Branch, Iowa. Hereinafter 
all letters in the Hoover Papers will be designated by box 
number. Only letters outside the Hoover collection will be 
designated more fully by paper, and by location.
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Although Congress abetted the national slump,
q  rHoover's ideology was the greatest handicap. 3 The Presi­
dent abandoned many of his own convictions, even if on a 
temporary basis, but he would go only so far. Too, he 
avoided enforcement of most of his policies. Hoover ration­
alized his position as the only correct and permissable
The retiring President was in no mood to accept 
defeat. He wanted vindication for his ideas and for his 
administration. At long last he saw the potential utility 
of political parties. The Republican Party "must be a party 
of ideals since only exalted purpose can bring great numbers 
of people together in united action. But the consummation 
of ideals must be o r g a n i z e d . F o r  the moment he recognized 
that all Americans must cooperate with the new Administration 
in its depression efforts. Yet, Republicans had a national 
obligation to "subject all proposals to the scrutiny of
9^The recalcitrant legislators, not without guile, 
ignored the President's soundest recommendations, refused to 
appropriate funds, continued publication of RFC loans, and 
later passed many of Hoover's proposals after his departure. 
For example: reduced veteran's benefits, federal pay cuts,
and executive reorganization. Everman, "Hoover-Roosevelt 
Interregnum," 156-159.
96por an analysis of Hoover's violations of his own 
credo and his rationalization of such steps, see Schlesinger, 
Old Order. 246. Also see Hargrove, Presidential Leadership. 
112; Golob, The "Isms," 110-121; Fusfeld, Origins of a New 
Deal, 224-227, 255.
^Hoover to Everett Sanders, February 27, 1933, K-108. 
Sanders was the Republican National Chairman.
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constructive debate and to oppose" those which, were unwise.^® 
As Hoover retired into his sanctuary, he genuinely was 
relieved by the escape from political p r e s s u r e s . H o w e v e r ,  
for a man with his ideological framework, his endless energy, 
and his personal frustration, sanctuary would provide only a 
temporary respite.
98ibid.
99Morison, Turmoil and Tradition. 334, notes that 
H.H., a Quaker, frequently sought "sanctuary for the inner 
light." Degler, "Hoover Ordeal,” 578-579, quotes H.H. as 
saying: "All the money in the world could not induce me to
live over the last nine months. The conditions we have 
experienced make this office a compound hell."
CHAPTER III
SANCTUARY
The tension between Hoover's ideas and reality aggra­
vated his frustration during the Interregnum and quickened 
his irritability and deep-seated resentment. Yet, from his 
own experience he recognized the gravity of the situation and 
determined to give ground, even urging his party to cooperate 
with Roosevelt in every effort to promote recovery. He was 
not, however, abdicating the responsibility of a loyal 
opposition.l
"Saturday, March 4, dawned gray and bleak. Heavy 
winter clouds hung over the city. A chill northwest wind 
brought brief gusts of rain."^ On Inaugural Day, even the
-*-For example, H.H. wrote Everett Sanders, February 27, 
1933, K-108, urging a cooperative policy with the reserva­
tion that the New Deal not violate the Constitution, that 
credit be maintained, that the currency remain sound, and 
that "equality of opportunity" continue. See New York Times, 
February 28, 1933, 1; "President Hoover's Farewell Address," 
Literary Digest, CXV (February 25, 1933), 9; Rexford Tugwell, 
The Brains Trust (New York, 1968) , xxii; and Hoover Collec­
tion, LXIII, Item 2133. The latter, consisting of bound 
volumes located at the Herbert Hoover Presidential Library, 
West Branch, Iowa, includes originals and copies of various 
Hoover addresses, telegrams, magazine articles, press state­
ments, and newspaper clippings.
^Schlesinger, Old Order, 1.
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weather accentuated the sombre atmosphere that pervaded the 
faces of the quiet crowds lining Pennsylvania Avenue.^ For 
millions this inauguration was more than a change of adminis­
trations. It was the passing of traditionalism.
Hoover felt mixed emotions at the surrender of power. 
In spite of his alleged relief, he recalled later that 
"Democracy {was] not a polite employer.”^ Hoover, after all, 
had become accustomed to wielding power. His personality 
now would require vindication for his discredited policies. 
Retirement, at best, would be difficult.
On leaving Washington, Hoover, "neglected, exhausted,
5and deeply disappointed," embarked for New York. There, he 
renewed old ties and recuperated from his depression ordeal.® 
In accord with his public bipartisan stance, the former 
President urged "whole-hearted support and cooperation of 
every citizen" with Roosevelt when the President, on March 6 , 
issued a proclamation closing all banks. Hoover also upheld 
the President's March 9 message to Congress concerning Bank
% e w  York Times, March 5, 1933, 1.
^Hoover, Memoirs. Ill, 344.
Raymond Moley, 27 Masters of Politics (New York,
1949), 25. Hereinafter cited as Moley, 27 Masters.
^Theodore G. Joslin, Hoover Off The Record (New York, 
1934), 366-367. Hereinafter cited as Joslin, Off the Record. 
Hoover acknowledged man's desire to escape from world prob­
lems throughout his book, Fishiner For Fun— And To Wash Your 
Soul (New York, 1963), 18.
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Rehabilitation.^ Too, Hoover’s own fiscal advisers helped 
to draft the Emergency Banking Bill which provided "for 
inspection and certification of soundness.” Although the 
act, passed on March 9, probably forestalled creation of a
Qnationalized banking system, Hoover privately was "not 
reconciled to the present banking program” and endorsed it 
solely because he thought there should be "no criticism of
Qthe new administration.” 3
Following a holiday in New York, Hoover left for his 
home in Palo Alto. On March 21, responding to reporters and 
enthusiastic well-wishers, he stated: "On economic and
political questions I am silent. I have no plans for the 
future. Hoover, undoubtedly, was at a loss as to what to
do with his new freedom. His loyal Secretary of State,
Henry Stimson, ably expressed the difficulty in adjusting to 
the "sudden cessation of duties” and his "sympathy of how
^Hoover Collections, LXIXX, Items 2136, 2137; and New 
York Times, March 7, March 10, 1933, 1. H.H. applauded 
Senator Dave Reed's efforts to unite the GOP behind the 
Banking Bill and later the Economy Bill. Hoover to Reed, 
March 10, 193 3, and Reed to Hoover, March 14, 1933, K-107.
®New York Times, March 10, 1933, 1; and Conkin, New 
Deal, 46. Arthur A. Ballantine, in "When All The Banks 
Closed,” Harvard Business Review, XXVI (1948), 138-139, 
states that he joined Ogden Mills, and George L. Harrison of 
the Federal Reserve in planning the banking bill.
^Hoover to Stimson, March 14, 1933, K-129.
10”Hoover at Home, Wants 'Long Rest, New York Times, 
March 22, 1933, as found in Hoover Collection, LXIII, Item 
2139.
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immensely harder it must have been" for the ex-President.-*-*• 
Hoover, gradually recovering his "normal equipoise,” 
wrote to Stimson, two months after retirement, that "the 
Washington combination of Coue— P. T. Barnum— W. J. Bryan—  
Carl [sic] Marx— Moody and Sankey" was keeping him enter­
tained. ̂  The former President, perhaps from boredom, had 
in truth devoted much of his energy and time to Stanford 
University, the Huntington Library, and other educational 
institutions. He also dedicated bridges and dams and can­
vassed his friends for donations to benevolent organizations. 
These activities necessitated trips eastward and swelled his 
growing interest in p o l i t i c s . f j £ s travels, coupled with 
his extensive correspondence, enabled him to keep abreast 
of the developments in Washington in spite of his alleged 
retirement to Palo Alto.-^
^Stimson to Hoover, April 10, 1933, and May 13, 1933, 
K-129. Stimson said: "X have felt so useless for the past
two months."
■^Hoover to Stimson, May 16, 1933, and Stimson to 
Hoover, May 24, 1933, K-129.
^ N e w  York Times, July 10, 1933, 1, in the Hoover Col­
lection, LXIII, Item 2143; New York Times, February 3, 1934; 
and Wolfe, Hoover, 359. Also see "How the Former President 
Spends His Time," Literary Dioest. CXVI (August 5, 1933), 34.
l^Wolfe, Hoover, 358-359. Certain Hoover lieutenants 
kept their "Chief" posted on the minutest details of local 
political circles. For example, see Harrison Spangler to 
Hoover, October 9, 1933, K-127; Will Irwin to Hoover, October 
23, 1933, K-61; Alan Fox to Hoover, July 26, September 17, 
and October 3, 1934, K-39. H.H.'s inner circle, heavily 
loaded with relief associates, affectionately called him 
"Chief."
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As months passed, the former President gave more and 
more time to politics. At no time in his past career had 
Hoover worked so relentlessly in attempting to acquire poli­
tical information, to curry favor, or to construct a phalanx 
of support as he did in the spring of 1933. He garnered 
political news at local, state, and regional levels. He 
corresponded with virtually every geographical, ethnic, 
racial, and economic bloc in American society. As his cor­
respondence of the 1930's so abundantly attests, he was 
attempting to justify his position and recover his pre­
depression s u p p o r t . A l t h o u g h  he once stated that former 
presidents spent their time "taking pills and dedicating 
libraries,"'1'® he obviously had more important goals.
During the 1930‘s and afterwards, his correspondence
fell primarily into two categories; letters and telegrams
from like-minded individuals who expressed dissatisfaction
with the New Deal and praise for Hooverian ideas and values;
and letters from the great coterie of lieutenants, long-
trained in loyalty to the "Chief, " who often indicated a
certain intellectual submissiveness as much as they did
1 7agreement or understanding. '
l^See H.H.‘s volumnious personal correspondence in the 
Post-Presidential Individual File, 1933-1940.
i^Bin Adler, Presidential Wit {New York, 1966) , 126.
•L^An inveterate Hoover critic, Rexford Tugwell, in 
Brains Trust, 499, says that H.H. was "surrounded by unusu­
ally sychophantic associates with blunted perceptions" who 
kept him "in ignorance" and insensitive to public
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Hoover's correspondence was heavily stacked. It 
reflected images as well as realities. It failed to present 
the whole picture because those who wrote him, generally, 
were already in agreement with his basic ideas. Even the 
"inside" information from Washington was distinctly shaped 
by an oppositionist frame of mind. As thousands of letters 
accumulated, criticizing the New Deal, Hoover became slack 
in his objectivity. He assumed that all people shared his 
disillusionment with the New Deal and its excessive spending, 
inefficiency, corruption, regimentation, and dictation.
Thus, he discounted the evidence of its popular appeal.
Having distinct and firm ideas of his own, he readily agreed 
with New Jersey Senator Walter Edge that "the new adminis­
tration [was] certainly charting new seas,”-1-® and with 
Supreme court Justice Harlan F. Stone, who wrote that "to 
judge by the rapidity of changing events[,] decades might have 
passed.
opinion. Since H.H. "had withdrawn from those who might 
warn him . . .  he continued to rely on his own defective 
judgment." In his Memoirs. II, 221, Hoover admits: "I doubt
if any President was ever surrounded by men and women of more 
personal loyalty or devotion to public service." As Joseph 
Davis, "Hoover: Another Appraisal," 310, 314, notes, H.H.
"encouraged like-minded advice" and discouraged criticism 
and pessimism. Too, he "was held in such awe by his sub­
ordinates that their loyalty to 'the chief' too often curbed 
their critical judgment." Thus H.H. collected letters and 
articles paying deference, never noticing that the real 
public tuned on and off at will.
l8Edge to Hoover, April 25, 1933, K-33. Former Secre­
tary of War, Patrick Hurley, also spoke of a "new era." 
Hurley to Hoover, May 26, 1933, K-60.
l9stone to Hoover, May 2, 1933, K-130.
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To Hoover, revolution was transpiring in the spring 
of 1933. As he saw it, suppression was obvious. The fil­
tered news incited his greatest fears. He believed the worst 
and then sought proof. As his lieutenants begged him to 
return to the political arena, it became more and more diffi­
cult to maintain silence. Surprisingly, for almost two years, 
he resisted the temptation to publicly criticize the New
Like their discredited leader, Republican politicos 
in Washington remained dormant during the early stages of 
the New Deal. Some politicians adjusted their differences 
with one another, while others sought a more centralized 
leadership. All factions of the bitterly divided GOP 
admitted disunity and lack of direction.
Hoover and his lieutenants scrutinized every New Deal 
policy and stored a fund of information for future use. Of 
all Hoover's advisers, the most indispensable was Odgen 
Mills, the former Secretary of Treasury. The New Yorker was
^ T h e  Hoover correspondence of the 1930's abounds in 
expressions of revolutionary fears, political advise, and 
criticism of the New Deal. Many of H.H.'s colleagues spoke 
to him of Roosevelt's "revolution.”
21port to Hoover, May 12, 1933, K-38; Fess to Hoover, 
June 9, 1933, K-36; William Allen White to Hoover, May 3, 
1934, K-137; Hanford MacNider to Arthur Vandenberg, July 3, 
1933, Hanford MacNider Papers, Series 5, Box 73, Herbert 
Hoover Presidential Library. Joslin, Off the Record. 340, 
discusses efforts by the Old Guard to reorganize the National 
Committee before H.H. even reached California. The majority 
of committee members, however, sided with the retiring Presi­
dent.
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the fiscal expert in the Hoover inner circle.^2 a close
friend of Elihu Root and Henry Stimson, Mills, along with 
Harlan Stone, provided cautious, restrained advice, often 
more realistic than that which Hoover received so abundantly 
from his ultra-conservative associates. J
Mills, in touch with Will Woodin, FDR's Secretary of 
the Treasury, gleaned valuable "inside" information into New 
Deal fiscal measures and readily notified Hoover in advance 
of forthcoming changes. By mid-March, Hoover knew of 
Roosevelt's decision to use fully "the extraordinary powers" 
which he, himself, had rejected as unconstitutional.^ The 
former President, already pessimistic, was agitated at the 
probability of inflation and wrote Mills in May that the 
current stock market fluctuations confirmed their darkest 
forebodings. Hoover urged a firm stand against devaluation 
of the dollar.^
2In his preoccupation with inflation, ° Hoover worried
2^See Claude Bowers, Mv Life (New York, 1962), 243, 
256; and Tugwell, Brains Trust. 480. Tugwell sees Mills as 
"the most agile and intelligent" of H.H.'s advisors, and as 
"formidable in the area of federal finance."
^See the Mills-Hoover exchanges, k -92, and the 
Stone-Hoover letters, K-130.
24jviills to Hoover, March 13, 1933, and May 2, 1933, 
K-92. Also see Rixey Smith and Norman Beasley, Carter Glass 
(New York, 1939), 341-342.
25noover to Mills, May 7, 1933, and Mills to Hoover, 
May 2, 1933, K-92.
^Hoover to Brown, April 25, 1933, K-16; Hoover to 
Kellogg, October 5, 1933, and Kellogg to Hoover, September 
25, and October 25, 1933, K-67.
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about Republican morale. On April 21, congressman Bert 
Snell of New York, Senator Dave Reed of Pennsylvania, and 
Senator Frederick Walcott of Connecticut publicized a joint 
statement indicting the Inflation Bill then pending in Con­
gress. Press speculation credited Ogden Mills with inspiring 
the action and Hoover with sanctioning it.^7 Whatever the 
case, the statement coincided with Hoover's private opinions 
that early New Deal legislation placed too much power in the 
executive office. Hoover also anticipated a new land boom 
resulting from the bill. Because all inflation bills tended 
to stifle long-term credit, he assumed the probability of 
additional inflation in the future. He also predicted, 
correctly, the early but temporary benefits for labor and
Opagrxculture.
During the summer of 1933, Henry Stimson visited 
England, conferred with British and American officials 
attending the London Economic Conference, and informed Hoover 
of the consternation over America's desertion of the gold
^7New York Times, April 22, 1933, 1. Reed, Pennsyl­
vania's Republican leader, was a frequent delegate to 
National Conventions from 1924 to 1940, served in the Senate 
from 1922-1935, and headed the Mellon machine. Snell, a New 
York Republican, a convention delegate from 1916 to 1940, and 
a congressman from 1915-1939, was an arch-defender of 
Hoover's record in the House of Representatives during the 
1930's. Biographical Directory of the American Congress. 
1724, 1838.
^Hoover to Brown, April 25, 1933, K-16. Hoover 
termed the Inflation Bill before Congress the most Jldangerous 
proposal [ever] laid before Congress."
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s t a n d a r d . B o t h  men agreed that the New Deal was drifting 
toward the "far right.”30
In the spring and early summer of 1933, as long-term 
credit evaporated, as the treasury situation remained criti-
O Ical, and as the recession continued, x Mills and Hoover 
became more certain that the New Deal could not effect long- 
run recovery. Yet Hoover, in an optimistic moment, repeated 
his belief that "the fundamental forces of recovery estab­
lished by [his] administration" might yet take effect. He 
ventured that more attention should be given to the question 
of the New Deal as "an Emergency program or a social pro­
gram. ” He concluded that FDR lacked the intelligence to form 
a social program and must be grandstanding. Others would 
have to remove the cancers.
By autumn, Lewis Strauss, a lifetime friend and an
2^Stimson to Hoover, July 31, 1933, K-129.
30Hoover to Stimson, October 3, 1933, and Stimson to 
Hoover, October 10, 1933, K-129. Elting E. Morison, Turmoil 
and Tradition: A Study of the Life and Times of Henry L .
Stimson {Boston, 1960), 37 9, credits Stimson with rejecting 
H.H.’s insinuations of a fascist state. Yet, it was Stimson 
who was most candid about FDR's move toward the "far right." 
Stimson to Hoover, October 10, 1933, K-129, is specific on 
this point. Only later did Stimson's views on the New Deal 
change.
3^Mills to Hoover, June 13, 1933, K-92.
33Hoover to Mills, June 23, 1933, K-92. William Allen 
White encouraged such a Hooverian conclusion by criticizing 
the lack of direction in Washington. White said there was 
"no plan either concealed or conscious. . . .  It is obviously 
a case of trial and error." FDR was "the greatest hitch­
hiker, . . .  courageous and unintelligent." White to Hoover, 
May 3, 1934, K-147.
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associate from the relief work of World War I, revealed to 
Hoover that certain New Deal advisers were pressuring FDR to 
inflate the currency.33 Hoover's onetime press secretary, 
George Akerson, discussed recent changes in Treasury person­
nel and the departure of Budget Director "Lew" Douglas as 
indications of the forthcoming inflation.34 As expected, FDR 
gave ground to the inflationists.
To Hoover, one of the worst aspects of the New Deal 
was its agricultural policy. From the outset, he charged 
FDR with discovering a "white rabbit . . .  in the Corn 
Belt."35 Arthur Hyde, Hoover's Agricultural Secretary, 
pondered the question of whether the "monstrosity" (AAA) was 
"of the animal or the vegetable k i n g d o m . " 3 6  ne marveled at 
Hoover's "kaleidoscope of national affairs" and expressed
37shock at the changes in the economic and social structure." 
Hyde bemoaned the cost of the "ridiculous" agricultural 
experiments.3S Franklin Fort, a New Jersey lawyer, onetime 
Congressman, and former GOP National Committee secretary,
33strauss to Hoover, September 20, 1933, K-130.
3^Akerson to Hoover, November 21, 1933, K-2.
^^Hoover to Hyde, March 25, 1933, K-61.
3^Hyde to Hoover, March 28, 1933, K-61.
3^Hyde to Hoover, April 19, 1933, K-61. In a letter
of June 4, Hyde expressed horror at the "socialization of 
industry," the redistribution of income, the debasement of 
currency, and the repudiation of debts. Hyde to Hoover,
June 4, 1933, K-61.
3%jyde to Hoover, December 24, 1933, K-61.
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warned his Chief that "the utter failure of the various 
radical farm proposals" insured inflation.^ Such expres­
sions only reassured Hoover that the New Deal was wrecking 
the nation and that something must be done to stop it.
Although Hoover devoted much of his time to an 
analysis of New Deal policies, he also concentrated on purely 
party politics. During the 1930's the Hoover clique 
accelerated the factionalism within the GOP. Aware of the 
movement underfoot to "oust Sanders" as party chairman, and 
cognizant of the political implications for their Chief's 
influence with the National Committee, Hooverites out- 
maneuvered the Old Guard leaders Charles Hilles of New York, 
Daniel Pomeroy of New Jersey, and Henry Roraback of Connecti­
cut. Hoover thwarted the Old Guard putsch and retained 
control of the Republican organization by mobilizing his 
lieutenants.^
Hoover called on former Postmaster General Walter F.
39port to Hoover, November 8 , 1933, K-38. Fort, a 
long-time Hoover colleague, served on the Food Administration 
staff during World War I. Biographical Directory of the 
American Congress. 1173.
^"News and Comment From the National Capital, " 
Literary Digest. CXVI (July 29, 1933), 10. Brown-Hoover 
correspondence, March-December, 1933, K-16. Of special sig­
nificance is Brown to Larry Richey, April 14, 1933, K-16. 
Richey, Hoover's personal secretary and an alter ego of 
sorts, was H.H.'s most trusted assistant. Also see Richey 
to Brown, April 11, 1933, K-16. Stokes, Chip Off My 
Shoulder, 226, sees Sanders as H.H.'s personal choice for 
the national chairmanship in 1932. Conservatives such as 
James Beck saw H.H.'s 1932 "rejection as an opportunity for 
true conservatives to regain command of their party."
Keller, In Defense of Yesterday, 238.
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Brown, the Ohio leader, for assistance.41 The Ohioan con­
ferred with Mills and other Hoover cohorts in an effort to 
invigorate the dormant Republican m a c h i n e . B r o w n  reaf­
firmed the trustworthiness of Colonel R. G. Creager, the 
Texas boss and longtime Hoover ally.43 For his part,
Creager informed the party dissidents that only the Execu­
tive Committee of the party was empowered to remove Chairman 
Sanders.4 4
As summer ripened, many Republicans, perturbed at 
Sanders 1 inactivity— even if from illness— and anxious for 
an aggressive attack on the New Deal, demanded action.
Colonel John Callan 0 'Laughlin, a rather conservative Hoover 
ally and an insider in the party hierarchy, delved into the 
intricate frictions at party headquarters, reconnoitered the 
strength of various factions, and informed Hoover that, in 
spite of fragmentation, the time was fast approaching when 
the majority would demand a change. Old Guard leaders were
42-Brown to Richey, April 14, 1933, and Richey to 
Brown, April 11, 1933, K-16.
42grown to Hoover, May 2, 1933, K-16. Progressives 
like William Allen White urged reorganization along liberal 
lines. See White, "Liberalism for Republicans," Review of 
Reviews. LXXXVII (January, 1933), 27.
43Brown to Hoover, May 16, 1933, K-16. As noted 
earlier, Creager organized H.H.’s forces in the South in 
1928 and 1932.
44Creager to Frederick S. Peck, May, 1933, K-16.
45Edge to Hoover, May 6 , 1933, K-33; John C. 0
'Laughlin to Hoover, May 17, 1933, and June 26, 1933, K-101.
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pushing for an autumn showdown.^® 0 'Laughlin expressed the
4-7belief that Senator Edge should become the next chairman. ' 
For his part. Chairman Sanders promised intensified 
action, a series of regional conferences, and a new coopera­
tion by the Old G u a r d . H o o v e r ,  recognizing the imperman- 
ency of the accord, decided that Administration Republicans 
must play the decisive role in offering an alternative
/gchairman when Sanders did resign. In an eastern trip, 
Creager of Texas sounded out conservative reaction and 
gained the acquiescence of New York boss Charlie Hilles. 
Although Creager suspected Hilles of personally desiring the 
office, the Old Guard leader probably was buying time to
cnmuster his own strength. v Whatever the case. Hoover, 
despite past relations, recognized Hilles' power and opened 
the door to a future settlement of their differences. Too,
any hope of an alliance between the center and progressive
^ I b i d . o 'Laughlin noted that Charles D. Hilles, 
the New York leader, was instigating the demand for a new 
chairman.
470  ‘Laughlin to Hoover, May 17, 1933, K-101.
^^Brown to Hoover, October 10, 1933, K-16. Pomeroy, 
the New Jersey boss and Old Guard spokesman, gave a somewhat 
dubious endorsement of Sanders' efforts.
^Hoover to Brown, May 17, 1933, K-16. H.H., noting
"direct and indirect pressures" for Sanders' resignation,
anticipated an early retirement but hoped that it would come
at a more opportune time.
50Brown to Hoover, May 23, 1933, K-16. Brown informed 
H.H. that there was no attractive alternative on the scene, 
that a semblance of party unity must be maintained, and that 
this was the wrong time for a change in the chairmanship.
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e *|wings of the party had evaporated.
Following a regional meeting of the National Committee 
at Chicago, Brown assured Hoover of success. He promised a 
full report as soon as they could confer. ^  Momentarily, 
the Hooverites postponed the chairmanship change.
Throughout the long summer of 1933, Hoover's band kept 
him informed of party developments. He received the major 
Eastern dailies at Palo Alto, and various correspondents 
enclosed editorials of interest from other papers. To a 
degree, Hoover's public silence was politically advantageous 
as it allowed the New Dealers plenty of rope.-^ yet, it 
also worsened the void in GOP leadership. Gradually, Hoover's 
onetime conservative critics began to see him in a new light. 
Congressman James M. Beck, an ultra-conservative who long 
opposed Hoover's moderation, exchanged views with the "Sage 
of Palo Alto" regarding the termination of constitutional 
government.^  Simeon D. Fess of Ohio, the GOP minority
^Hoover was aware of the attempt of western radicals 
to form a new "Progressive Party." Hoover to Brown, Novem­
ber 22, 1933, K-16.
^Brown to Hoover, July 15, 1933, K-16.
■^Article, Literary Digest, CXVT (July 29, 1933), 10.
^Beck to Hoover, June 13, and June 28, 1933, Hoover 
to Beck, June 19, 1933, K-9. A month earlier Beck denounced 
the New Dealer's adoption of the "gag rule" as "the most 
monstrous denial of representative government ever proposed 
to an American Congress." Cong. Rec., 73 Cong., 1 Sess.
(May 4, 1933), 4196.
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r rleader in the House of Representatives, 3 told Hoover that 
the New Deal was leading to "State Socialism and regimenta­
tion." It was, wrote Fess, "not a drift to the left wing; 
[but] a complete s o m e r s a u l t . F e s s  incorporated Hooverian 
analyses in his Senate speeches but allowed his inspiration 
to remain anonymous.^ The two men agreed to stand on their 
principles. They shared indignation at the compromising
C Qtendencies of disloyal Republicans. °
As his mail reflected a growing dissatisfaction with 
the New Deal, Hoover became less cautious and disseminated 
his darkest thoughts among lawyers, bankers, oldline Repub­
licans, and even newspapermen— once critical of him. 
Ironically, he gained popularity in circles previously 
hostile. Symbolically, the dispersion of his ideas compared 
to the permeation of money under his RFC— a trickle down 
theory: much of his constructive criticism reached only the 
elite instead of spreading out to the public, whereas his 
shrill, somewhat ludicrous charges gained currency and
invited the criticism of a later generation.
^Fess Was an educator, news editor, congressman, then 
Senator from Ohio. Biographical Directory, 1153.
S^Fess to Hoover, June 27, and June 29, 1933, K-36. 
Fess also spoke of "bolshevik poison."
57Fess to Hoover, May 4, 1933, K-36. For Fess' 
defense of the American System, American Individualism, and 
his attack on regimentation, see Cong. Rec., 73 Cong., 1
Sess (June 7, 1933), 5273.
^Hoover to Fess, May 9, 1933, K-36.
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Samuel Crowther, a witty writer and news correspon- 
dent, became a Hoover favorite because of his denunciation 
of ’’The Happiness Boys" and that "circus’1 in Washington.^9 
With invective, Crowther lambasted the leaderless, ineffi­
cient, disingenuous New Deal, run by a "bunch of children 
playing with m a t c h e s . c r o w t h e r ,  recognizing the ancient 
and mutual hatred between Hoover and Senators Hiram Johnson 
and William E. Borah, wrote to him that once the two Senators 
became disillusioned by the New Deal, they would turn on FDR 
with "all the fury of frustrated prostitutes."^ Crowther, 
meanwhile, cautioned the former President against New Deal 
tricks and urged constant vigilance.
The National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933, once 
accepted even by industrialists, endorsed by Hoover's former 
Secretary of War Patrick Hurley, and allegedly an extension 
of Hoover's "voluntary" business codes, became anathema to 
Hoover.^ He had championed voluntary codes for industry, 
but his emphasis had differed considerably from that of the
^ 9 C r o t h e r  to Hoover, March 5, 1933, K-25.
^^Crowther to Hoover, April 22, 1933, and April 28, 
1933, K-25. H.H. replied that Crowther's writing had "punch." 
Hoover to Crowther, June 8 , 1933, K-25.
63-Crowther to Hoover, June 13, 1933, K-25.
6 2Crowther to Hoover, June 19, 1933, K-25. To Crowther, 
FDR was making the same mistakes as the European dictators.
®2Hurley to Hoover, December 27, 1933, K-60; "At the 
Observation Post," Literary Digest, CXVII (June 23, 1934),
12.
N R A . ^  In a bipartisan moment, Hoover signed the consumer's
pledge for the NRA®^ before Mills explained that the NRA
would eventually drive up costs and prices while adversely
affecting c o n s u m p t i o n . N e i t h e r  businessmen nor reformers
anticipated the resultant monopoly or the coercion involved
67in federal supervision of wages, hours, and standards.0
In a dark mood, Hyde wrote to Hoover of the impending 
doom that would result from the NRA’s habit of setting 
"neighbors to spying upon one another" and from its aggrava­
tion of labor-management discord.^8 ^t iast, Hoover's pique
egat business regimentation reached an apex. In a revealing
5^Ibid.; Fess to Hoover, November 6 , 1933, K-36, 
agreed on the need to impress upon the public the "temporary 
nature of the NRA. Charles F. Roos, NRA, Economic Plannincr 
(Bloomington, 1937), 7, 27, treats H.H.'s contribution to 
the NRA idea, and notes his advocacy of higher wages and 
shorter hours. Hereinafter cited as Roos, NRA.
^Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Coming of the New 
Deal (Boston, 1958), 115. Hereinafter cited as Schlesinger, 
New Deal.
^Mills to Hoover, July 20, 1933, K-92.
5 70tis L. Graham, Jr., An Encore For Reform (New York 
1967), 29. Interestingly, the old progressive reformers 
used the same arguments as Hooverites in rejecting the NRA.
®®Hyde to Hoover, August 10, 1933, K-61.
6^Fort to Hoover, April 1, and April 12, 1933, K-38. 
Fort promised to keep H.H. posted on "the tempo of things." 
He was convinced the New Deal was leading the nation toward 
economic quicksand and that business opposition to all New 
Deal policies would soon crystallize. Also see Fort to 
Hoover, May 12, and June 9, 1933, and Hoover to Fort, June 
14, 1933, K-38. Hoover was well informed of NRA activities, 
impact, and results. See Hoover Papers, Box Q-216 and Box 
Q-227 for NRA memos, articles, codes, court cases, and other 
data.
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letter to Franklin Fort, a New Jersey banker, insurance man,
and GOP stalwart, Hoover stated:
I am not in a position to criticise the code notion 
because I have for years advocated building up of 
business codes and have, in fact, taken part in the 
construction of scores of them; but, of course, X 
have no patience with the attempts to control produc­
tion and prices . . . it is all a question of degree.70
Hoover soon came to believe that the NRA encouraged
monopoly by its circumvention of the antitrust law, and that
it negated his American Individualism through a dictatorial
fixing of hours and wages, as well as by its regulation of
products, quantities, prices, and distribution. Business,
he said, was "hooked on an artificial fly."71 Nor could he
accept Hurley's optimistic belief that the NRA legislation
would be amended s h o r t l y . 72 Convinced of the NRA's failure,
7 “3Hoover saw it as an impediment to recovery. Charles F. 
Roos, NRA Director of Research, concluded that the NRA "must, 
as a whole, be regarded as a sincere but ineffective effort 
to alleviate the depression."74
As criticism of the NRA mushroomed, Negro journalist
^^Hoover to Fort, September 3, 1933, K-38.
^Hoover, Memoirs, III, 421-427; Hoover to Mills,
July 26, 1933, K-92. See Roos, NRA, 45-51.
^Hurley to Hoover, December 27, 1933, and Hoover to 
Hurley, January 4, 1934, K-60.
^Hoover to Hurley, January 4, 1934, K-60. H.H. wryly 
concluded that New Dealers would credit him with fathering 
the NRA as soon as they accepted its failure.
74r o o s , NRA, 472.
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John P. Davis exposed the discrimination involved in the 
program. According to Davis, NRA white workers displaced 
Negro industrial workers even while accelerated prices out- 
gained the new wages. Nor were Negroes' wages as high as 
those of whites, even under NRA codes. Finally, as marginal 
workers, Negroes were the first to lose their jobs.7  ̂ The 
future utility of NRA seemed dubious.
In September, 1933, Ogden Mills analyzed America's 
economy for his Chief. Despite encouraging signs of recovery, 
Mills pointed to the lack of capital market, the stagnation 
of the goods industries, the accelerating plight of the 
farmer, and credit shortage. He predicted inflation but 
assured Hoover that their silence must be maintained for the 
time, as they would "only be accused of sabotaging the 
recovery program by destroying c o n f i d e n c e . " ^  Hoover readily 
incorporated Mills' analysis into his own thinking and 
shared it with other associates.77 By October, news analyst 
Lawrence Sullivan was publicizing the negative effect of the
7^John P. Davis, "What Price National Recovery?"
Crisis, XL (December, 1933), 271-272. Roos, NRA, 172-173, 
notes the early opposition to NRA by dissatisfied Negroes.
He discusses the preference given whites in the South for 
new jobs, the discrimination in wages, and the actual re­
placement of Negroes in other jobs. He estimates that 
500,000 Negro workers were effected by the discriminatory 
codes.
7®Mills to Hoover, September 19, 1933, K-92. During 
Mills' absence Henry M. Robinson, a Los Angeles banker, had 
furnished H.H. with Federal Reserve figures and information. 
Robinson to Hoover, March 28, April 8 , June 24, and August 
7, 1933, K-92.
77Hoover to Brown, November 16, 1933, K-92.
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NRA and the current paralysis in business.^® Hoover, anxious 
for an acceleration of anti-New Deal articles, pressed Mills 
to influence the employment of William Hard as an editor for 
the New York Herald Tribune: "[Hard] badly needs a pulpit
where his unique qualities of humor and satire, his economic 
penetration, can have full play.”7®
Although Hoover held a moderate view of the New Deal 
throughout much of the summer of 1933, even crediting FDR 
with majority support, the rejected recluse steadily moved to 
the right.®® By autumn, he accepted the hard line and 
asserted that "behind [New Deal] measures is a determination 
to conduct some sort of social r e v o l u t i o n . A s  Hoover 
moved toward a reconciliation with Eastern conservatives, 
including even some Old Guard leaders, he recognized the 
demise of the old GOP. After all, Hiram Johnson and his 
colleagues were trying to organize a new "Progressive
p 9Party.” Too, the nation was moving leftward, destroying 
any possibility of Hoover's reunification of the center 
support he had once commanded. Hoover, the centrist, must
7®"New Deal in Command,” Forbes Magazine, October 15, 
1933, copy in General Charles Dawes' letter to Hoover,
October 31, 1933, K-27.
7®Hoover to Mills, November 15, 1933, K-92.
®®Hoover to Fess, July 5, 1933, K-36.
®-^Hoover to Fess, November 14, 1933, K-36, showed 
little restraint as he discussed the "socialism [which] 
seemed to be the aim."
82Hoover to Brown, November 22, 1933, K-16.
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alter his philosophy or seek new allies to the right.
Inevitably, he remained loyal to his ideas. In seclusion,
he drafted a list of principles for the party and anxiously
urged National Committee members to adopt his fundamental 
83ideas. Mills and Brown conferred with National Chairman 
Ev Sanders, Senator Dave Reed, and Congressman Bert Snell in 
an effort to force a statement of principles by the National
O  A , #Committee. ^ As the hopes for a statement of principles 
lagged. Hoover wrote Brown that they must assert the impor­
tance of ideas and defend the Constitution. He found a 
continuance of the current "socialistic program," with its 
disastrous fiscal program, intolerable. He expressed agita­
tion at Sanders1 remark concerning too much "Hoover color to
85the National Committee." Finally, in confidence, he 
stated that he had been approached by a potential chairman 
who would cooperate and "be a friend of all of us."®®
Hooverian allies such as Simeon Fess informed him 
that the timing was wrong for a statement of principles and 
that "the greatest obstacle lies within our own ranks, . . .
®®Hoover to Brown, October 22, October 23, and Decem­
ber 5, 1933, K-16. H.H. wanted to remain anonymous because 
he recognized that certain Congressional leaders would auto­
matically oppose anything he supported.
®^Brown to Hoover, October 10, 1933, K-16. Brown also 
told H.H. that Eastern leaders must be wooed concerning the 
subject of a new treasurer for the National Committee.
®®Hoover to Brown, October 22, 1933, K-16.
86Ibid.
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P7where unity on fundamental principles is impossible."0 '
Hoover, in frustration, postponed the expression of his 
deepest desire.
He continually tried to goad Ev Sanders and the 
National Committee into action. Failing this, he encouraged 
the "gradual erection of committees and organizations to
QOoppose [New Deal] policies." Finally, Hoover realized 
that Sanders, a lame horse, must be sacrificed.®9 Hoover 
urged Franklin Fort, his reliable Jersey associate, "to 
establish friendly relations with Senator Edge," who "could 
be made to serve most useful purposes if he had the oppor­
tunity as he would appeal to certain groups most strongly.”90 
In pursuance of an alliance with Edge, Hoover learned 
that the Jersey Republican would accept the Chairmanship 
providing a fight could be avoided. Edge revealed that
Senator Dave Reed and George Moses were collecting votes for 
91him. Hoover remained friendly to Edge's efforts, hoping
®^Fess to Hoover, November 6 , November 28, December 
12, December 22, 1933, and Hoover to Fess, October 24, 1933, 
K-36.
°®Hoover to Sanders, July 5, December 11, 1933, and 
January 10, 1934, K-117; Hoover to Brown, November 22, 1933, 
K-16? and Hoover to Reed, October 23, 1933, K-107.
Q QHoover to Brown, December 5, 1933, and Brown to 
Hoover, December 15, 1933, K-16.
90Hoover to Fort, November 14, 1933, K-38. Edge was 
a former New Jersey Governor, two-time U. S. Senator, Hoover's 
ambassador to France, and a perennial delegate to GOP con­
ventions from 1916-1948. Biographical Directory. 1118.
9^-Edge to Hoover, October 30, 1933, K-33.
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to undercut the influence of the uncooperative and reac- 
tionary Jersey boss, Daniel Pomeroy. Although Sanders 
balked on Hoover's idea of a "statement of principles" and 
refused to include Hoover's defeated congressional supporters 
in the party hierarchy, it was the wrong time for a change 
in the chairmanship. Consequently, Mills, probably at 
Hoover's direction, and with the aid of Frank Knox and 
Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg, persuaded the Eastern leaders 
to refrain from injecting the chairmanship fight into the 
December meeting. Although the Hooverites again carried the 
day, all sides admitted that a change was certain in 1 9 3 4 .
Following the Hoover triumph, Edge, Senator Reed, and 
Senator Charles McNary of Oregon conferred in Washington. 
McNary, a long-time Hoover antagonist, emerged from the 
parley and told reporters that Hoover had withdrawn from 
politics permanently, that Ev Sanders was being permitted to 
continue as the GOP Chairman, and that the party was badly 
divided.9^ Hoover, understandably, was incensed at McNary's 
politics and the effort "to read me out of any form of
9 ^ H o o v e r  to Brown, December 5, 1933, and Brown to 
Hoover, December 15, 1933, K-15. Although Hoover urged Edge 
to try for the National Committee, he made no commitment 
concerning the chairmanship. By mid-December, Pomeroy 
recovered and thwarted the move to elevate Edge.
^Hoover Sanders, December 11, 1933, and January
10, 1934, K-117. Brown to Hoover, December 15, 1933, K-16.
9^Brown to Hoover, December 27, 1933, K-16, related 
the version current in New York newspapers.
public life. "9!̂
Aside from the intra-party struggles, Hoover was 
becoming more and more impatient with New Deal policies. He 
was anxious for an acceleration of constructive criticism 
and was considering writing a book on the New Deal. As 
old Progressives such as Bainbridge Colby and Henry J. Allen 
concluded that FDR had "sabotaged" the Constitution, Hoover 
determined to expose the New Dealers.9^
Whereas the Hoover Administration had initiated an 
investigation of the dishonest political machine of Louisiana 
Senator Huey Long for its income tax evasions, Roosevelt 
ignored the odor for two years.9® Too, Hoover was upset by 
a memorandum from the U. S. Department of Agriculture (dated 
January 5, 1934, and concerning AAA personnel), stating that 
"all additional appointments, including replacements, may be 
made without regard to the Civil Service rules and
9®Hoover to Brown, December 29, 1933, K-16. H.H. 
suspected McNary of "political ambitions," meaning the GOP 
presidential nomination of 1936.
9®Hoover to Crowther, September 4, and November 13, 
1933, K-25.
Akerson to Hoover, September 6 , 1933, K-2, informed 
H.H. of a conference with Colby. Allen, the Kansas Senator, 
expressed shock at FDR's continuous "trampling on the con­
stitution." Allen to Hoover, November 14, 1933, K-2.
9 ®T. Harry Williams, Huey Long (New York, 1969), 794- 
801, notes that FDR renewed the exposure of Long only after 
the "Kingfish" became a thorn in Roosevelt's side. Hof- 
stadter, Age of Reform, 310, shows Progressive disillusion­
ment with FDR's general attitude toward political machines.
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r e g u l a t i o n s . N o w  Hoover was certain that New Dealers 
were "not interested in reform.” In fact, they were cutting 
out "the heart and nerve center" of the American system.
They were playing politics.100 Dealers were violating
moral and political traditions of the past. They had 
abandoned the communion table of the American System.
As "evidence" of political, economic, and intellectual 
dishonesty accumulated, Hoover urged Will Irwin, his life­
time friend, biographer, and confidant, to write a book on 
"modern methods of propaganda, " revealing how the New Deal 
stifled free speech and free criticism. He even outlined 
the sections for a book. Significantly, he wanted the last 
part to concentrate on the NRA and New Deal propaganda with 
their "distortion" and "destruction" of true liberalism. He 
thought the New Deal was drifting "more clearly to Fascism 
and Nazism than even toward Socialism."101 Enunciating his 
darkest fears, Hoover indicted the New Deal as too far to 
the right. ^ 2
^Memorandum, U. S. Department of Agriculture,
January 5, 1934, Clause F, Q-213.
^-0°Hoover to Fess, December 18, 1933, and December 27, 
1933, K-36. H.H. blasted the New Deal for prolonging the 
depression, abetting the bank panic, and devaluing the 
dollar. He charged FDR with Fascist, Hitlerian tactics.
'^-'-Hoover to Irwin, December 16, 1933, K-62.
i02por months Crowther had accused H.H. of too much 
restraint. H.H. dissented by saying, "I would not go as far 
as you do." Crowther to Hoover, November 24, 1933, and 
Hoover to Crowther, December 1, 1933, K-25.
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To add to Hoover's pessimism, Mills wrote that the 
new budget figures were ’’literally, staggering. 11 He also 
noted the alarming proportions of the Civil Works Administra­
tion dole, the failure to balance the budget, and the high 
probability that inflation in the new year would approach 
fifty per cent.^®^
Nor could Hoover expect the GOP in Congress to offer 
sane alternatives. Cal 0 'Laughlin, in a confidential 
analysis, informed the chief of the fragmentation within the 
GOP in Congress, the lack of leadership, the absence of a 
policy, and the certainty that Senator McNary, working for 
an alliance with Progressives, would hold no caucuses and 
present no programs because he thought the Democrats should 
be given plenty of rope and thus determine the issues.
Samuel Crowther blasted the "craven stupidity of the GOP in 
Congress" and warned Hoover to expect nothing from the "nit-
i ncwits" holding positions of leadership.
Hoover decided that the future of the party and the 
nation depended on attracting young men of vision to the
1 0 3 M i n s to Hoover, January 5, 1934, K-92.
104g 'Laughlin to Hoover, December 30, 1933, K-101. 
Ashmun Brown described McNary as "unenlightened. 11 A. Brown 
to Hoover, January 11, 1934, K-15.
105Crowther to Hoover, January 25, and January 30, 
1934, K-25.
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*1 rt/"cause. He asked Henry Allen of Kansas and Arthur Hyde of
Missouri to organize a Young Republican Club in their area.
In suggesting they follow the example of the "Republican 
Builders" in New York, he accepted the necessity of educating 
the public and winning it to "high ideals.
By the winter of 1933-1934, senatorial politicians, 
probably hoping to embarrass the Hoover Administration, 
initiated the Black Investigation, an inquiry into the con­
tracts and activities of former Postmaster General Walter F. 
Brown. Hoover, acting through Larry Richey and Edgar 
Rickard, two trusted aides, urged Brown to volunteer as a
1 n owitness. Hoover and Brown, irritated at the smear
efforts of the Black investigation, agreed that Capitol Hill 
was dominated by "popinjays and nitwits. " - ^ 9 Although the 
inquiry had scrutinized Brown's activities with reference to
106As early as August, 1933, Hoover had urged the 
development of more young Republican clubs. Hoover Collec­
tion, LXIII, Item 2145, Hoover to Louis M. Killen, August 
26, 1933.
^Hoover to Allen, January 27, February 1, and 
February 16, 1934, K-2; Hoover to Hyde, January 27, January 
29, March 5, 1934, and Hyde to Hoover, March 13, 1934, K-61. 
H.H. pointed to the success of Mills in New York and the 
attractive name of the "Republican Builders." On this sub­
ject H.H. also wrote to Jay Darling of Iowa. For the affirma­
tive reply, see Darling to Hoover, October 25, 1933, K-26.
l°^Edgar Rickard to Hoover, September 30, 1933, K-16.
Rickard, a "close friend and devoted associate" from the 
relief activities onward, was trusted with the most confi­
dential matters. Davis, "Hoover: Another Appraisal," 297.
109BrOwn to Hoover, January 31, March 3, March 10,
March 12, and May 9, 1934, and Hoover to Brown, March 5,
March 7, March 13, May 3, and May 14, 1934, K-16.
79
mail contracts, stock holdings, dividends, and other matters, 
nothing was u n c o v e r e d . W h e n  Brown failed to follow his 
suggestion of a libel suit, Hoover, anxious for vindication, 
suggested that Brown at least write a series of articles on 
how the Hoover Administration had advanced the aviation 
i n d u s t r y . F o l l o w i n g  the fruitless investigation of Brown, 
Congress turned on Patrick Hurley, the former Secretary of
1 1 OWar, and a firm Hoover supporter. J-̂  Again, a Hoover official 
was cleared but the ex-President's anger bristled at the 
insinuations.
In spite of the temptation to defend his policies and 
principles, Hoover maintained his public silence. When Alan 
Fox, a prominent New York Republican, approached him and 
asked him to make the Lincoln Day Dinner Address, even the 
assurance that it might well be used by others to launch 
their presidential aspirations would not move Hoover to 
a c c e p t . R e c o g n i z i n g  the political implication, he did
llOgtone to Hoover, March 27, 1934, K-130, stated that 
FDR had made “a serious mistake in [his] handling of the air 
mail contracts." Akerson to Hoover, February 26, 1934, K-l.
lllHoover to Brown, May 3, 1934, K-16.
112Hurley, recognizing H.H.'s frustration and bitter­
ness over the politically motivated investigations, tried to 
quell his anger. Hurley to Hoover, June 8 , 1934, K-60.
113Ibid.
114Fox Hoover, January 16, 1934, K-39, wanted 
H.H.'s advice regarding the future before "featuring any 
such potential candidate" for the 1936 nomination. Fox also 
informed his "Chief" that Mills was too antagonistic a per­
sonality to have any political future.
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suggest that Fox choose a Midwesterner such as Arthur Hyde
I I Cas speaker. x 3 Too, he promised to help secure Hyde's con- 
sent.^-*^ As anticipated, the Missourian accepted.
Pleased with Hyde's selection and acceptance, Hoover 
urged him to defend their high spiritual and intellectual 
principles. He offered to aid Hyde in writing the speech 
and pressed for a condemnation of New Deal regimentation, 
fiscal policies, and the negation of the "spirit’' of the Bill 
of Rights. Hoover, in advance, assured a wide circulation 
of the February 12 A d d r e s s ®
James Beck, following Hoover's earlier advice, also 
struck a discordant note in launching an aggressive attack 
on the New Deal. In Hooverian style, Beck solemnly espoused 
"The Mission of the Republican Party."-^O Pennsylvania's 
Henry Fletcher, the future GOP National Chairman, urged a 
more earnest opposition if the party was to survive.^-*-
H^Hoover to Fox, telegram, January 16, 1934, and 
Hoover to Fox, January 19, 1934, K-39.
-Ll^Hoover to Hyde, January 22, 1934, K-3 9.
H ^F o x  to Hoover, January 30, 1934, K-39.
H^Hoover to Hyde, January 27, January 29, March 5, 
and January 30, 1934, K-61.
119New York Times, February 13, 1934; Hyde to Hoover, 
February 23, 1934, K-61.
120ijjew York Times, February 13, 1934; Beck to Hoover, 
January 12, 1934, and February 10, 1934, and Hoover to Beck, 
February 20, 1934, K-9. Beck joined Hyde as a speaker at 
the Lincoln Day Dinner.
121pietcher to Hoover, February 22, 1934, K-38.
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Privately, Hoover expressed his belief that the nation was 
"recovering some of its critical faculties. ,l̂ -22
By February, 1934, Hoover was obsessed with the money 
bill, and the enormous profits speculators were making. In 
a series of letters to Crowther, Hoover unburdened his dis­
gust with a policy that encourated investors, already over­
extended in stocks, to profit from gold manipulation. He 
also doubted the administration's intention of allowing an 
inve s tigation. 1 2 2
As criticism of the New Deal surfaced, the demand for 
a change in the GOP chairmanship accelerated. 0 'Laughlin 
informed Hoover of Senator Vandenberg's backstage maneuvers 
and the widespread rumor that Sanders was finished. He 
urged his Chief to make a choice and "take steps promptly to 
see that the proper man is selected."l2^ o 'Laughlin 
repeated that Edge was the front-runner. Personally, he had 
sounded out Hilles on the possibility of Henry Fletcher, but 
the New Yorker remained noncommittal. Hilles, however, was 
receptive to a conference with Hoover. Elsewhere, McNary
l22Hoover to Moses, April 27, 1934, K-9.
l22Crowther to Hoover, January 31, and February 21, 
1934, and Hoover to Crowther, February 3, 1934, and February 
6 , and February 26, 1934, K-25.
1240 'Laughlin to Hoover, January 20, and January 26, 
1934, Box 44, John Callan 0 'Laughlin Papers, Library of 
Congress, Washington, D. C. Permission to use the 0 
'Laughlin Papers was granted by Mrs. Dorothy Brown, Washing­
ton, D. C.
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favored Senator Dickinson, and Vandenberg was backing 
Hanford MacNider .-*-25
Although 0 'Laughlin and Harrison Spangler, Hoover's 
Iowa leader, pressed him for a decision concerning the 
chairmanship, Hoover was certain only of the need for a "new 
face," preferably from the Midwest. When Spangler and other 
Hooverites failed to draft a list of possibilities. Hoover 
reiterated his willingness to accept E d g e . ^26 Hilles, with 
the Eastern bloc in his pocket, thwarted the move for 
E d g e . t o o ,  the Jerseyman hardly fulfilled Hoover's con­
ditions for a "new face," young blood, and a Midwestern 
o r i g i n . 128 seeing that Congressional leaders would soon
1250 'Laughlin to Hoover, January 26, 1934, Box 44,
0 'Laughlin Papers, Library of Congress. As early as July,
Vandenberg had worked for the selection of MacNider, the 
Commander of the American Legion, former Assistant Secretary 
of War, and a prominent financeer. Charles B. Robbins to 
MacNider, July 1, 1933, and MacNider to Vandenberg, July 3, 
1933, and MacNider to Charles B. Robbins, July 3, 1933, and 
MacNider to Congressman Paul A. Martin, July 13, 1933, Series
5, Box 73, 1933 folder, Hanford MacNider Papers, Herbert 
Hoover Presidential Library, West Branch, Iowa. MacNider 
wanted no part of the factional quarrel between the Hoover- 
Mills clique and the Wadsworth-Hi lies gang. He thought that 
Governor Brucker of Michigan was a potential national chairman.
126spangler to Hoover, November 29, 1933, Hoover to 
Spangler, December 28, 1933, K-127; Hoover to 0 'Laughlin, 
January 29, 1934, Box 44, 0 'Laughlin Papers.
127q 'Laughlin to Hoover, February 10, February 27,
and March 17, 1934, Box 44, 0 'Laughlin Papers. By March, 
Hilles was leaning toward Fletcher. Conrad Joyner sees 
Fletcher as the favorite of the Old Guard, an "arch-conserva­
tive," and as out of tune with GOP Congressional leadership. 
Conrad Joyner, The Republican Dilemma (Tuscon, 1963), 4.
128noover to 0 'Laughlin, March 5, 1934, Box 44,
0 'Laughlin Papers.
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force Sanders' resignation, Hoover asked Brown to discuss a 
list of potential successors with the Chairman. Possible 
choices included Hilles, Edge, Senator Dickinson, Fletcher, 
and MacNider.129
Although Brown hastily sounded out Hooverites Mills 
and California oil executive Mark Requa, each supported a 
different candidate.I20 The lack of consensus only com­
pounded Hoover's difficulty in endorsing one of the candi­
dates. Although he realized that anyone with as much "Hoover 
color" as Spangler was unavailable, Hoover probably preferred 
Senator Edge but asked Mills to confer with Henry Fletcher. 
Following a March conference with Mills, Fletcher publicly 
declined to run for the Pennsylvania Governorship and wrote
T O THoover that the fight for the chairmanship was "in a fog."
In writing Mills, Hoover expressed disappointment over the 
lack of cohesion among Hooverites on any topic, the shortage 
of campaign funds, and party apathy.-*-32
Franklin Fort, Hoover's Jerseyite leader, agreed to 
go to Chicago for the June meeting of the National Committee,
2^Hoover to Brown, February 7, 1934, K-16.
130grown to Hoover, May 9, 1934, K-16. Mills favored 
Governor Garder of Maine, Requa leaned toward Silas Strawn, 
the Chicago banker, and Brown urged the selection of Harrison 
Spangler of Iowa. Mills to Hoover, April 20, 1934, K-92, 
disclosed the impasse following a Hilles, Brown, Requa,
Mills and Roraback conference in New York.
131pietcher to Hoover, March 23, 1934, K-38.
132jjoover to Mills, April 10, and April 24, 1934,
K-92.
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if Hooverites endorsed a candidate for chairman.-*-33 Reveal- 
ingly, Hoover admitted that ’’Our trouble is that we do not 
know the ideal man for Chairman.1’ However, he reassured 
Fort that "if the Republicans attempt to follow the Old 
Guard I shall make a public protest. ’'-*-34
Hoover urged Creager, Spangler, and Brown to push for 
a statement of principles as well as "a new face” for chair­
man. He noted the availability of ex-Governor Brucker of 
Michigan but endorsed no o n e . -*-35 the close of the month,
Sanders, as expected, called for a June meeting of the
National C o m m i t t e e . -*-36
On June 6 , the National Committee elected Henry 
Fletcher chairman. Hoover praised the new officer as "a 
most experienced and courageous leader" and urged him to 
create a vigorous party organization, issue a declaration of 
principles, and invite the youth of the party into national 
councils.137
133port to Hoover, May, 1934, K-38, informed the 
Chief of a meeting with Requa and Walter Newton. Fort urged 
H.H. to remain independent of the Old Guard.
-*-3^Hoover to Fort, May 17, 1934, K-38.
135Creager to Hoover, May 17, 1934, and Hoover to 
Creager, May 23, 1934, K-25; Hoover to Spangler, May 9, May 
17, and May 23, 1934, and Spangler to Hoover, May 5, May 12, 
and May 15, 1934, K-127; Hoover to Brown, May 14, 1934, K-
16. Hereafter Brown's long illness disrupted the intense 
correspondence for months. Hoover to Sanders, May 30, 1934, 
K-117, expressed regret at E v 's retirement and applauded his 
devotion to the party. Hoover to 0 'Laughlin, May 17, 1934, 
Box 44, 0 'Laughlin Papers.
-*-36Spangler to Hoover, May 5, 1934, K-127.
-*-3^Hoover to Fletcher, telegram, June 6 , 1934, K-42; 
New York Times, June 7, 1934, 1.
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Men representing the diverse factions of the GOP 
applauded Fletcher's election as Chairman.x'JO Hooverites 
commended Fletcher's proposals to revive the party. Mills 
assured the Chief that a forthcoming Committee on Policies 
would make positive proposals in the fields of industry,
*1 *5 Qagriculture, finance, and foreign relations. 0 'Laughlin
wired Hoover that Fletcher's cooperation was assured and that 
Spangler and John D. M. Hamilton would help clean h o u s e . ^  
With the elimination of the chairmanship question, and the 
satisfactory move to formulate a program in opposition to 
the New Deal, Hoover again concentrated on specific policies.
Although Hoover's own Federal Farm Board, in its 
financing of farm cooperatives and attempted systematization
■*-^James R. Garfield to Hoover, July 9, 1934, K-42; 
Fort to Hoover, June 15, 1934, K-38; Mills to Hoover, June
25, 1934, K-92; Knox to Hoover, July 11, 1934, K-72. Knox 
said, "X like very much the way Henry Fletcher is taking 
hold of his job.” Frank Kent, Without Gloves (New York, 
1934), 277-279, notes that Fletcher, a 1912 Bull Mooser, was 
acceptable to men as different as Senator Dave Reed and 
William Allen White.
l^Mills to Hoover, June 25, 1934, K-92.
!40o 'Laughlin to Hoover, June 25, 1934, Box 44,
0 'Laughlin Papers. Schlesinger, New Deal, 481, credits 
Hilles and the Old Guard with outmaneuvering the Hooverites 
in the selection of Fletcher and the recognition of Hilles' 
leadership on the policy committee. However, the evidence, 
previously treated, shows that the Hooverites, like the Old 
Guard, lacked a majority and, at best, could only exercise a 
veto on the chairmanship question. As Brown, Mills, 0 
'Laughlin, and other Hooverites stated, Fletcher was quite 
acceptable. His inclusion of Spangler and Hamilton as his 
chief assistants indicated the congenial relationship 
between H.H. and the new chairman. Fletcher was not H.H.'s 
first choice, but it is equally doubtful that he was at the 
top of the Hilles list either.
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of marketing farm products, had served as the basis for New- 
Deal agricultural policies, Hoover failed to admit the con­
nection,-*-41 Nonetheless, Hoover's perceptive lieutenant 
Ogden Mills admitted that agriculture was the one area in 
which New Dealers had continued and expanded a Hoover pro­
gram. -*-42 Agricultural leader George N. Peek lambasted FDR's 
Agricultural Secretary Henry A. Wallace for implementing and 
enforcing a Hoover policy.-*-43
As summer advanced, as the New Deal moved to newer 
and more extreme positions, as his anxiety mounted, as "evi- 
dence" of corruption, bureaucratic escalation, inefficiency, 
and even negative effects surfaced, Hoover's bitterness 
fermented. The "preposterous" AAA, which Hoover had lamented 
earlier, continued in his view to violate one constitutional 
principle after a n o t h e r . ^44 He was incensed at the provoca­
tive contract clause that farmers were being forced to sign
1411*At the Observation Post, ” Literary Digest, CXVTI 
(June 23, 1934), 12. Gilbert c. Fite, "Farmer Opinion and 
the Agricultural Adjustment Act, 1933," MVHR, XLVIII (March, 
1962), 657-658.
-*-42Mills, Seventeen Million, 11. Mills tried to dis­
tinguish the two administrations by degree: "between govern­
ment leadership and government coercion.' Too, he noted 
that H.H.'s innovations were temporary, whereas FDR's were 
permanent.
Peek, Why Quit Our Own (New York, 1936) , 
62. In the past, Peek had opposed H.H. for "restricting 
production to the demand of the domestic market."
-*-44jjoover to Mills, July 26, 1933, K-92.
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in order to retain their corn l o a n s . S e n a t o r  Dickinson 
and New Hampshire's George Moses questioned the Americanism 
of such policies.^ 6  Even William Allen White, normally a 
cautious commentator, denounced "the apple-cheeked, starry- 
eyed brain trusters in the Agricultural Department" and the 
federal government’s excessive use of p o w e r . ^  Chicago 
newspaper magnate and former Bull Mooser Frank Knox, in 
bewilderment, marveled at the "asininity of Roosevelt and 
Wallace persisting in the AAA folly when Providence has 
taken the necessity for it out of their hands. "148 As f00<a 
prices advanced upward, FDR criticized the press for publi­
cizing the figures and thus creating fear in the public
14 5 L. W. Ainsworth, Iowa National Committeeman, a 
close friend of Senator Dickinson and an agricultural 
adviser, kept H.H. informed on agricultural policy, includ­
ing this contract clause. The clause that offended H.H. 
read: "the undersigned agrees . . .  in any general plan or
program presented by the Secretary of Agriculture for the 
reduction in acreage of corn and production of hogs for 
market in 1934. Copy of contract found in Ainsworth to 
Hoover, December 10, 1933, and January 5, 1934, K-2.
146MoSes to Hoover, April 12, and April 18, 1933, K- 
92, had accused the Brain Trust of "undiluted sovietism." 
Dickinson to Hoover, September 14, 1933, and January 3, and 
February 23, 1934, K-29, secured a list of personnel turn­
overs within the AAA as well as the NRA and noted the defec­
tions because of conscience.
^47white to Hoover, May 3, 1934, K-147. As White 
joined the chorus indicting the processing tax, the Hoover 
council became virtually unanimous in its opinion of New 
Deal farm policy.
148Kn0x to Hoover, August 27, 1934, K-72.
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149mind. But to Hoover, as well as to correspondent Ashmun
Brown, “The food destruction of the past eighteen months[,] 
silhouetted against the drought, " was an explosive topic.150 
To many "concerned citizens," New Deal methods were 
intolerable. Reports of corruption were mounting steadily. 
CWA jobs reportedly were being allocated by the political 
bosses.151 Nepotism, meanwhile, reaped considerable profits 
in the sale of insurance policies to government port author­
ities.152
The party situation, despite much optimism, improved 
only slightly. Hyde, recognizing the vacuum in leadership,
^^Ashmun Brown, the capital correspondent of the 
Providence Journal, wrote H.H. frequently. Brown explained 
the method by which FDR was juggling "the item of seignior­
age in the Daily Treasury Statement" and thus minimizing the 
expanding deficits. A. Brown to Hoover, August 16, 1934, 
K-15.
15®Hoover to A. Brown, August 23, 1934, K-15. H.H. 
noted the growing criticism of AAA by consumers and farmers. 
Incensed at the Treasury deceptions, H.H. noted that the 
biggest camouflage concerned "General Expenditures" being 
transferred to "Emergency Expenditures." This included 
public works, naval construction, and other items. H.H. 
would continually point out this deception in his public 
speeches in 1935. As Brown noted, FDR also listed all "loans 
as assets." "Even a child," said Brown, would know better. 
Brown to Hoover, August 30, 1934, K-15.
1 5 1 A. Brown to Hoover, January 11, 1934, K-15, cited 
three specific New England towns where New Deal patronage 
through government jobs was dependent on political subser­
vience .
‘'-^^Walter Brown noted young James Roosevelt's sales of 
insurance policies to New York Port Authorities and to cer­
tain ports in the South. The contracts were unusually high, 
and the million-dollar negotiations netted considerable 
profits for the salesman. Brown to Richey, June 1, 1933, 
K-16.
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urged the Chief to return to the arena: "You possess the
only voice that will be heard. . . . You alone can adequately 
answer Roosevelt."153 Charles G. Dawes, the former Vice- 
President, voiced the same opinion. -̂54 Crowther, tired of 
the "jelly-fish" politicians in Washington, pleaded with 
Hoover to launch a vigorous o f f e n s i v e .  ̂ 5
Hoover, steeped in literature, correspondence, and 
propaganda of the conservative, oppositionist frame, assured 
a partisan analysis. New Deal proposals and actions chal­
lenged his ideology. To Hoover, the New Deal consumated his 
long prophecized and deepest fears. Tyranny, bureaucracy, 
and centralization were realities. There was no time for 
second-guessing. He must meet the challenge head-on. It was 
time to forego the tranquility of his sanctuary. By August, 
he wrote Ashmun Brown of his decision to publish: "My con­
science will not stand it any l o n g e r . "  ̂ -56
•^■^Hyde to Hoover, July, 1934, K-61. Former Kansas 
Senator Henry Allen hoped for a Hoover comeback in 1936.
Allen to Hoover, June 5, 1934, K-2.
154j)aWes to Hoover, August 29, 1934, K-27. Dawes said 
that H.H. was "the natural leader of our people" and must 
defend their principles.
l^Crowther to Hoover, July 30, 1934, K-25.
156pjoover to A. Brown, August 23, 1934, K-15.
CHAPTER IV
THE CHALLENGE TO LIBERTY
Rexford Tugwell, a Brains Truster, once described 
Hoover as "a man of principle . . . driven by duty."
Although personal and political reasons were influential, 
ideas primarily motivated Hoover's emergence from his sanc­
tuary.^ During the 1930's, he earned the place of "high 
priest and chief theologician of conservative Republicanism, 
a sort of St. Thomas Aquinas who reconciled the party's 
principles and stated them admirably." 2
As the ex-President reflected on his ideas of an 
"American System" and "rugged individualism," he resisted 
government participation in business, and opposed its 
restrictions, coercion, and abridgement of individual rights, 
and denounced the spread of graft, politics and bureaucracy.
-^-Rexford G. Tugwell, "The Protagonists: Roosevelt
and Hoover," The Antioch Review, XIII (December, 1953), 419, 
426. Personal vindication and a fragmented political party 
only added fat to the fire.
2Hicks, Republican Ascendancy, 210. Christopher 
Morley saw H.H. as "a scholar, the man of culture, the lover 
of books." John Haverstick (ed.), Saturday Review Treasury 
(New York, 1957), 1-8.
2Hicks, Republican Ascendancy, 210, 236. Hoover to 




Hoover sincerely feared that "corruption of the constitu­
tion" was leading to an elimination of individual freedom.
By 1934, the time to protest this "eclipse of liberty" had 
arrived.̂
Even before Hoover's publication efforts, financiers, 
skeptical of the New Deal, organized a league to defend 
their interests. John J. Raskob, a former Democratic 
National Chairman, joined Jouett Shouse, a Democratic poli­
tico, and millionaire Irenee du Pont in founding the Liberty 
League. John W. Davis and Al Smith, the Democratic Presi­
dential nominees of 1924 and 1928, respectively, were also 
leading figures in the new organization.^
Despite the League's obvious hostility to the New 
Deal, its public goal of defending property rights, its 
praise of "nineteenth century individualism and liberalism," 
and even its eventual political move to defeat FDR, Hoover 
remained its outspoken critic.^ He expressed his contempt 
by saying it was "one of the humors of the time." Too, its
^Hoover, The Challenge to Liberty (New York, 1934), 10. 
Hereinafter cited as Hoover, Challenge to Liberty.
^Strawn to Hoover, October 10, 1934, K-13 2; Hoover to 
Dawes, September 1, 1934, K-27; Wolfe, Hoover, 361; Schlesin- 
ger, New Deal, 482-487, said that conservative Democrats 
panicked and organized the League. Also see Burns, Lion and 
Fox. 206, 208.
6 Ibid.; Hoover to Dawes, September 1, 1934, K-27.
?Burns, Lion and Fox, 206. Frederick Rudolph, "The 
American Liberty League, 1934-1940," American Historical 
Review, LCI (October, 1950), 20-21, 31-32, sympathetically 
treats the League, its ideas, and its goals.
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leadership would increase the President's popularity and
chances of re-election.® Correspondent Ashmun Brown agreed
with Hoover that the millionaires running the League had
"financed all grouch movements since 1928" and that the
organization was "no place for a real Republican.1,9
Although Hoover clearly enunciated his opposition to
the League, several of his colleagues cautiously praised it
and hoped it would weaken Roosevelt. At the least, they
reasoned, its existence pointed up the division in the
Democratic r a n k s . I t  may have colored New Deal speeches
with conservative hues for a short time. Yet, Hoover and
Ashmun Brown predicted a move leftward by the administration
1 1following the November election.
8 M o o s ,  The Republicans, 401-402. H.H. blamed the 
League leaders for the existing chaos. Hoover to Dawes, 
September 1, 1934, K-27. H.H. also said that he was "no more 
fond of the Wall Street model of Liberty than [that] of the 
Pennsylvania Avenue model." Hoover to Lawrence Sullivan, 
August 27, 1934, K-132. H.H. wrote Henry Fletcher that they 
must condemn the "Big Business" orientation of the Liberty 
League. Hoover to Fletcher, August 25, 1934, K-38. Burns, 
Lion and Fox. 206, discusses FDR's relief on learning that 
the conservative opposition had coalesced and organized the 
Liberty League.
®A. Brown to Hoover, September 13, 1934, and A. Brown 
to Hoover, November 15, 1934, K-15. Brown disclosed the 
press' growing disillusionment with the Liberty League.
l®Knox to Hoover, September 4, .1934, K-72. Knox hoped 
the League would benefit the GOP and make a positive contri­
bution to stalling the New Deal. O 'Laughlin and Silas 
Strawn expressed similar sentiments. 0 'Laughlin to Hoover, 
September 6 , 1934, Box 44, O 'Laughlin Papers. Strawn to 
Hoover, October 10, 1934, K-132.
■^Hoover to Brown, October 17, and November 23, 1934, 
and A. Brown to Hoover, October 25, and December 6 , 1934, 
K-15.
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Hoover, recognizing his party's disturbing tendency
for fragmentation and self-destruction, hoped to find a
neutral, unifying ground. Liberty seemed a perfect issue.
Convinced of New Deal violations of the sacred covenant, he
sincerely and fervently urged a re-evaluation of New Deal
methods. In a couple of articles for the Saturday Evening
Post, anticipating his forthcoming book, he expressed his
1 7first public criticxsm of the New Deal. At once, Arthur 
Hyde, a loyal lieutenant, detected "the influence of 
[Hoover's] thought in the statements of men on the street, 
and in the speeches of those who [were] quoted in the 
p a p e r s . " - ^  Undoubtedly, in some circles this was the case.
As the publication date for Hoover's The Challenge to 
Liberty approached, the Chief’s advisers and well-wishers 
became more excited. They anticipated a tremendous philo­
sophical impact from the book.^ Hoover himself said:
l^uelsen, "Hoover Image," 160; Allen to Hoover, Sep­
tember 12, 1934, K-2; Silas Strawn to Hoover, October 10,
1934, K-132, praised the Post articles. Herbert Clark Hoover, 
"Consequences to Liberty of Regimentation," Saturday Evening 
Post, CCVII (September 15, 1934), 5-7. Herbert Clark Hoover, 
"Challenge to Liberty," Saturday Evening Post, CCVII (Sep­
tember 8 , 1934), 5-7.
'*'̂ Hyde to Hoover, September 13, 1934, K-61. Hyde 
told H.H. that the Post articles were well received, widely 
quoted, and very influential.
•^Sullivan to Hoover, August 23, 1934, K-132; Hyde to 
Hoover, September 27, 1934, K-39, lauded the thesis and 
H.H.‘s ability to steer a middle course between Wall Street 
and Washington. Fess to Hoover, October 17, 1934, K-36, 
liked H.H.'s "grasp of intricate governmental problems" and 
his exposure of the corruption of the public mind.
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"The Republican Party has been given the Ark of the Covenant,
if they have sense enough to recognize it; and they alone
can protect it.
As a "voice in the New Deal Wilderness," Hoover
articulated "the anxieties of many Americans with a vigor
and a clarity that he had rarely mustered while holding 
*1 /"power." He was recalling an older liberalism which had
permitted greater freedom to business and industry. He won
many adherents to his viewpoint. Because "his philosophy
never again represented a majority consensus is not to deny
the devotion it continued to earn in many quarters and the
significant weight it continued to bear in the modification
17of national attitudes and policies.'
When Hoover went to press, he strove for a muted, even
subtle, attack on the New Deal. He vigorously defended
individual liberty and warned of the ever existent challenges 
18to it. He was struggling against time, for his was an age
•^Hoover to Silas Strawn, October 15, 1934, K-132. 
Hoover to Theodore Roosevelt, Jr., September 10, 1934, K-115. 
In both letters, H.H. pointed to principles and expressed 
his belief that Republicans alone could protect liberty.
ISciarke A. Chambers (ed.), The New Deal At Home And 
Abroad, 1929-1945 (New York, 1965), 103. Hereinafter cited 
as Chambers, New Deal.
1 7Ibid. Richard S. Kirkendall, "The New Deal As 
Watershed," Journal of American History. LIV (March, 1968), 
849, says that "deep change" under FDR was impossible 
"because of the resistance of the opposition."
18Wolfe, Hoover, 361.
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of necessitated experiment. The trends in America, which he 
condemned— toward regimentation, broad executive power, and 
planned economy— were irreversible.
In The Challenge to Liberty, Hoover defined liberty 
as the right to choose one's calling, to develop a skill, to 
earn a profit, to accumulate property, and to go as far as 
character and ability would allow. ^  To him, liberty was 
"an endowment from the Creator . . . upon which no power,
whether economic or political, may encroach, and that not 
even the government can deny." Man was master, not servant 
of the state. "The sole purpose of government," he said,
"is to nurture and assure these liberties.
Despite the sacredness of liberty, economic blocs on 
the "Right," and bureaucracies on the "Left," in their 
respective greed for money and power, constantly challenged 
individual liberty. x Hoover thought that revolutions 
sparked by any extremist group invariably used similar 
tactics. To him, they all defamed existing institutions, 
negated public confidence, and gained office through 
demagogic promises. Revolutionaries fomented emergencies in
- ^ H o o v e r ,  challenge to Liberty, 2. Much of his 1934 
work was a restatement of his American Individualism.
^Hoover, challenge to Liberty, 3-4. According to 
Allan Nevius, "The Battle of 1936 Begins," Saturday Review 
of Literature, XI (October 6 , 1934), 168, H.H., in the 
Spencerian tradition, saw government as a necessary evil, an 
"agency apart from the people."
^^Hoover, Challenge to Liberty, 6.
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which the legislatures delegated extraordinary power to the 
executive while judicial independence was circumvented. To 
Hoover, revolutionaries played on the emotions while they 
destroyed liberty in its own house.^
According to the philosopher of American Individualism, 
liberty was implicit in the religious belief and spiritual 
aspirations of the founding fathers. Their unique contribu­
tion to liberty was in their establishment of a division of 
powers, within the government, to check encroachments or 
imbalances between state and federal authority, or threats 
to the independence of the executive, legislative, or judi­
cial branches.^
To Hoover, liberty was the key to progress. The 
American System, as he defined it, provided the atmosphere 
for the expression of individual instincts, impulses, 
creativity, change, and success. As he so often stated, "no 
economic equality can survive the working of biological 
inequality.”24 njn its wisdom," the American System had 
provided "rewards to stimulate the creative instincts” of
77Ibid., 15-17? Wolfe, Hoover, 362. H.H. was trying 
to claim the middle of the road. He was bending reality to 
fit his images and thus ignored his own experience with the 
Congress. That august body rarely relinquished its power 
for any great length of time. Once again H.H. was following 
his theories instead of framing them in his own experience.
2 %oover, Challenge to Liberty. 18-20.
7 AIbid., 23-27. Wolfe, Hoover. 362.
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m a n . 25 For the rest of his life, he defended economic com­
petition as the key to progress.
His System did not allow any group a license to 
exploit, for it had "within itself the forces of corrective 
antagonism to oppression of any kind.1126 Too, Hoover 
credited his system with humaneness, and community spirit.
He thought America's economic freedom explained her gradual 
obliteration of social and economic classes, her higher level 
of education, and her exemplary quality of justice.27 
Hoover's increasing isolation from reality had caused him to 
sanctify his own ideas.
Although the Great Depression disclosed certain weak­
nesses and abuses in the system. Hoover rationalized that 
thoughtful men had long conceded the need for reform and 
that this did not invalidate the system. To the contrary, 
he thought that existing problems could be solved within 
that frame of government and economy traditionally followed 
by Americans. He often stated that the depression was 
atypical of the system and that there was nothing wrong with 
the philosophy of i n d i v i d u a l i s m . t o  charges of rampant 
individualism or laissez-faire, he explained that such an 
attitude ended in America during the nineteenth century.
Only "reactionary souls" still yearned for such a policy.29
25Hoover, Challenge to Liberty. 28.
26ibid., 33-34. 27ibid-/ 40-44.
2 8Ibid., 46-48. 2 9l£id., 50-53.
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Hoover praised the philosophy of individualism as a 
bulwark against tyranny. In its natural opposition to 
"regimentation and National Planning," individualism thwarted 
dictatorial grasps at power. He credited it with frustrating 
the state's attempts to consolidate power in the executive 
office. Once the legislature of a state capitulated, he said 
that executives invariably enacted a managed currency and 
credit, debased the coin, adopted a sales tax, and sponsored
ongovernment competition with business. u
In one of his more powerful analyses, Hoover warned 
against the regimentation of industry and commerce. He 
indicted federal wage and hours codes and collective agree­
ments as coercive and unethical means to reach somewhat
O *1 (plausible goals. He reaffirmed his devotion to voluntarism 
and cooperation between the sectors of the e c o n o m y . T o
30lbid., 60, 70, 76-77, 91.
3 ^Ibid., 8-84. Although H.H. never mentioned the NRA 
by name, it was obvious that he dissented from this degree 
of regulation. He admitted the states had the moral power 
to enact many of the codes, but he failed to see their 
inability to do so. Allan Nevins, Saturday Review of Litera­
ture, XI {October 6 , 1934), 169-172, noted H.H.'s strong 
arguments against regimentation but charged the ex-President 
with creating a straw man, and ignoring reality.
^^Hoover, Challenge to Liberty. 85-86. H.H. was 
furious at government suppression of agricultural production. 
Nevins pointed to H.H.'s agricultural failure as the best 
proof for the enforcement established by the AAA. Too, the 
AAA was in the hands of county committees chosen by the 
farmers themselves and supposedly responsive to their wishes 
and direction. Allan Nevins, "The Battle of 1936 Begins," 
Saturday Review of Literature, XI (October 6 , 1934), 172.
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Hoover, the greatest sin, however, was government purchasing, 
construction, operation, and sale of products, in competition 
with private enterprise.33
In Hoover's mind, all national planning was national 
regimentation. He warned of shifts in fundamental philo­
sophical principles, especially those disguised as emergency 
programs.3^ Ironically, he stated: "No one with a day's
experience in government fails to realize that in all 
bureaucracies there are three implacable spirits— self­
perpetuation, expansion, and an incessant demand for more 
power."33 Hoover, who had done so much to advance federal 
bureaucracy and power— even if on a temporary basis— and who 
had laid the foundation for several New Deal programs, was 
shocked at the degree of change. He beat a hasty retreat.
As he looked back, somewhat nostalgically at the individ­
ualistic, rural, agrarian, Jeffersonian past and compared it 
to the regimented, urban, industrial, mass society of the 
leviathan state, he must have felt some guilt. Historian 
George Mowry summed it up thusly: "If no one is as zealous
33Hoover, Challenge to Liberty, 88. H.H. never con­
cealed his lifelong contempt for TVA. For an analysis of 
H.H.'s traditional way of thinking, and its fallacy, see 
Commager, The American Mind, 343-344.
3^Hoover, challenge to Liberty, 104-105, 111, 113-114. 
As Commager, The American Mind, 219-220, notes, H.H. thought 
the American System was irreconcilable with "planning."
Like Sumner and the Conservative Darwinists, he charged the 
planners with regimentation, bureaucracy and dictatorship.
•^Hoover, Challenge to Liberty, 113.
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as a convert, then perhaps no one conserves what is left of 
his ideological inheritance more than the man who has lost 
part of it. m36
To Hoover, the greatest misfortune of the present was 
the increasing conflict in all areas. He was absorbed by 
conflict between management and labor, creditor and debtor, 
government and public, executive and legislature, government 
and private enterprise, and the distinction of classes." 
Too, the expansion of federal power, via taxes, business 
codes, usurpation of legitimate legislative powers, and
•D Qbureaucracy, assured additional conflict in the future. °
In pleading for proper methods to obtain ideal goals, 
Hoover stated his acceptance of reform, change, responsi­
bility, and the need for experimentation. However, he said 
there was 11 as much danger in haphazard, ill-considered 
experiment as in stubborn opposition to all corrective 
movement and change." To him, experimentation must be in 
harmony with liberty; thus, certain boundaries were invio­
lable.3 9
He warned of bureaucratic propaganda, one-sided news
O /■George E . Mowry, The Era of Theodore Roosevelt, 1900- 
1912 (New York, 1958), 95.
"Hoover, Challenge to Liberty, 119-127, 134.
3 8 Ibid.. 127, 132-135.
" ibid., 145-146, 152. Wolfe, Hoover, 361, notes 
H.H.'s belief that methods of reform were as important as 
the aims.
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coverage, and smear tactics against critics and dissenters: 
"Managed Opinion" always accompanied managed economy, 
managed agriculture, and managed government.4°
Hoover denied the failure of his system. In pointing 
to the successful correction of past abuses, he said, "We do 
not need to burn down the house to hill the rats. He 
thought that the regulation of the trusts, monopolies, Wall 
Street, and the "robber barons" represented necessary and 
wise restrictions of the past. Yet, "in regulation," he con­
tended, "there must be the minimum necessary to attain true
A 9public ends." in this, he ignored the fact that the 
regulation he cited as good was necessarily imposed by the 
federal government.
Concerning the atypical depression which had raised 
so many questions about the American system, Hoover, pro­
moting his personal thesis, explained that the aftermath of 
World War I and the despotism of Europe were direct causes. 
Rampant nationalism throughout the world, he theorized, had 
aggravated an international depression. Once the economy 
touched bottom in 1932, everyone began recovering. Only the 
United States, due to an election of a new administration 
and the lack of confidence in its intentions, he said, failed 
to recover. Yet, the system was so sound that ninety-two per 
cent of all bank deposits were validated, along with their
^Hoover, Challeng-e to Liberty, 135-136.
4 1 Ibid., 154. 42ibid.. 157, 15 9.
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respective banks, after a brief, unnecessary closing. To 
him, minor reforms and adjustments were all that were 
required.43
Although convinced of the soundness of his system, 
Hoover was gravely concerned about the abridgement of liberty, 
even on a temporary or an emergency basis. To him, regimen­
tation was the greatest danger of modern society. He saw 
the breakdown of spiritual values, of the family, and of the 
home as an erosion of traditional safeguards. He warned,
"We cannot extend the mastery of government over the daily 
life of a people without somewhere making it master of our 
souls and thoughts . "44
Men with a variety of viewpoints read Hoover's analy­
sis of modern society, with its challenges to liberty.
Reviews of the book were mixed. The W ashington Daily News 
described it as "singularly free from personalities or 
bitterness.1,43 The Wall Street Journal praised Hoover's dis­
passionate approach and his lucid analysis of "true liberal­
ism."^ The Christian Century termed it "the most powerful,
4 3 Ibid.. 169-171, 177, 184. Wolfe, Hoover, 362.
4 4Hoover, Challenge to Liberty, 191, 193, 196, 203. 
Even at this late date, H.H. denied a revolution had occurred 
within the United States. He did admit there were individ­
uals who wanted to completely alter American society.
^ W a s h i n g t o n  Daily Hews, August 22, 1934, as cited in 
Nelsen, "Hoover Image," 160.
4^Wall Street Journal, September 28, 1934.
both in tone and argument, that has yet appeared11 but ques­
tioned the former President's ability to accept change.47
New Dealers Donald Richberg and Harold Ickes and cor­
respondent Heywood Broun denounced Challenge to Liberty as 
representative of a near-anarchist frame of mind and as a 
politically-motivated diatribe.48 Critic John Chamberlain 
said Hoover's "need for self-justification" and his over­
flowing bitterness were now undeniable.49
In a third viewpoint, William Allen White said Hoover
c nwas not an enemy of the New Deal goals but of its methods. w 
Correspondent Wesley Mitchell credited the former President 
with a middle view, independent of the radical and conserva­
tive elements.51 Reviewer Allan Nevins categorized Hoover's 
book as "high ground," impersonal, restrained, principled, 
and a eulogy to "old standards, old aims, and old tradi­
tions . "52
Like the reviewers, politicians reacted diversely to
"Mr. Hoover on the New Deal," Christian Century, LI 
(October 3, 1934), 1230-1232.
48New York Times, September 6 , 1934; Washington Post, 
September 5, 1934, and San Francisco News, September 4, 1934, 
as cited by Nelsen, "Hoover Image," 160.
49New York Times, September 28, and October 3, 1934, 1
5QIbid., September 28, 1934, 1.
5^Wesley Mitchell, "Mr. Hoover's Challenge to Liberty, 
Political Science Quarterly, XLIX (1934), 599.
52ftiian Nevins, "The Battle of 1936 Begins," Saturday 
Review of Literature, XI (October 6 , 1934), 155-172.
104
the controversial booh. Some Republicans claimed it was a 
sacred text which would mobilize men of ’’reason and sanity" 
into a resurrection of principles for American society.^
The irascible James Beck damned the ’’morons" of The Hew 
Republic and The Nation for trying to minimize "the value of 
your m e s s a g e . E a r l  Warren, a rising young Republican from 
California, wrote his Chief, "challenge to Liberty will 
always be among my most prized possessions.’1̂  Mills thought 
the Chief's book had stemmed the tide and exposed the New 
Deal's lack of principle. However, he urged a fresh attack 
along economic lines, for "the danger of individualism is 
too remote to interest the average man, but the economic 
failure is close to home."^®
The apolitical nature of the book gained little 
acceptance in any quarter. Spokesmen for the Administration
S^Henry j. Allen to Hoover, October 13, 1934, K-2, 
said that he carried it around "like a Mohammedan carries 
his Koran." Silas Strawn to Hoover, October 10, 1934, K-132, 
praised the common sense approach of the book. Ashmun Brown 
to Hoover, October 11, 1934, K-15, thanked H.H. for a 
"coherent and well reasoned textbook on principles of govern­
ment." Lawrence Sullivan to Hoover, October 23, 1934, K-132, 
noted the book was "a sensational success" and that Herald- 
Tribune polls showed it as the top nonfiction seller in 
forty-one of the nation's forty-five largest bookstores.
S^Beck to Hoover, October 23, 1934, K-9.
^Warren to Hoover, August 23, 1934, K-145.
56Mills to Hoover, September 7, and October 1, 1934,
K-92.
105
deprecated its v a l u e . E v e n  Republicans scoffed at the 
facade of nonpartisanship of the book and noted its loaded 
critique of New Deal methods and its pre-election timing. 
Obviously it was much more than a simple restatement of 
Hoover's philosophy of American Individualism.®® Senator 
Borah, with "the Presidential bee in his bonnet," accused 
Hoover of firing the opening gun for a 1936 presidential
Surprisingly, some of Hoover's most faithful lieu­
tenants dissented on his analysis of American society. 
Justice Harlan Stone softly disagreed by saying that modern 
civilization, with all its complexity, made a return to the 
ideal Jeffersonian state impossible.®® Henry Stimson,
5^Donald Richberg, Harold Ickes, and Heywood Broun 
wrote articles for various newspapers, condemning the book. 
Nelsen, "Hoover Image," 160. Hoover to Hyde, October 1, and 
October 8 , 1934, K-39, and Strauss to Hoover, September 6 , 
1934, K-130, discussed the critical articles and their 
sources.
®®"Pawns of the State," New Republic, LXXX (September
26, 1934), 181-182. Literary Dicrest, CXVIII (August 25,
1934), 14, said that the book marked the return of H.H. to 
the political arena. Mayer, The Republicans, 432, notes 
H.H.'s efforts to give the GOP a constitutional issue and 
calls it a partisan move. "Mr. Hoover on the New Deal," 
Christian Century, LI (October 3, 1934), 1230-1232, speaks 
of the book as "a campaign manual." Cal 0 'Laughlin praised 
the political utility of Challenge to Liberty. 0 'Laughlin 
to Hoover, September 6 , 1934, Box 44, 0 'Laughlin Papers.
The Nation, CXXXIX (September 19, 1934), 313-314, noted that 
the book would be on the stands one month before the election.
®®Fort to Hoover, November 14, and December 12,
1934, K-38.
®®Cramer, Newton D. Baker, 263-264.
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although in complete accord with Hoover's "fundamental dis­
tinction between liberalism and all other forms of govern­
ment, " disagreed with the Chief on the attitude of the 
American public. Stimson doubted the people had "abandoned 
the philosophy of their fathers."®-1'
Many lawyers, journalists, and politicians recognized 
the political nature of Challenge to Liberty and applauded 
its "exposure" of dangerous policies and methods.®2 Too, 
the ex-President's intentions, hardly debatable, were under­
lined when he urged his friends to write letters to their 
newspapers on Challenge to Liberty in order "to irritate the 
New Dealers."®®
As Hoover and his followers reflected on the chal­
lenges to liberty, the importance of the November election 
loomed ever larger. Too, Republicans throughout the nation
®lstimson to Hoover, July 12, 1934, K-129. Stimson 
was evaluating the draft of Challenge to Liberty which H.H. 
had sent him.
®20liver Street to Hoover, May 21, 1934, K-132.
Allen to Hoover, October 13, 1934, K-2. Beck to Hoover, 
October 23, 1934, K-9. Mills to Hoover, September 7, and 
October 1, 1934, K-92. 0 'Laughlin to Hoover, September 6 ,
1934, Box 44, 0 ’Laughlin Papers, Strauss to Hoover, 
September 6 , 1934, K-130.
®®Hoover to Allen, October 17, 1934, K-2, urged the 
Kansan and his friends to write letters to the editor of 
their newspapers concerning the book.
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fiAwrote distressing news to the ex-President. Even in the 
farm belt, for months an area of great dissent where agrarians 
had denounced federal restrictions, men began to note the 
rise in prices and the generous government checks. The
65pendulum was clearly swinging in favor of the Democrats. J 
Saddened by election polls, Hoover painfully admitted, "you 
don't shoot Santa Claus."^® News correspondent Frank Kent 
wrote: "The bribery of the nation is so complete and on such
a colossal scale that I can't see any reason the New Deal 
should not win everything in sight at the coming
Spangler to Hoover, September 5, 1934, K-127; Theo­
dore Roosevelt, Jr., to Hoover, September 4, 1934, K-15, saw 
no hopes of winning the East in November. Congressman Bert 
Snell of New York agreed that the East was "in a stupor."
The GOP would have to wait until another election for the 
restoration of sanity. Snell to Hoover, October 17, 1934, 
K-126. Alan Fox to Hoover, September 17, 1934, K-39, con­
ceded New York to Democrats and noted that the strongest men 
in the party refused to make the sacrifice. Fox to Hoover, 
October 3, 1934, K-39, said that personalities, not issues, 
would assure the Democrats a November sweep. He also con­
fessed the GOP was still badly divided. Chairman Henry 
Fletcher wrote H.H., August 31, 1934, K-38, that Republicans 
would gain few if any seats in the Senate. Also see A.
Brown to Hoover, October 11, 1934, K-15.
^^Spangler to Hoover, September 5, 1934, K-127; Hyde 
to Hoover, September 13, 1934, K-61; Allen to Hoover, October
13, 1934, K-2; Strawn to Hoover, October 10, 1934, K-132, 
bemoaned the dole and the votes it assured for the Democrats; 
Senator Dickinson charged the Democrats with "buying 
favoritism" and implementing Tammany methods on a national 
scale. Dickinson to Hoover, November 1, 1934, K-29. Ogden 
Mills wrote H.H. that Democrats were setting records through­
out the nation in their "colossal outpouring of funds."
Mills to Hoover, September 7, and October 1, 1934, K-92.
®®Hoover to Spangler, September 10, 1934, K-127;
Hoover to Lewis Strauss, September 10, 1934, K-130, admitted 
that the GOP's hopes looked lean for November.
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e l e c t i o n . A s  Tammany methods swept across the nation, 
Hoover feared that the people had "abandoned all their 
creative thought.
Aside from the lean Republican prospects, Hoover 
lamented the failure of so many party candidates to defend 
principles or attach the major issues. To him, "jelly-fish" 
politicians were accepting fifty per cent of FDR's platform, 
and Vandenberg was "a profound example."^® Frank Knox tried 
to bolster his Chief's morale by showing that some Republi­
cans were dispensing "the good, old-fashioned gospel. 
Unreconciled, Hoover’s faith in the party's future declined.
Following the disastrous November election, Hoover and 
Chairman Fletcher grasped at every straw. Admitting the
^ K e n t  to Hoover, October 8 , 1934, K-61.
®®Dickinson to Hoover, November 1, 1934, K-29.
^Hoover to Will Irwin, August 27, 1934, K-61; Hoover
to Knox, October 2, 1934, K-72, began to doubt the party's 
future.
^Hoover to Hyde, October 1, 1934, K-61; Hoover to 
Hurley, September 11, 1934, K-60; Hoover to Allen, October 
17, 1934, K-2; Hoover to Knox, October 2, 1934, K-72; Hoover
to Reed, October 17, 1934, K-107, praised the Pennsylvanian
for "fighting the campaign on its main issue and the real 
question of principle." Hoover to Tox, October 8 , 1934, K-
39, praised Reed and Fess as the only ones not "trying to 
pussyfoot into office." H.H. was probably upset with the 
assaults on his administration and the weak defense of it by 
congressional Republicans. For example, see Cong. Rec., 73 
Cong. 2 Sess. (February 1, February 5, 1934), 1784-1785, 
1795, 1934.
^ K n o x  to Hoover, October 23, 1934, K-72.
72Hoover to Knox, October 2, 1934, K-72.
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party's loss within Congress, they hoped it was gaining new 
strength outside. Although GOP totals had fallen since 
1932, they noted that the Democrats had lost seven million 
votes. Consequently, they concluded that the party was still 
alive, even strong, and had been beaten by money.
Hoover tried to boost party morale and rally an oppo­
sition.^ Republicans everywhere recognized the difficult 
task they faced in the new Congress.^ Hoover thought that 
the California election, where "sane" (conservative) Demo­
crats allied with the GOP to defeat the radical candidates, 
portended an important lesson for the future.
73port to Hoover, November 7, 1934, K-38, noted that 
Jersey Republicans ran less attractive candidates and suf­
fered from a shortage of funds. Hoover to Fletcher, November 
8 , 1934, and Fletcher to Hoover, November 12, 1934, K-38. 
Hoover to Fess, November 9, 1934, K-36, and Hoover to Dickin­
son, November 9, 1934, K-29, discussed the heavy spending by 
the Democrats. Hoover to Reed, November 9, 1934, K-107.
0 'Laughlin to Hoover, November 12, 1934, K-101, pointed to 
the relief rolls, the many concessions to Labor, the GOP 
division, FDR's personality, and higher farm prices, as 
explanations of the expansion of Democratic totals. O 'Laugh­
lin noted the GOP, with forty-six per cent, was strong enough 
to challenge the New Deal in the future. Despite the November 
setback, the Literary Pi crest polls were most encouraging.
^Hoover to Snell, November 9, 1934, K-126; Hoover to 
Vandenberg, November 13, 1934, K-141.
"Defeatism stalked through the Republican camp." E. 
Francis Brown, "The Moral of the Elections," Current History, 
XLI (December, 1934), 279-283. Vandenberg to Hoover, Novem­
ber 8, 1934, K-141.
76Hoover to Snell, November 9, 1934, K-126; Hoover to 
Vandenberg, November 13, 1934, K-141. Hoover hoped GOP 
leaders in Congress might gain the cooperation of "sane" 
Democrats to thwart the New Deal. Later, Vandenberg would 
become the famous advocate of bipartisanship in Congress.
1X0
Hooverite Arch Shaw of Chicago, in a sourgrapes mood,
concluded that the elimination of Republican candidates who
refused to defend the Hoover Administration and attack New
Deal transgressions was proper.77 However, Senator Dave
Reed, Pennsylvania's powerful GOP leader, a firm advocate of
the Hoover line, had suffered an ignominious defeat. Pess
7 8and other stalwarts had been unseated. Nothing could
cover the fact that the GOP had lost ten more Senate seats
and nineteen additional House seats.79 Regardless of what
they said to one another, Hooverites could find little
consolation. In bitterness, Reed said that the election was
"an auction” and "an endorsement of [nothing] but ready 
80cash.” Hoover assured the Pennsylvanian he would "be more
effective in awakening the public mind outside of the halls
81of the Senate than even in them."ox Pennsylvania voters agreed.
77ghaw to Hoover, November 9, 1934, K-119. O 'Laugh­
lin to Hoover, November 12, 1934, Box 44, O 'Laughlin Papers, 
agreed with the opinion that some Republicans were deserving 
of defeat. Ashmun Brown to Hoover, November 15, 1934, K-15, 
believed that the GOP invariable nominated weak candidates 
for the 1934 races.
^Hoover to Reed, November 9, 1934, and Reed to 
Hoover, November 20, 1934, K-107. Mayer, The Republicans, 
432-435; E. Francis Brown, "The Moral of the Elections,” 
Current History, XLI (December, 1934), 278-283, said that 
the defeats of Reed and Fess were particularly stinging.
^Mayer, The Republicans, 432-435.
®^Reed to Hoover, November 20, 1934, K-107, although 
recognizing that money had beaten him, could not understand 
how the American "people were fooled so easily."
8^Hoover to Reed, November 9, 1934, K-107.
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As Republicans reflected on the November debacle and 
their own internal divisions, they recognized that the time 
for national reorganization had arrived. Once again, how­
ever, they differed on the proper method for revival. Cal 
0 'Laughlin expressed a widely held contention that there 
were too many prima donnas at the national level. In the 
Senate alone, Republican individualists like McNary, Hiram 
Johnson, Norris, Borah, Nye, and even Vandenberg refused to 
follow sound leadership. Old Guard leaders in the East 
refused to make concessions within the party organization 
and hence progressive-Old Guard quarrels were frequent. 
Someone from the center would have to revitalize the party,
and to Hooverites there was only one man for the job.®3
As Jerseyite Franklin Fort informed the Chief, 
following a conference with Borah and publisher Frank 
Gannett, all wings of the party wanted an alteration in the 
Republican image. Too long, Democrats had pinned the GOP 
with placing "property rights before human rights." Although 
Fort knew the two were inseparable, he recognized the prob- 
lem. Like his Chief, the Jersey adviser hoped to improve 
the party's image and remain "left to Hilles, Pomeroy, and 
Roraback" without moving in the direction of the
Q 90 'Laughlin to Hoover, November 12, 1934, K-101.
8 8 Ibid.; Hyde to Hoover, November 19, 1934, K-61.
8<%ort to Hoover, November 14, 1934, K-38.
New Deal.®^
Progressives William Allen White and Roy Roberts of 
Kansas also spoke for a revitalization of the party. How­
ever, they thought a Midwesterner, not closely identified
with the past administration, would serve as the best con-
86solidator. Both noted the availability of Frank Knox.
As efforts to remold the national party gained momen­
tum, the various state parties attempted to reorganize.
Earl Warren, the chairman of the Republican State Central 
Committee in California, wrote his Chief asking for a 
conference. The purpose was to discuss the future of the 
state party.
By late November, Hoover, pondering if his mail or 
his recent public receptions signified anything, became 
increasingly anxious to commence a public debate on issues. 
He even encouraged a public request for his return to the
p Ostump. Since the printed word had failed to awaken the
8®Hoover to Fort, November 17, 1934, and Fort to 
Hoover, December 12, 1934, K-38. As to Borah, the ex-Presi- 
dent said, "he constitutionally just must be against every­
thing. If ever there was a program . . .  in line with 
Borah's sentiments” it was the New Deal.
®®Hyde to Hoover, November 19, 1934, K-61. The 
Missourian, following a talk with White and Roberts, reit­
erated his belief that H.H. alone had "the name, the vision 
or the popular support to undertake the task."
8?Warren to Hoover, November 23, 1934, K-145.
88Hoover to Hyde, November 23, 1934, K-61. "I am 
wondering if a group of 1 0 0 representative men over the 
country could be organized to make a request that I undertake 
a constructive debate of the measures before Congress . . . 
as a needed public service."
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populace to its danger, perhaps public addresses would 




As the new year began, the ex-President prepared to 
take to the road with a series of public addresses which he 
hoped would reawaken America's conscience. As Raymond Moley 
once said: "No politician would wish his words and actions
to be known as political; to deny political motives is a 
first principle in the political a r t . H o o v e r ,  never "per- 
mitting himself to rust in inactivity,” carried on his 
prolific correspondence, issued numerous statements, sent 
memos to his aides, penned articles, and framed speeches 
throughout the early months of 1935.^
Hooverites, aware of their Chief's decision to abandon 
his sanctuary, vied for the opportunity to publicize his 
public pronouncements. Harrison Spangler, the Iowa national
^Moley, First New Deal, 7.
^Moos, The Republicans, 395.
3Hinshaw, Hoover, 304, says that H.H. spent 1933-1934 
reflecting on events. Then, in the spring of 1935, "he went 
forth to preach, according to his light, the gospel of the 
place of government in the life of an individual, the place 
of the individual in his relations with other individuals 
and government, and the place of the individual in God's 
unfolding purpose for the universe." See Hofstadter, Politi­
cal Tradition, 308, concerning H.H.'s assumption of "the 
role of a hopeful Jeremiah."
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committeeman, pushed for a Midwestern Republican conference 
in Chicago to demonstrate GOP vitality and to reassure the 
public. He indicated the willingness of non-Hooverites such 
as John D. M. Hamilton of Kansas to cooperate in the rally. 
Too, Spangler thought that it was an opportune time to push 
for a reorganization of the party.^ In January, Hoover, 
ostensibly on a business trip, conferred with Chicago
CRepublicans. Walter Newton, having learned of a Young 
Republican meeting planned for Lincoln's birthday at Spring­
field, urged his Chief to speak, on this auspicious occasion 
and expressed the hope that such an address would be aimed 
at young Republicans of the Midwest.®
Meanwhile, Hoover and Ashmun Brown continued to 
analyze Roosevelt's budget and express disgust with the 
administration's attempts to disguise its actual spending. 
They found that FDR was transferring all public construction 
and reclamation costs from their normal categories to the 
"Recovery and Relief" section, and then dispensing false 
reports of a government surplus.7
Will Irwin, the Chief’s closest friend, disclosed the
^Spangler to Hoover, January 4, 1935, K-127.
®Hoover Collection, LXIV (January 6 , 1935), Item
2176A.
®Walter Newton to Hoover, January 22, 1935, K-97.
7A. Brown to Hoover, January 14, 1935, and Hoover to 
A. Brown, January 18, 1935, K-15. Both men blasted FDR's 
dual budget system.
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most startling political discovery. Irwin, on a trip to New 
Orleans, learned that the "Louisiana dictator, " Senator Huey 
P. Long, was planning to run on a third-party ticket in the 
presidential election of 1936. The "ingenuous Long" expected 
to split the Democratic vote, thus assuring the Republicans 
of victory. In return. Long expected the GOP to reward him 
with "all the patronage south of the Mason and Dixon Line." 
With this financial power base, the "Kingfish" could
Oseriously bid for the White House in 1940.
On February 12, Lincoln's Birthday, the former Presi­
dent attended the National Republican Club Dinner in New 
York City. in a few brief remarks, Hoover praised Lincoln's 
most admirable qualities of individuality, self-reliance, 
courage, patience, tolerance, and intellectual honesty.
Hoover also made a plea for personal liberty and warned that 
the public must always be master and "not the pawns of the 
state. 1,9
Having broken his two year's silence, Hoover soon
®Irwin to Hoover, January 24, 1935, K-62. To Irwin, 
Long was, "in his crooked, unscrupulous way, a genius." Con­
cerning the Long strategy, see T. Harry Williams, Huey Long, 
794-801.
®New York Times, February 13, 1935, 1. Hoover Collec­
tion, LXIV (February 12, 1935), Item 2180. Clinton Rossiter, 
Conservatism In America (New York, 1955), 187-191, notes 
that H.H. like all classical liberals, was devoted to Jeffer­
sonian phrases and ideas. Liberty was a favorite word with 
which to defend laissez-faire. Inasmuch as a man's eulogy 
often describes characteristics the speaker himself admires, 
Hoover's speech revealed his own desires.
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issued a public statement praising the Supreme court's 
decision negating America's repudiation of the gold clause. 
Hoover, a traditional defender of the gold standard and an 
arch-opponent of any repudiation of the Covenant, foresaw a 
restoration of confidence in the dollar and hoped for a re­
establishment of the gold standard. He contended that such 
action would restore jobs, create new ones, lower the 
living costs, reassure creditors, and check inflation.^®
Following Hoover's February barrages, Kansas Governor 
Alf Landon, possibly courting the ex-President's favor, 
struck up a correspondence with Hoover. Landon, praising 
Hoover's "penetrating" economic analyses, stated: "X hope
the country, as well as the party, may have the benefit of a 
more active interest m  politics on your part. 1 Such words
must have been sweet music to Hoover’s ears.
Cal 0 'Laughlin, ever laudatory, expressed his and
justice James Clark McReynolds' agreement with Hoover's gold 
1 9statement. Hoover, aware of the political repercussions 
his public views had caused, regretted that no other 
Republican had been willing to protest the moral issues. To
•^New York Times, February 21, 1935, 1. Hoover Collec­
tion, LXIV (February 20, 1935), Item 2185. See Cong. Rec.,
74 Cong. 1 Sess. (February 21, 1935), 2379. According to 
Nelsen, "Hoover Press Image," 167-158, H.H. reclaimed his 
role as spokesman for the "opposition" in his gold statement.
■^Landon to Hoover, February 22, 1935, K-74.
'Laughlin to Hoover, February 23, 1935, Box 44,
0 'Laughlin Papers.
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Hyde, he disclosed, "X will not keep still any longer, and X
1 *3an going to periodically shoot at the situation. N-1-J
Despite Hoover's efforts to breathe life into the GOP 
corpse, other party leaders failed to exemplify his aggres­
sive lead. 0 'Laughlin continued to inundate his Chief's 
desk with pessimistic letters concerning the abuses of the 
NRA, AAA., and other alphabetical organizations. 0 'Laughlin 
forecast even greater chasms and disasters in the future.^ 
Hoover, in turn, wrote his lieutenants of "a real degenera­
tion of the economic situation." He wished for Hyde's aid 
in drafting a forthcoming a d d r e s s . - ^
Despite unusually strong opposition on the part of 
his advisers, Hoover prepared a stinging message for the 
Young Republican Convention assembling at Sacramento. ° 
Perturbed at the National Committee and Republican Congres­
sional leaders, Hoover, although aware of the political 
folly, decided to unburden his conscience. He reasoned that 
his unselfishness, and the hari-kari tone of his act, would 
prove his disinterest in further political office. Too, he 
hoped that his GOP critics would realize, despite their
13noover to Hyde, February 25, 1935, K-61.
-*-̂0 'Laughlin to Hoover, March 2, March 9, March 16, 
March 23, and March 30, 1935, Box 44, 0 'Laughlin Papers. 
H.H.'s pessimistic Washington adviser moved steadily to the
"right" throughout the 1930's.
l ^ H o o v e r  to Hyde, March 15, 1935, K-61.
^Hoover to Hyde, March 17, 1935, K-61.
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selfish motives, that there was "such a thing as patriotism 
in the world.
In his address to the Sacramento convention, the 
former President urged young Republicans to accept "The 
Responsibility of the Republican Party to the Nation." He 
insisted on a "defense of fundamental American principles" 
and a restoration of the Constitution. "The newly created 
system of regimentation and bureaucratic domination," he 
said, "must be scrapped." To Hoover, the future of the 
country depended on a rejuvenation of a vigorous GOP organi­
zation. He thought that the incumbent administration had 
repudiated its obligations, debased the currency, multiplied 
the national debt, bureaucratized every facet of the economy, 
crushed competition, restricted production, abetted monopoly, 
violated the Constitution, and abridged individual liberty. 
Hoover demanded a change in methods. To him, real recovery 
was possible only through individual initiative and a new
1 Qopportunity free of regimentation and bureaucratic tyranny. °
l^Hoover to Hyde, March 19, 1935, K-61.
"The Responsibility of the Republican Party to the 
Nation,” Herbert Hoover, Addresses Upon The American Road, 
1933-1938 (New York, 1938), 40-44. Hereinafter cited as 
Hoover, Addresses on the Road. New York Times. March 24,
1935, 1. Hoover Collection, LXIV (March 23, 1935), Item 
2187. H.H. bemoaned the acceleration of class conflict. He 
hoped for a restoration of the traditional place of the 
family, and of the home, in men's lives. Democratic Congress­
man Fred H. Hilderbrandt, a constant critic, lambasted H.H.'s 
return to political activity. The South Dakotan said that 
it was tragic that Hoover wanted to revive a reactionary ele­
ment which had continually impeded progress. Concr. Rec.. 74 
Cong. 1 Sess. (March 25, 1935), 4403.
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Correspondent Lawrence Sullivan wrote the ex-Presi- 
dent: "The Sacramento declaration is a smash!" It provided
a rallying point for all New Deal opponents. For the first 
time in two years, "the banner is u p . I n  championing an 
aggressive attack on the New Deal, Arthur Hyde blasted the 
"opportunism and cowardice of others" and urged Hoover to 
give no quarter to the enemy. He reminded his Chief that 
"he who would be greatest among you shall be minister of 
all."2^ Rank and file Republicans were pleased with the 
former President's return to the arena and applauded his 
vigorous defense of "justice" and "right. " 2 1
Although Hoover, searching for a method to gain 
greater endorsement of his ideas, had hoped for a vigorous 
"grass roots expression of Republicanism" from the Resolu­
tions Committee of Midwest Republicans assembling in Kansas 
City, a distressed Hyde reported the failure of the committee 
to enunciate principles or indict the New D e a l . 22 M i s ­
sourian also noted a deterioration in party harmony as the 
Kansas clique pushed a Knox-Landon ticket for 1936. To Hyde,
if Republicans would only defend a principle, "they can then
-^Sullivan, Memo #28, March 24, 1935, K-132.
2®Hyde to Hoover, March 23, 1935, K-61.
21por example, see John Broom to Hoover, March 25, 
1935, K-15, and Oliver Street to Hoover, April 1, 1935,
K-132.
22Hoover to Knox, March 1, 1935, K-72, urged the 
Chicago leader to move his group toward a positive defense 
of their principles. Hyde to Hoover, March 20, 1935, K-61.
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do their worst on candidates. Charles H. Hilles, the 
national committeeman and New York "boss," concerned about 
the continued splintering of the party, urged a private 
Hoover-Hilles-Fletcher conference to discuss the party's 
future.
Despite the setback at the Kansas city conclave, 
Spangler promoted another Midwestern conference for early 
June. He believed that such a move would provide an 
excellent chance to rally the prairie belt to Hooverian 
ideas. Recognizing the need to avoid further squabbles over 
presidential candidacies, he pressed the leaders for the 
selection of a neutral speaker. Hyde wanted to invite 
Colonel Charles A. Lindbergh to address the meeting.
Their Chief, thinking in political terms, had a better idea. 
Having reopened contact with Governor Lowden during the 1934 
chairmanship fight and having cultivated the friendship of 
this old Progressive, Hoover, recognizing the Illinoian's 
influence with other segments of the party and anxious to 
promote harmony, suggested that Lowden was the ideal choice 
for speaker. Although the former politico had enjoyed seven 
years of retirement, Hoover personally visited him in
^Hyde to Hoover, March 20, 1935, K-61.
2^Hilles to Hoover, March 21, 1935, K-54.
2^Spangler to Hoover, March 26, 1935, K-127.
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a /;Illinois and coaxed him into making the Springfield address.
With the growing belief, obtained through his steady- 
correspondence, that his efforts were creating "a change in 
public psychology,” Hoover began to take heart at America's 
future. He was convinced that the time was ripe for a 
declaration of principles and a staunch defense of his past 
record with its "positive” solutions for the depression. To 
him, only the New Deal had prevented recovery.^ As William 
Allen White had stated, inflationists and jealous Republicans 
continued "to hurl garbage" at the ex-President because they
p pfailed to recognize the depth of his economic analyses. °
Yet, to Hoover, even the disbelievers were potential converts.
Hoover's return to political activity received ap­
plause from a variety of Republicans. An Alabama lawyer
expressed the hope that the former President would run the
pqNew Dealers out of Washington. Relief associate Vernon 
Kellogg praised his Chief as the natural "leader of the
^^William T. Hutchinson, Lowden of Illinois (Chicago, 
1957), II, 678-680. Following Hoover’s lead, Knox and Hyde 
readily conferred with Lowden concerning the Springfield 
Conference.
^Stone to Hoover, March 23, 1935, and Hoover to 
Stone, March 29, 1935, K-130. Both men perceived a change 
in the public mood. Also see Hoover to Spangler, March 29, 
1935, K-127.
28white to Hoover, February 26, and March 4, 1935,
K-147.
^Olive Street to Hoover, April 1, 1935, K-132.
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Republican party= Governor Landon, excited at Hoover's 
reassertion of leadership, said: "I, for one, am happy to
follow your leadership and will be glad to receive sugges­
tions from you at any time. 11 ̂fl­
ouring April, talk of presidential candidates surfaced 
at every Republican conclave. Hanford MacNider, who had 
been promoting a Knox boomlet for over a month, began to see
o Od i v i d e n d s . I n  fact, Knox, a former Bull Mooser, seeing 
the rapid momentum his candidacy was gaining, began to fear
a ’'premature” enthusiasm.^3 Nonetheless, following a
Chicago conference with Hoover, Knox, in a private letter to 
MacNider, disclosed the confidential admission that their 
Chief, "in the most specific terms, [stated] that he would 
never be a candidate again." The Chicagoan, sympathizing 
with Hoover, recognized the necessity for keeping his 
silence in order to maintain a degree of influence within 
the party.^
In spite of, or because of, Hoover’s renewed activity, 
Republican divisions became more evident. Hoover, lamenting
-^Kellogg to Hoover, April 1, 1935, K-67.
^^Landon to Hoover, April 4, 1935, K-74.
■^Knox to MacNider, March 1, 1935, Series 5, Box 73,
Hanford MacNider Papers, Herbert Hoover Presidential 
Library.
■^^Knox to MacNider, April 5, 1935, Series 5, Box 73, 
Hanford MacNider Papers.
3^Knox to MacNider, April 5, 1935, Series 5, Box 73, 
Hanford MacNider Papers.
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the lack of cohesion in the party, told Knox that GOP leaders 
panicked every time he left Palo A l t o . 35 Hilles, in a letter 
to Spangler, expressed the belief that the Midwestern con­
clave must promote party harmony and concentrate on New Deal 
failures rather than Republican personalities.^^ 0 'Laughlin 
reported a Fletcher-Hamilton split within the national head­
quarters . ̂  7
Magazines began speaking of the former President's 
busy activities, especially his conferences with Eastern GOP 
l e a d e r s . A s  rumors flew concerning Hoover's candidacy as 
well as his decision not to run again, his lieutenants urged 
him to make no statements which would weaken his influence
o qor imply endorsement of any other candidate.J= To them, a 
disavowal would minimize his influence. Too, Congressional 
leaders, long envious of his popularity with rank and file 
Republicans, would say that he was simply recognizing the 
fact that he had no chance at the nomination.^0
■^Hoover to Knox, April 29, 1935, K-72. Also see the 
New York Times. May 8 , 1935, 1, concerning House leaders' 
fear of another Hoover candidacy.
36nilles to Spangler, April 22, 1935, K-54.
370  'Laughlin to Hoover, April 27, 1935, Box 44,
0 'Laughlin Papers.
3%yews-Week, V (April 27, 1935), 17.
39a . Brown to Hoover, April 29, 1935, K-15; 0 'Laugh­
lin to Hoover, April 21, 1935, Box 44, 0 'Laughlin Papers.
4°Ibid.; A. Brown to Hoover, April 29, 1935, K-15.
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As s p e c u l a t i o n  o n  p r e s i d e n t i a l  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  m ounted, 
H o o v e r  b e c a m e  a g i t a t e d  at t h e  e f f o r t s  o f  E a s t e r n  n e w s p a p e r s  
to c r e d i t  h i m  w i t h  p r o m o t i n g  the p r e s i d e n t i a l  a s p i r a t i o n s  of 
O g d e n  Mills. A l t h o u g h  the e x - P r e s i d e n t  g r e a t l y  a d m i r e d  his 
former T r e a s u r y  Secretary, h e  k n e w  th a t  M i l l s  was n o t  a 
candidate, or i n t e r e s t e d  in b e c o m i n g  one. Too, H o o v e r  d i s ­
c o u n t e d  the a v a i l a b i l i t y  o f  any E a s t e r n  c a n d i d a t e  a n d  w a s  
c o n v i n c e d  t h a t  the n e x t  R e p u b l i c a n  n o m i n e e  w o u l d  be f r o m  the 
Mi d w e s t .  A l t h o u g h  it w a s  too e a r l y  to e n d o r s e  any o f  the 
candidates, H o o v e r  c o n c l u d e d  t h a t  "the m a n  X do s u p p o r t  will 
from t h a t  m o m e n t  lead the r a c e .
As the M i d w e s t  C o n f e r e n c e  approached, H o o v e r  an d  
s e v e r a l  of  h i s  c o l l e a g u e s  h o p e d  for the r e v i v a l  o f  th e  p a r t y
AO
t h r o u g h  a s e r i e s  of s u c c e s s f u l  r e g i o n a l  c o n f e r e n c e s .  6 
Mills, f o l l o w i n g  his s t a t e m e n t  t h a t  "under n o  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  
w i l l  I be a c a n d i d a t e  for o f f i c e , " n o t e d  a  m a r k e d  i m p r o v e m e n t  
in h i s  r e l a t i o n s  w i t h  V a n d e n b e r g ,  Knox, Landon, and o t h e r  
aspirants. C o n s e q u e n t l y ,  M i l l s  sou g h t  t h e i r  c o o p e r a t i o n  in 
f r a m i n g  a d e c l a r a t i o n  o f  p r i n c i p l e s  at th e  f o r t h c o m i n g
^ H o o v e r  to A. Brown, A p r i l  27, 1935, and A. B r o w n  to 
Hoover, A p r i l  29, 1935, K-15. B o t h  m e n  w e r e  c o n v i n c e d  that 
a m a n  from the W e s t  w o u l d  b e  the 1936 n o m i n e e .  H o o v e r  to 
0 'Laughlin, A p r i l  27, 1935, K-101, w o n d e r e d  if the E a s t e r n  
p r e s s  w o u l d  e v e r  r e a l i z e  t h a t  M i l l s  w a s  d i s i n t e r e s t e d .  H.H. 
h o p e d  th a t  so m e  o f  the p r e s i d e n t i a l  a s p i r a n t s  w o u l d  a w a k e n  
to the va l u e  o f  h i s  p e r s o n a l  e n d o r s e m e n t  o f  their candidacy.
^ K e l l o g g  to Hoover, A p r i l  27, 1935, K-67? H o o v e r  to 




Prior to the conclave, Hyde worhed on a draft of--his 
own principles while Spangler pressed William Allen White to 
accept the lead role in advocating a platform with Hooverian 
ideas. Although the Kansan expressed general agreement on 
issues, for personal reasons, he hesitated to participate 
officially.^ Hoover, anxious for White's participation, 
wrote the Kansan that the time had come to defend their 
principles. He urged White to move party leaders toward a 
statement which defended the GOP record and pointed up the 
international origins of the depression, the recovery under­
way in 1932 (prior to the election and panic), the constitu­
tional violations by the New Deal, and the direction to true 
recovery.45 White, disturbed at the Republican failure to 
formulate a constructive program and anxious to avoid embroil­
ment in the factional disputes of his party, declined the 
leadership role of the approaching conference.^
Colonel Creager theorized that factionalism was
^Mills to Hoover, May 13, 1935, K-92. Donald R. 
McCoy, "Alfred M. Landon and the Presidential Campaign of 
1936," Mid-America, XLII (October, 1960), 204, says that 
Mills was an official Landon adviser during the campaign.
^Hyde to Hoover, May 10, 1935, K-61. Spangler to 
Hoover, May 13, 1935, K-127. Hyde to Hoover, April 29, 
1935, K-61, expressed doubt concerning the Kansan's ability 
to formulate "a decently conservative platform."
^^Hoover to Spangler, May 10, 1935, K-127.
46Hoover to Spangler, May 10, 1935, and Spangler to 
Hoover, May 13, 1935, K-127.
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d e s t r o y i n g  the R e p u b l i c a n  Party. He h o p e d  t h a t  the 1936 
n o m i n e e  w o u l d  b e  able to r e u n i t e  the p a r t y . H o o v e r ,  
e q u a l l y  c o n c e r n e d  over the i n t e r n a l  b l o o d - l e t t i n g ,  w a s  m o r e  
d i s t u r b e d  at the ta l k  o f  a n e w  c o a l i t i o n  party, p e r h a p s  a 
C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  Party. To Hoover, h i s t o r y  h a d  p r o v e n  the 
lack o f  w i s d o m  in t h i r d - p a r t y  moves, and h e  d o u b t e d  t h a t  the 
S o u t h  w o u l d  le a v e  the D e m o c r a t i c  fo l d  e x c e p t  for a d e e p  
e m o t i o n a l  a v e r s i o n  such as in 1 9 2 8 . H e  h o p e d  th a t  C r e a g e r  
an d  o t h e r  i n t e l l i g e n t  R e p u b l i c a n  l e a d e r s  o f  the S o u t h  w o u l d  
n i p  the m o v e  b e f o r e  it b l o s s o m e d .49 In a l e t t e r  w h i c h  h a r d l y  
r e a s s u r e d  the ex-P r e s i d e n t ,  C r e a g e r  e x p r e s s e d  h i s  p e r s o n a l  
b e l i e f  t h a t  J e f f e r s o n i a n  D e m o c r a t s  w o u l d  a l i g n  w i t h  R e p u b ­
licans in 1936 "if we n o m i n a t e  a p r o p e r  c a n d i d a t e  an d  a d o p t  
the k i n d  o f  p l a t f o r m "  r e q u i r e d .50
Creager, a l u d i n g  the former P r e s i d e n t ' s  b r o a d s i d e s  at 
"the s o c i a l i s t i c  c r o w d  in W a s h i n g t o n , " t h o u g h t  t h a t  the 
s peeches w e r e  t a k i n g  p o s i t i v e  e f f e c t . F r a n k  K n o x  also 
n o t e d  a g r o w i n g  d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n  w i t h  the N e w  Deal. L i k e  
Hoover, the C h i c a g o a n  t h o u g h t  t h a t  the GOP n e e d e d  to m o b i l i z e  
an d  take a d v a n t a g e  of the s i t uation. T o  Knox, H e n r y  F l e t c h e r
4?Creager bo Hoover, May 10, 1935, K-25.
40Hoover to Creager, May 16, 1935, K-25.
4 9 I b i d .
50C r e a g e r  to Hoover, M a y  29, 1935, K-25, n a m e d  
S e n a t o r  H a r r y  F. B y r d  of  V i r g i n i a  as the J e f f e r s o n i a n  th e  
So u t h  w o u l d  m o s t  r e a d i l y  accept.
5^Creager to Hoover, May 10, 1935, K-25.
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w a s  a f a i l u r e  as N a t i o n a l  C h a i r m a n ,  and o n l y  t h e  a g g r e s s i v e  
J o h n  H a m i l t o n  o f  K a n s a s  s h o w e d  a n y  o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  t a l e n t  at 
p a r t y  h e a d q u a r t e r s .53 H o w e v e r ,  th e  division, e v e n  at the 
to p  o f  t h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n ,  w a s  r e l a t e d  to p r e s i d e n t i a l  a m b i ­
t i o n s  .
O g d e n  Mi l l s ,  h a v i n g  r e a s s u r e d  K n o x  a n d  o t h e r s  o f  the 
s i n c e r i t y  in h i s  p e r s o n a l  d i s a v o w a l s ,  n o w  m o v e d  t h r o u g h  t h e  
c a m p s  o f  the d i f f e r e n t  p r e s i d e n t i a l  a s p i r a n t s .53 M i l l s  
d e c i d e d  t h a t  K n o x  w a s  th e  l e a d i n g  c o n t e n d e r .  H e  also l e a r n e d  
t h a t  H a m i l t o n  a n d  S e n a t o r  C a p p e r  o f  K a n s a s  w e r e  l e a n i n g  
t o w a r d  t h e  C h i c a g o a n .  R u m o r s  e v e n  f l e w  a r o u n d  t h a t  B o r a h  
w a s  a b o u t  to e n d o r s e  K n o x . 5 ^
By early 1935, Senator Borah and various Progressives 
were accusing the NRA of discrimination and of abetting 
monopoly. In March, 1935, Roosevelt appointed a commission, 
headed by Clarence Darrow, to investigate the codes, their 
coercion, and their negative results. When no reports were 
printed and no Republican leader questioned the failure to 
publicize the commission's findings, Hoover decided to
52Knox to Hoover, May 1, and May 6 , 1935, K-72.
^Mills to Knox, May 9, 1935, Box 11, Ogden Mills 
Papers, Library of Congress. Knox to Gordon 0 'Neill, May
15, 1935, Box 11, Ogden Mills Papers. Creager to Hoover, 
May 10, 1935, K-25.
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provide “some intellectual leadership for the p a r t y . O n  
May 15, he issued a press statement on the NRA, indicting it 
as "un-American in principle and a proved failure in prac­
tice." To him, the codes had retarded recovery by increasing 
the "costs of production and distribution, and therefore 
prices." He said that non-consumption and unemployment were 
the end results. He charged the NRA with encouraging 
monopoly by allowing certain violaters to bypass the anti­
trust laws. He noted a new degree of coercion and intimida­
tion by federal bureaucrats. He concluded that "we do not 
construct new buildings on false foundations, and we cannot 
build a nation's economy on a fundamental error." He called 
for specific statutory laws abolishing the abuses which the 
NRA had, in spite of its shortcomings, sought to overcome.^ 
As Hoover accelerated his activities, he noted and
55noover to Creager, May 16, 1935, K-25. H.H.'s 
charges were endorsed in the U. S. Senate Committee on 
Finance, 74 Cong., 1 Sess. Hearings: Investigation of the
National Recovery Administration (Washington, 1935), 1101, 
1271, 1304-1307, 2010, 2215, 2396, 2399, 2602, 2604, 2669, 
2633, 2891, 2847. The testimony underlined the lack of 
uniformity in administering the codes, the defective weak­
nesses in the codes, the coercion, the circumvention of the 
anti-trust laws, the destruction of competition, especially 
the detriment to small business, and the impediments to 
national recovery.
^Hoover collection, LXIV (May 15, 1935), Item 2195; 
New York Times, May 16, 1935, 1; Hoover, Addresses on the 
Road, 45-48. On May 24, H.H. issued an additional statement 
on the NRA, concentrating on its methods. Hoover Collection, 
LXIV (May 24, 1935), Item 2197. See Ogden L. Mills, What of 
Tomorrow? (New York, 1935), 10-14, 65, 121-217. Mills used 
Hooverian language in criticizing the NRA and economic 
planning as violations of individual liberty.
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57drew satisfaction from the "squirming" of his opponents.
The ex-President continued to work for regional conferences 
which would endorse his ideas. Willis C. Hawley of Oregon, 
an author of the controversial 1930 tariff, sent Hoover a 
list of Beaver State Republicans of "political experience 
and influence" who shared their belief in "the great princi­
ples of the Republican Party."58
On May 27, the Supreme Court invalidated the NRA as 
unconstitutional. Hooverites saw the decision as a personal 
victory for their Chief as it was "in accord with the views 
you have been publicly expressing.
Although Hoover was pleased with the Supreme Court's 
decision, he was uneasy about the new proposals of the 
Administration. Throughout June, he received letters from 
0 ‘Laughlin describing an acceleration of demagoguery, 
political opportunism, power grabs, and violations of indi­
vidual r i g h t s . Hoover became so obsessed with O 'Laughlin's 
pessimism that he turned his Chicago parley with Governor
^Hoover to O ‘Laughlin, May 20, 1935, Box 44,
O 'Laughlin Papers.
SSwillis c. Hawley to Hoover, May 31, 1935, K-50.
Hawley informed H.H. that the Oregon party was as badly 
divided as the national organization.
59creager to Hoover, May 29, 1935, K-25. Doctor Joel 
T. Boone to Hoover, June 6 , 1935, K-14, noted, "your sound 
decisions upheld." O 'Laughlin to Hoover, May 28, 1935, Box 
44, 0 'Laughlin Papers, praised H.H.'s sagacity. See Mason, 
Supreme Court, 84.
600 'Laughlin to Hoover, June 1, June 7, June 15,
June 22, and June 29, 1935, Box 44, O 'Laughlin Papers.
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Lowden into a discussion "of the administration's proposals 
to change to a European form of government."®-**
The Springfield Conference loomed as a crucial event. 
Hoover wired the delegates to fight for American principles. 
They could "give heart to the country."®^ Despite the 
initial success of the Hooverites in drawing up resolutions 
which dissented from various New Deal methods, the conven­
tion soon strayed from the Hoover path.®3 Governor Lowden1s 
Springfield speech was all the Hooverites could have hoped 
for as it indicted the New Deal1s NRA and AAA. The latter 
attack surprised some delegates to the extent that Hoover 
was charged with writing the speech and then persuading 
Lowden "to deliver it because of his greater influence with 
rural Republicans." Actually, Lowden1s speech was aimed 
primarily at the NRA but due to a few critical remarks on 
the AAA, the speech was misinterpreted. Notwithstanding, it 
had the Hoover tone.®^
Despite mixed reports thereafter, the Convention 
acted independently of the Hooverites' advice. The
SlHoover Collection, LXIV (June 4, 1935), Item 2200? 
New York Times. June 4, 1935, 1.
®^Hoover Collection, LXIV (June 6, 1935), Item 2201. 
A message to Springfield Republican Grassroots Convention.
®3Hyde to Hoover, June 13, 1935, K-61.
®^Hutchinson, Lowden of Illinois, II, 681. The 
Lowden biographer positively denies any Hoover authorship 
and credits Lowden with penning the entire speech, even the 
remarks on the AAA.
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Resolutions Committee endorsed a farm plank which included 
an "equalization fee," anathema to Hyde. Too, the Mis­
sourian was beside himself at its failure to include "a 
statement on the cause of the depression" and to point out 
Roosevelt's role in abetting it.®'’ Arch Shaw of Chicago 
denounced the Springfield conclave for rejecting Hoover's 
depression theory and urged the ex-President to explain the 
"facts" to the nation.®® In a less objective report,
Creager informed Hoover that the conference was a great 
success. He noted a new harmony and enthusiasm. He said 
that divisive issues like agriculture had been avoided and 
that "there was absolutely no evidence of the beginnings of 
organized candidacies." But then, Creager had conferred 
mainly with Hurley, Hyde, Lowden, and Fletcher.®^
Following the Springfield Convention, Ashmun Brown 
noted the increasing number of anti-New Deal editorials, and 
wrote Hoover that his Challenge to Liberty and his recent 
public statements were responsible for the growing signs of 
courage. To Brown, Hoover's inspiration was reflected in 
Judicial decisions and New Deal criticism by men in the 
street.®®
®®Hyde to Hoover, June 13, 1935, K-61. Newton to 
Hoover, June 15, 1935, K-97, shared Hyde's disappointment. 
Newton thought that the depression issue could not be 
avoided and that the GOP erred in not "facing it squarely."
SSghaw to Hoover, June 21, 1935, K-119.
®^Creager to Hoover, June 22, 1935, K-25.
®®A. Brown to Hoover, June 14, 1935, K-15.
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On June 16, Hoover delivered the commencement address
at his alma mater, Stanford University. He spoke on the
’’Essentials of Social Growth in America. " Aware of public
interest in “so-called social security,” he enumerated the
principles of true security as the freedom "to develop their
own talents and to be rewarded for their effort" and "the
capacity to produce a plenty of goods and services with which
to give economic security to the whole of us," as well as a
set of constitutional "checks and balances" and independence
from the "concentration of economic or political power."
The ex-President reaffirmed his belief that "there are no
short cuts. . . . Social security must be built upon a cult
& 9of work, not a cult of leisure." Again, the former 
President had enunciated an unmistakable stand against a New 
Deal proposal. Again, he had reaffirmed his belief in 
American Individualism.
Hoover's was not the first voice raised in opposition 
to social security proposals. Weeks earlier two Negro 
writers denounced the idea as a political trick. They noted 
that in the "black belt," states would control the Negro's 
social security check and would continue the discrimination
^%oover, Addresses on the Road, 51-57. Guerrant, 
Comparisons and Contrasts, 80-86, notes H.H.'s classical 
liberal approach to security. Wilbur and Hyde, Hoover 
Policies, 48-52, 91, note H.H.’s idea that "personal thrift" 
was the key. Too, H.H. favored an old-age plan through 
private mutual life insurance companies with low premium 
payments. Also see "Hoover: Ex-President Gives His Idea of
'Social Security,'" News-Week, V (February 23, 1935), 9.
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that existed in other areas. According to them, only a 
"pollyanna optimist" could fail to see through the AAA, the 
NRA, and now the Social Security Bill. They contended that 
Negroes, as marginal workers, had been the first to lose 
their jobs under the NRA, and that they had also been under 
differential wage scales as a result of the codes. Too, as 
tenants, Negroes had lost their livelihood as a result of 
government restrictions under AAA and had rarely received 
allotment checks from that agency.^
As New Deal injustices mounted, Hoover became more 
sensitive to the need of positive leadership. The former 
President returned to the political stump. Speaking at 
Grass Valley, California, on July 4, he warned that a 
"crisis of liberty" was at hand and that "America had today 
a transcendent mission to civilization, far beyond our own 
safety. It is our high duty to hold bright the light of 
individual liberty."^
Hoover's pique at his party’s failure to defend
^Editorial, "Social Security— for White Folk,"
Crisis, XLII (March, 1935), 80; George E. Haynes, "Lily-White 
Social Security," Crisis, XLII (March, 1935), 85-86. For an 
early denunciation of NRA, see John P. Davis, "What Price 
National Recovery?" Crisis, XL (December, 1933), 271-272.
Also see John P. Davi's, ^  Black Inventory of the New Deal,” 
Crisis, XLII (May, 1935), 141-142, for charges of racial 
discrimination in NRA, AAA, and PWA. See Roos, NRA, for a 
fuller treatment of this problem.
^Hoover Collection, LXIV (July 4, 1935), Item 2209. 
Congressman Hilderbrandt blasted Hoover's statements on 
Liberty as "ludicrous" and as an apology for exploiters of 
the working class. Cong. Rec., 74 Cong. 1 Sess (May 10, 
1935), 7318.
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principle accelerated at much the same rate as speculation 
on the 1936 presidential race. For several months, Knox 
remained the front runner. Despite Hurley's assurance that 
the former President had "absolutely no wish to return to 
public office," Old Guard leaders as well as their progres­
sive counterparts remained uneasy at Hoover's refusal to 
disavow his own possible candidacy.^
Concerning the various rumors of Hoover's unavaila­
bility, his disinterest, his endorsement of Knox, and his 
alleged intention of publicly announcing his decision to 
seek no more public offices, a disturbed Hyde wrote; "Please 
do not let them drive you far enough to say you would not 
accept if drafted." And "don't slam the door against the
7 orise,of a sentiment which may yet come."/J New Hampshire's 
George Moses,^ colonel Creager,^ and Henry R. Adams, a 
California Republican, equally upset with recent rumors,
^Hurley to Hoover, July 1, 1935, K-60.
^Hyde to Hoover, July 1, 1935, K-61. The Missourian 
reported that many of his friends and acquaintances thought 
that H.H. was the most experienced and able leader in the GOP 
but that they doubted his availability or his election 
chances. However, such reasoning, to Hyde, did not "prevent 
the growth of a positive pro-Hoover sentiment" in the near 
future. Fearing a disavowal statement from his Chief, Hyde 
urged caution, moderation, and the maintenance of an open 
door.
7 A^Moses to Hoover, July 2, 1935, K-95, also encouraged
further Hoover-Knox negotiations.
^Creager to Hoover, July 8, 1935, K-25. Creager
pointed to the political advantages of remaining silent and
urged H.H. to consolidate his "influence in the party and
in the next national convention."
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wrote Hoover to abstain from any public disavowal.78
Chicago lawyer Nathan W. MacChesney, a Hooverite but 
one outside the inner circle, hoped that the ex-President 
would maintain his noncommittal attitude on a possible 
candidacy. Having heard businessmen discuss Hoover's 
ability and the fact that he was the "logical candidate, 1 
MacChesney thought that he saw a drift in Hoover's direc­
tion.7  ̂ After a trip to the west c o a s t , 7^ the Chicagoan 
announced that critical times might force a draft-Hoover
move since the ex-President remained "the strongest single
7 Qcandidate" for office. A rank and file Republican, John 
Broom, endorsed the MacChesney statement and called on 
Hoover to expose the "Raw Deal."®®
In the month of July there were a myriad of mistakes. 
The Kansas City Star reported, in an authoritative tone, 
that Hoover privately had given Knox his blessing. Arthur 
Hyde attempted to force a retraction by editor Roy Roberts
78Adams to Hoover, July 20, 1935, K-l. Adams pre­
dicted that the nation would again call on Hoover for 
leadership.
77MacChesney to Richey, July 5, 1935, K-86.
78Ibid. "I am leaving for California tomorrow night
where I plan to see M r ..Hoover and talk things over with
him. "
78Los Angeles Times, July 13, 1935, 1.
80Broom to Hoover, July 8, and November 19, 1935,
K-15.
Q  Ibut left the waters even more muddied. Henry Fletcher 
allowed or encouraged the National Committee to circulate 
copies of Post articles which placed the ex-President in a 
bad light.83 Hoover was so incensed that he considered 
publicly demanding a change in the chairmanship.®3 Spangler 
equally irritated with Fletcher's conduct, admitted that the 
Chairman should spend even more time "at the golf course in 
Greencastle" but thought a public breach was unwise since 
many of their opponents would accuse Spangler of desiring 
the party post.®^ The Spangler note tempered Hoover's anger 
In fact, when Ogden Mills wrote the Chief demanding a shake- 
up in national headquarters, Hoover calmly replied that the 
time was wrong. He did promise, however, to work for 
reorganization in the future. Hoover also concluded that 
Fletcher was "now only a dummy for Hamilton" who was under
octhe wing of the Chicago group.
The former President remained uneasy at the efforts
®-*-Hyde to Hoover, July 4, 1935, K-61. The Star pro­
moted the Landon candidacy. Roy Roberts became the Governor 
publicity agent. See James W. Davis, Presidential Primaries 
Road to the White House (New York, 1967), 180; Herbert Eaton 
Presidential Timber (London, 1964), 363; and McCoy, "Landon 
and the Campaign of 1936," 197, 198, 202. McCoy says that 
H.H. "could not be considered out of contention." Hence, 
the article was probably a deliberate effort to discern 
H.H.'s actual intentions.
82nc>over to Spangler, July 15, 1935, K-127.
83Ibid.
®^Spangler to Hoover, July 18, 1935, K-127.
8^Mills to Hoover, July 22, 1935, and Hoover to Mills 
July 30, 1935, K-92.
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to deprive his friends of influence within the party hier- 
archy. Hoover and some of his advisers continued to press 
the Party for a defense of his administration and for a 
popularization of his depression-recovery theory. They 
reasoned that the depression could not be avoided as a cam­
paign issue and that an aggressive attack was the best means 
to minimize its effect.8^
In spite of Roosevelt's novel experiments, the economy 
remained on a low key. The processing tax stifled the tex­
tile industry in Rhode Island and undoubtedly affected 
election results in the small New England state. The August
returns were so surprising that several Eastern newspapers
88predicted that FDR would be a one-term President.
Throughout the nation, consumers' prices soared. 
Inflation was reflected in the astronomical rise in food 
stuffs, and especially in meat prices. As living costs and 
taxes spiraled upward, there was increasing talk of Con­
sumers' Leagues as a means to protest government policy.88
88Hoover to Spangler, July 24, 1935, K-127.
8^Hoover to Ashmun Brown, July 25, 1935, K-15.
88a . Brown to Hoover, August 12, 1935, K-15. New 
York Times, August 7, 1935, New York Herald Tribune, August 
7, 1935, Worcester Telegram, August 7, 1935, and Providence 
Journal, August 9, 1935, with their editorials on the elec­
tion, are included in the Brown to Hoover letter of August 
12, 1935.
88Ibid.; Henry J. Allen to Hoover, September 6, 1935,
K-2.
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On August 11, Hoover released a public statement 
indicting the Administration's efforts to alter the Consti­
tution. He warned of the destruction of the "balance of 
powers." He argued that Congress had surrendered its checks 
on executive authority, that the federal government had vio­
lated states rights, that bureaucracy had become a leviathan, 
and that constitutional revision was being promoted in an 
effort to alter the Supreme Court's challenge to the concen­
tration of power in the hands of the executive,Alabama's 
national committeeman, Oliver Street, wrote the former 
President that he alone among national leaders had pointed 
to "the supreme issue"— concentrated power. The lawyer urged 
Hoover to wage "an aggressive war on Roosevelt."9-1*
As Hoover-oriented Republicans continued to push for 
a platform of p r i n c i p l e s ,9  ̂ Spangler convinced Fletcher to 
call a September meeting of the Executive Committee. The 
GOP Chairman also agreed to cooperate with the Grass Roots 
movement in the Midwest and designated Spangler, Hamilton, 
and Indiana1 s George Ball to head the Chicago organization.93
^^Hoover Collection, LXIV (August 11, 1935), Item 
2211. New York Times. August 12, 1935, 1. Also see Mills, 
What of Tomorrow? 7-10, for a denunciation of the suspension 
of the constitution and unlimited executive power.
91Street to Hoover, August 12, 1935, K-132.
9^Henry Adams to Hoover, August 7, 1935, K-lr 
Spangler to Hoover, August 20, 1935, K-127.
93Ibid.
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Throughout the summer of 1935, the Knox presidential 
bandwagon gained steam. The Bull Mooser made inroads in New 
Jersey,94 Iowa,95 North Dakota,96 and Georgia.97 Delegates, 
friendly to the former President, assumed that Knox had 
Hoover's blessing.^8 When Knox came within one vote of 
Senator Lester Dickinson in Iowa, the GOP Senator's balloon 
burst.89 Senator Borah's drive also stalled.-1-99 Senator 
Arthur Vandenberg, waiting in the wings, needed the endorse­
ment of the Western Progressives if he was to become a serious 
candidate.-1-9-1-
Republican National Committeeman Mark Requa of Cali­
fornia conferred with Earl Warren, the state Attorney General, 
and informed his Chief that California laws negated any pos­
sibility of running uninstructed delegates for the national 
convention as a group. Each delegate, by state law, must be
94port to Hoover, July 27, 1935, K-39.
95icnox to MacNider, August 23, 1935, Series 5, Box 
73, Hanford MacNider Papers.
96ibid.. August 30, 1935.
97h . H. Turner to Hoover, September 9, 1935, K-15.
98lbid.
99Knox to MacNider, August 23, 1935, Series 5, Box 
73, Hanford MacNider Papers.
-'-"waiter Myers to Hoover, August 20, 1935, K-97.
lOlport to Hoover, July 27, 1935, K-39. Fort dis­
closed the attractiveness of Vandenberg to Washington leaders 
and the "old Regular crowd," many of whom thought that H.H. 
was unavailable.
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elected individually.l0^ New Yorker Alan Fox, persistently 
pressing his chief towards an active candidacy, conferred 
with Oklahoma Republicans and learned of a surprising rank- 
and-file receptivity for the former President. Although the 
majority of pro-Hoover men believed that he was unavailable, 
and although Fox admitted that his Chief could not openly 
seek the nomination, the New Yorker thought that Hooverites 
could encourage a public demand for the ex-President.-L®3 
Larry Richey, Hoover’s alter-ego, encouraged Fox and other 
friends of the Chief "to do whatever you can."1®^
When rumors spread concerning a break in the Hoover 
inner circle, Lewis Strauss, a confidant of the Chief, con­
ferred with Mills. Strauss soon denied "the defeatest 
attitude attributed to" the disciple and said that Mills 
continued to see Hoover as the antithesis to the New 
Deal.105
As the September meeting of the executive Committee 
approached, Spangler reminded his Chief of its importance
102j^eqUa to Hoover, August 12, 1935, K-108. The 
motive for this inquiry remains uncertain. Knox, the closest 
candidate to H.H.1s ideas, was the frontrunner. Only later 
did Landon emerge as the man to beat. Perhaps H.H. was 
reconsidering his own position as a non-candidate.
103pox to Richey, August 27, 1935, K-39.
104Richey to Fox, September 11, 1935, K-39.
l®^strauss to Hoover, September 17, 1935, K-130. 
Strauss conceded that Mills' conversation might have been 
"tempered by knowledge" of Strauss' own sympathies.
14-2
lOfiand the need to mobilize all Hooverites. The former
President urged Franklin Fort to push for a publicity drive 
by the organization and a delegation of more power to 
Spangler and the Midwestern group. Hoover also wanted a 
direct appeal to the youth of the nation and an acceleration 
of efforts at the local level.
Hooverites such as Earl Warren remained agitated at 
the expanding federal bureaucracy, the regimentation of 
Americans "into a socialistic state, and the [centralization
*| rjpof] all power in Washington. consequently the need for
positive alternatives accelerated. Fort decided to send up 
"a trial balloon" in an effort to prove the need for a 
stronger platform on principles. I-®9
For his part, Hoover made a Constitution Day Address 
at San Diego, California, on September 17. He spoke on "The 
Bill of Rights." Hoover accused alien philosophies popular 
in Europe with creating "a new slavery" in their violations 
of individual rights and their distortions of the role of 
government. To him, the Bill of Rights were as clear as the 
Ten Commandments. Moreover, "behind them is the conception
-*-®^Spangler to Hoover, September 10, 1935, K-127.
^®^Hoover to Fort, September 14, 1935, K-39.
-L®8Warren to Hoover, September 18, 1935, K-145.
Warren damned federal regulation of business and agriculture. 
He thought that it was incredible that farmers could be 
imprisoned for raising more than five bushels of potatoes 
without a federal permit.
109port to Hoover, September 18, 1935, K-39.
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which is the highest development of the Christian faith: 
the conception of individual freedom with brotherhood." To 
Hoover, the new panaceas lacked virtue, reason, or legality. 
He said, "Liberty is safe only by a division of powers and 
[through] local self-government. " H O
Following the National Executive Committee meeting, 
Walter Brown sent a full report to his Chief. As antici­
pated, Spangler had been named to chair Western activities. 
The Iowan promised to promote Young Republican Clubs and 
Leagues across the country. GOP finances were improving.
There was an increasing optimism regarding a platform of 
1 1 1principles.
Throughout 1935, Hoover made "what he regarded as 
authoritative definitions of party doctrine. At times 
he worked through the National Committee. More often he 
stumped the country. As an orator, he was ineffective, "for 
he read his uninspired speeches monotonously, rarely lifting 
his eyes from the manuscript. Yet, his oratorical
11 nJ"LUHoover, Addresses on the Road, 58-62. New York 
Times, September 18, 1935. See Cong. Rec.. 74 Cong. 1 Sess. 
(August 12, 1935), 12872.
H l w .  Brown to Hoover, September 26, 1935, K-16; 
Spangler to Hoover, September 30, 1935, K-127. Brown's reso­
lution on behalf of Spangler was unanimously endorsed. 
Hooverites were in the saddle as far as the Executive 
Committee was concerned.
H2jyiayer, The Republicans, 436.
ll^Qeorge Creel, Rebel At Large (New York, 1947), 266. 
Creel also noted H.H.'s improvement as an orator after his 
presidency. By the mid-1930's, H.H. looked at his audience.
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efforts were improving. Even his phraseology reflected a 
variation. There was increasing talk, even some articles, 
concerning the "new" Hoover— mellow, pungent, and human.^^ 
Correspondents were amazed at the buoyancy, optimism, and 
camaraderie of the oppositionist leader. His biting sarcasm 
and analytical "brilliance” sparkled in his Oakland
lieaddress.
Speaking to the California Republican Assembly on 
October 5, 1935, the ex-President focused on "Spending, 
Deficits, Debts and Their Consequences." In his plea for a 
return of common sense, Hoover said, "The issue of America 
is not a battle of phrases, but a battle between straight 
and crooked thinking." He denounced a "policy of deliberate 
spending," an unbalanced budget, and increasing debts. He 
lamented the fiscal maneuvers of the Administration and 
warned that generations upon generations would have to pay
chose his words, and elucidated many problems. Also see 
Guerrant, Comparisons and Contrasts, for a critical evalua­
tion of H.H.'s speaking liabilities.
114schlesinger, Politics of Upheaval, 526-527. "Hew 
Hoover Challenges New Deal," Literary Digest, CXX (October 
12, 1935), 8.
115xbid. Also see"GOPossibilities," Time, XXVI 
(October 14, 1935), 15-16. Time noted a "new," vigorous 
H.H. and spoke of him as the "only national figure" in the 
GOP. "Hoover: Ex-President’s Attack Shows New Vim, Vigor,
Humor, " News-Week, VI (October 12, 1935), 12, credited Ben 
S. Alien, an Associated Press correspondent, with influ­
encing H.H.'s new style.
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for present mistakes.-**-**̂  He noted that the national debt 
was rising some three and a half billion dollars a year and 
that the only way to recovery was through a sound fiscal 
program such as that which his own administration had pur­
sued. He called on the public to end "the most gigantic 
spoils raid in our history.
Despite its unprecedented power, the New Deal, in
Hoover's mind, had failed in area upon area. He pointed to
the unemployment figures which had remained within half a 
million of the 193 2 totals, to budget deficits, to inflation, 
to the repudiation of debts, to the rise in consumers'
prices, and to the declining living standards as evidence of
a "mistaken" policy. To him, retrenchment, in a "sound 
fiscal policy," was the answer. Hoover called for a restora­
tion of liberty and admitted that the road ahead was rough 
but that it was the only way. He concluded: "We cannot
spend ourselves into a real prosperity. That is joyriding 
to bankruptcy.'1 He predicted that the election of 1936 would 
be the most important of the century.-*-’*-®
Hoover was repeating the indictments that he had made
116ibid.; New York Times, October 6, 1935, 1; Hoover, 
Addresses on the Road, 63-65. Also see Mills, What of 
Tomorrow? 47-64, 76, for a similar concern over spending, 
deficits, and debts. James P. Warburg, Hell Bent For Elec­
tion :(Garden City, 1935), 9, 14, 17, 25-27, is extremely 
critical of FDR’s economic policy.
l^Hoover, Addresses on the Road, 65-67.
H 8 lbid., 68-73.
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in Challenge to Liberty. Although his content remained 
soaked with words such as regimentation, centralization, 
balanced budgets, individualism, and liberty, he showed 
"surprising flashes, even grim humor." Above all, a 
crusading fervor radiated his fierce determination to awaken 
the country to its spiritual decline. At times he achieved 
eloquence in invoking an older America of individual enter­
prise and individual responsibility.11!̂  Hoover's spiritual 
motif was constantly reflected in his correspondence. Of a 
rank-and-file admirer, he said: "Here is another
disciple.1,120
As October drew to a close, various Republicans sought 
Hoover's advice on the forthcoming campaign.121 Sol Levinson, 
the financeer, a Borah booster, worked for a reconciliation 
between the "Lion of Idaho" and the former President. At 
the least, he hoped to elicit Hoover's promise to support 
Borah should the Senator gain the Republican nomination in 
1936.122
H^Schlesinger, Politics of Upheaval. 526-527.
120Hoover to Shaw, October 19, 1935, K-119. H.H. 
commented on the laudatory letter from Colonel Charles R.
Gow which endorsed H.H.'s ideas.
121styles Bridges to Hoover, October 30, 1935, K-15.
The rising young Hew Hampshire Republican, a Hoover admirer, 
said that his state would send an uninstructed delegation to 
the 1936 convention but assured H.H. that Knox, as a "native 
son," would enjoy solid support.
122Richey to Hoover, November 21, 1935, K-14, belat­
edly reported Levinson advances, Borah was emphasizing the
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Although Hoover ignored the Borah overtures, he sent 
Richey a memo of contentions that he wished Borah had the 
sense to recognize. The list cited the need for the GOP to 
unite against the New Deal rather than commit self-destruc­
tion; to realize that Hoover had "no organization seeking 
delegates" and had "refused to allow anything of the kind"; 
that the Old Guard and Hoover were antagonists; that Borah 
and Hoover had many similar views; that both "should keep an 
open mind that [would] enable them to use their influence to 
secure some proper man and a proper set-up of Republican 
principles"; that Hoover was not opposed to a Borah candi­
dacy; and that Borah should give the country assurance that 
he would not bolt the GOP in 1936, regardless of the candi­
date. 123 it xikely that Richey passed this information 
on to Levinson. It is equally doubtful that Borah accepted 
the validity of the Hoover pronouncements.
Hoover's burst of activity and his numerous trips 
across the country fanned speculation that he was indeed a 
candidate for the 1936 presidential nomination. Consequently, 
Arthur Sears Henning of the Los Angeles Times obtained an 
interview with the former President. According to Henning,
ideas he shared with H.H. concerning distaste for the Old 
Guard and the New Deal. Borah led the October public opinion 
polls with forty-two per cent, more than Landon and H.H. com­
bined. These three men remained at the top of the polls from 
October, 1935 to May 1, 1936. Hadley Cantril (ed.), Public 
Opinion, 1935-1946 (Princeton, 1951), 590-597. Also see 
McKenna, Borah, 315, 322-326.
l^^Hoover memo, 1935, Borah folder, K-14.
148
Hoover was not actively seeking the nomination and was very 
conscious of his depression image and the "disastrous defeat" 
of 1932. The ex-President was dedicated to exposing the 
defects of the New Deal and, according to Henning, was 
simply sounding the trumpet for the loyal opposition. Hoover, 
he said, wanted a change, regardless of who led it.-*-24
In a press statement of November 11, 1935, Hoover 
reasserted that his only objective was the defeat of FDR and 
the restoration of principles. He thought that "the first 
duty of the Republican Party is a just and frank debate of 
the New Deal." Speaking of the various failures of New Deal 
policies, he predicted the desertion of millions of Demo­
crats to the Republican ticket in 1936.
On November 16, Hoover, in New York City, spoke on 
"The Consequences of 'Economic Planning' and Some Remedies 
For It." Although he realized that if he "were simply to 
read the Ten Commandments it would be interpreted as critical 
by the Administration, " he wanted to point up the "planned 
extravagance" which was prevalent. "The starry-eyed young
124^1-thur Sears Henning, "Menaces of New Deal Hoover's 
Chief Concern," Los Angeles Times, November 9, 1935. Henning 
did admit that H.H. would accept another nomination in the 
event the convention turned to him.
l-2%[oover collection, LXIV (November 11, 1935), Item 
2230, includes articles speculating on Hoover's possible 
candidacy. The newspapers included were the Chicago Daily 
News, November 11, 1935, Washington Post, October 7, 1935,
New York Times. November 8, 1935, Palo Alto Times. August 
24, and October 10, 1935, and a clipping from News-Week, 
November 23, 1935.
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men in Washington, " he charged, were impoverishing the nation. 
He doubted that any amount of rhetoric could conceal their 
passion for p o w e r . -*-26
Hoover used the departure and disillusionment of 
numerous "brain-trusters," government officials, and even 
cabinet members as ''proof" of the inadequacy of New Deal 
planning. He concluded that the nation was rapidly progres­
sing toward the end with its alphabetical agencies. Sar­
castically, he said, "but of course the New Russian alphabet 
has thirty-four letters."127
In a biting manner, Hoover blasted the "carefree 
scattering of public money" as exhibited in the budget, the 
increasing debt, and the relief roles. To him, economic 
planning was limiting competition, restricting production, 
concentrating power in Washington, abetting monopoly, and 
creating a "planned scarcity." He said that the New Deal 
was repeating past mistakes. To him, history had long 
proven the lack of wisdom in fiscal irresponsibility and the
1 9 0hampering of individual freedom. Perhaps the worst aspect
126fjOOVer, Addresses on the Road, 75-76. Hoover Col­
lection, LXIV (November 16, 1935), Item 2231. New York 
Times, November 17, 1935, 1. Also see "Politics: Hoover
Rounds Up His Forces and Looks To His Fences," Newsweek. VI 
(November,23, 1935), 12.
■^^Hoover, Addresses on the Road, 77-79. In his 
sarcasm, H.H. suggested that New Dealers, in order to exhaust 
the American alphabet, might establish a Quick Loans Cor­
poration for Xylophones, Yachts, and Zithers.
128jj00verf Addresses on the Road. 81-85.
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of the "planned economy," he said, was its cost to farmers, 
workers, and businessmen who would pay the price far into 
the future. He called for an end to "planned extravagance." 
He concluded that the time had arrived for "plain speaking." 
America must face the facts. ^
Following Hoover's New York address, Justice Stone 
praised his Chief's sound, courageous, constructive effort 
to point up the fallacies in the economic policies of the 
New Deal. Stone lamented America's loss of markets as a 
result of artificial restrictions on production. He rea­
soned that the public would be shocked when it learned the 
complete truth about the spreading bureaucracy.-*-^^ Encouraged 
by Stone's candor. Hoover promised to continue hammering at 
principles. He said, "I have no other interest than to see 
that the issues are put before the country. . . .  As you 
seemed to like the last book in this so far compiled Bible,
X send you a copy of it."̂ -̂ -*-
The "hermit of Palo Alto" crossed the Rockies fourteen 
times between 1933 and 1935.-*-22 His efforts, coupled with 
the Republican's November showing throughout the East, buoyed
129Ibid.
-*-29Stone to Hoover, private, November 19, 1935, K-130.
-^-^H.H.'s belief in the sacredness of his message is 
unmistakable in this letter. Hoover to Stone, November 27, 
1935, K-130.
132)iH0over1 s New Deal 'Remedies,'" Literary Digest.
GXX (November 23, 1935), 5.
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] o*iparty hopes. Even Ogden Mills regained a certain opti­
mism concerning the 1936 election. The New Yorker, however, 
became increasingly uncomfortable in Hooverian circles where 
he felt "self-accusations of disloyalty" from his statement 
that Governor Landon was "an outstanding contender."134
Walter Brown, recovering from a protracted illness, 
resumed working with the chief in late November. Brown 
urged Hoover to time his next speech so as to anticipate the 
National Committee meeting. This, he reasoned, would boost 
party morale.-*-35
As the date for the conclave approached, Creager and 
Hoover discussed the possible sites for the 1936 Convention, 
its timing, and other matters. The Texan was most concerned 
with capitalizing on Democratic discord. Thus, he favored a 
late time, in order to benefit from any divisions which 
developed at the Democratic Convention, and an alliance with 
Constitutional Democrats, to be gained by nominating someone
133q 'Laughlin to Hoover, November 9, 1935, Box 44,
0 'Laughlin Papers. New York Times, November 8-9, 1935, 1.
■^-^^Strauss to Hoover, November 27, 1935, K-130. 
Whatever H.H.'s intentions were, "a coterie of personal sup­
porters preferred another catastrophe at the polls to the 
abandonment of the ex-President." Mayer, The Republicans, 
436. Strauss, ever loyal to H.H., probably encouraged Mills' 
feeling of disloyalty. Strauss to Hoover, November 27,
1935, K-130.
135Brown t-0  Hoover, November 20, 1935, K-16. Brown 
to Richey, telephone conversation, November 29, 1935, K-16, 
urged a speech on agriculture. He also disclosed Ted 
Joslin's endorsement of Landon.
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like Senator Harry Byrd of Virginia for the second spot on 
the ticket. The ex-President emphasized the desirability of 
choosing St. Louis or Cleveland as the site because of the 
Midwestern flavor. He admitted that St. Louis might attract 
more dissident Democrats.135
Speaking at the John Marshall Republican Club in St. 
Louis, December 16, 1935, Hoover concentrated on "the Bank 
Panic and Relief Administration Reform." Concerning FDR's 
recent defense of his economic policy, Hoover said: "You
will not be astonished if we do not agree. . . .  In its 
larger dimensions this irrepressible conflict is between the 
American system of liberty and New Deal collectivism."
Hoover denied that "the mechanics of civilization," as 
Roosevelt had put it, "came to a dead stop on March 3, 1933." 
To Hoover, such a partisan statement was without founda­
tion .3-37
At St. Louis, Hoover presented his pet thesis that 
his administration had checked the depression in the summer 
of 1932, that recovery had begun, and that only the election
with its uncertainties had halted the upswing. Concerning
the "so-called collapse of the banking system," ninety-two 
per cent of the banks were proven sound even by Roosevelt's
own admission. To Hoover, it was the New Deal which had led
1 36creager to Hoover, December 2, 1935, and Hoover to 
Creager, December 10, 1935, K-25.
^•^Hoover, Addresses on the Road, 87-88.
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to a "breakdown in confidence. 3®
The former President was incensed at efforts to smear 
him as inhumane. Had the public forgotten his experience as 
a relief worker and Food Administrator? He recalled that he 
had seen far too much human suffering, hunger, and despair. 
He had witnessed more than his share of wars, floods, and 
famines. To Hoover, however, relief was an emergency opera­
tion, "not a social experiment." He saw the Hew Deal as 
"more red tape than relief." He castigated visionaries and 
politicians for claiming that the people had suffered in 
silence until the New Deal came along and solved all their 
problems. In reality, he said, the panacea had broken 
people's spirits.
Hoover, warning to the attack, quoted the Democratic 
mayor of Pittsburgh as charging the New Deal with creating 
"a blood clot in the arteries of industry." For his part, 
Hoover urged a re-establishment of checks and balances, and 
of the division of power. He noted that the public must 
"learn that there are other things moving around in the dark 
besides Santa Claus."140
Following Hoover's St. Louis speech, Creager, who had
138ibid., 89-92. Also see "Who But Hoover?" New 
Republic, LXXXV (December 4, 1935), 92-95, for a discussion 
of the Hoover depression theory. The article concluded that 
it was human to excuse his failure but wrong to deny it.
l3®Hoover, Addresses on the Road. 92-95.
140Ibid.. 96-99.
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listened to it with Spangler, Brown, Requa, and other members 
of the inner circle, wired the former President: "most
effective speech we have ever heard. . . .  A great service 
to the party. "^41 jyiore and more Republicans were seeing 
Hoover as the logical candidate. To them, he was the intel­
ligent, courageous, uncompromising leader who could offer 
alternatives to the New Deal. Fort urged an aggressive 
campaign for principle. He said that Hoover, as the "ablest 
Republican," was leading an upswing in party morale.-^2
Yet, there were other candidacies. Mills, perturbed 
at his Chief's refusal to publicly disavow any candidacy, 
was moving toward the Landon camp.143 The Borah menace was 
aiding the "favorite-son" candidacy of the Kansas 
Governor.-*-^ David Hinshaw, a Hoover biographer, endorsed 
Landon because of his political resemblance to Grover
l^lcreager to Hoover, telegram, December 16, 1935,
K-25.
l-^john spargo, "Republicans must choose, " Review of 
Reviews, XCII (December, 1935), 22-26. 0 'Laughlin to
Hoover, November 30, 1935, K-101, thought H.H. was "the one 
Republican voice to which attention will be paid." Fort to 
Hoover, December 28, 1935, K-39, reported the favorable 
comment on the Chief's St. Louis speech. The San-Mateo- 
Burlincrame Advance Star, December 30, 1935, noted H.H.'s 
popularity with rank and file Republicans but concluded that 
he was "too intellectual to suit a nation accustomed to 
ballyhoo," D-245. Wolfe, Hoover, 366, noted that if the 
GOP chose the Hoover strategy, he would become the obvious 
candidate for 1936.
143noover to W. Brown, December 10, 1935, K-16, 
regretted Mills1 pique but felt that a public disavowal 
would look foolish.
144port to Hoover, December 18, 1935, K-39.
155
Cleveland. Other conservatives were promoting a Dickin­
son boomlet in O h i o . 1^6
As political speculation mounted, the Hoover lieu­
tenants began shifting and reporting attitudes toward another 
Hoover nomination. Although the Ohio Central Committee 
voiced no enthusiasm for another Hoover try, Brown hoped to 
gain a favorite son delegation "to keep the lid on." Brown 
had gained the cooperation of Hilles in designating Cleve­
land as the next convention site. Relations with Eastern 
leaders had rarely been so c o r d i a l . A l a n  pox reported 
"some headway" as delegates showed an increasing warmth to 
the idea of a Hoover c a n d i d a c y . ^48 Frank Fort was all but 
cleared as a convention delegate, and his loyalty was well 
known.^ 9
At the time of his St. Louis speech, Hoover had refused 
to commit himself pn the question of a possible candidacy.
He had reaffirmed his interest in issues. He even stated,
l^Hinshaw to Harold Johnson, December 19, 1935,
K-74.
146Brown to Hoover, December 6, 1935, K-16.
to Hoover, December 6, and December 18, 1935, 
K-16. In the last letter, Brown, having recently attended 
the National Committee meeting, reported the friendly 
attitude of Hilles and Pomeroy.
148pox to Richey, December 19, 1935, K-39.
-̂̂ 8Fort to Hoover, December 28, 1935, K-39.
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150"I have no Interest m  picking a candidate.” Actually,
he was very interested in the speculation about possible 
candidates. At the least, he wanted a nominee who would 
defend Hoover policies and ideas. At his request, Hyde per­
formed a reconnaisance on Governor Landon and his political 
views.151
As the year closed, the 1936 election became the 
leading topic of conversation in every gathering of Republi­
cans. Regardless of his attitude toward the former Presi­
dent, no aspirant or delegate could ignore the shadow of the 
former leader. If Hoover was politically dead, and many 
Republicans expressed such a belief, why did his staunchest 
antagonists devote so much attention to his alleged unavaila­
bility? The time for decision, both for the ex-President 
and his Party, was fast approaching.
iSOjjoover Collection, LXIV (December 16, 1935), Item 
2240. New York Times, December 17, 1935, 1.
l^lHyde to Hoover, December 19, 1935, K-61.
CHAPTER VI
YEAR OF DECISION
Rexford Tugwell, a "brains-truster," once theorized 
that "the politician of any age is an individual motivated 
to influence others, particularly in the direction of support 
for himself, and secondarily in support of the causes with 
which he chooses to identify himself."-*- Although Hoover 
placed his ideas ahead of his ambitions, it was obvious that 
an endorsement of Hooverian principles would mate him the 
logical candidate for 1936. At all costs, he was determined 
to witness the repudiation of the New Deal.
Throughout 1936, the ex-President released an 
increasing number of press statements. In a devastating 
rebuke of the President's message to Congress, Hoover charged 
Roosevelt with moving "the date of creation . . .  to March 
4, 1933." To New Dealers, until the inauguration "the world 
was without form and void." Hoover charged that no mortal 
man had ever exercised such extraordinary powers as FDR. The 
former President called for retrenchment from such authority.2
■^-Rexford G. Tugwell, The Art of Politics (Garden 
City, 1958), 214.
2Hoover Collection, LXIVA (January 5, 1936), Item
2251. New York Times, January 6, 1936, 1.
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On January 7, Hoover lauded the Supreme Court's 
invalidation of the AAA as a great judicial decision. 
Hooverites, equally elated at the Court's verdict, thought 
that the ex-President's sagacity again had been proven.3
On January 16, Hoover spoke at Lincoln, Nebraska, on 
"Further Explorations of the New Deal— Including Agricultural 
Policies." Hoover accused the Administration of driving 
farmers into the ditch. He thought that New Dealers had 
failed on their promised utopia and then had denounced any­
one who criticized them. To him, Agriculture, as a national 
problem, affected labor and capital. Wasn't the farmer 
paying direct and hidden taxes? Weren’t the wasteful spend­
ing and unbalanced budgets of the federal government bleeding 
all agrarians? To Hoover, an "economy of scarcity" based on 
controlled production was boosting prices, but inflation, 
drought, and world recovery would have achieved as much.^
Hoover thought that the best profits came from uncon­
trolled commodities. Of course, he said, there was no 
surplus of such produce. To him, this was the point. He 
proposed a "conservation-based policy for agriculture" which 
would provide subsidies for new crops as an incentive and
^Hoover Collection, LXIVA (January 7, 1936), Item
2252. Ted Joslin to Hoover, January 6, 1936, K-66.
% o o v e r  Collection, LXIVA (January 16, 1936), Item 
2254. Hoover, Addresses On The Road, 101-106. "Freedom For 
the Farm, 1 Vital Speeches. II, January 27, 1936, 271-275.
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5positive answer to farm problems.
The former President blasted the "processing tax" 
which hurt the working classes; bemoaned the Administra­
tion's manufacturing sales tax with its twenty-five per cent 
allotment on pork, and its thirty per cent tab on flour, 
both of which robbed the poor; and reaffirmed his loyalty to 
his own 1933 two-and-a-half per cent sales tax proposal 
which would have exempted food and cheaper clothing.®
He lamented America's loss of markets due to a forced 
scarcity. He cited numerous examples of America's declining 
exports. To him, New Deal coercion, ineffectiveness, contra­
diction, and waste had lowered the purchasing power of the 
farmer's dollar to a new nadir. The time, he said, had 
arrived for a reversal in the collectivization drive. The 
farmer's freedom must be restored.7
Hoover was pleased at the reception of his Nebraska
Dspeech. It "was deliberately critical of the AAA program.'
^Hoover, Addresses on the Road, 106-108, 111. Hutch­
inson, Lowden of Illinois, II, 683. H.H.'s new agricultural 
position, embodying so much of Lowden's 1929 proposal, led 
to speculation that the Illinois Governor had converted H.H. 
to his views.
®Hoover, Addresses on the Road. 103, 107.
7Ibid.. 104, 107-113.
^Hoover to Creager, January 19, 1936, K-25. A. Brown 
to Hoover, January 17, 1936, K-15, said that members of the 
press were praising the elevated plane of the Nebraska 
speech. Brown enclosed the laudatory editorials of several 
newspapers. L. W. Ainsworth to Hoover, K-l, January 27,
1936, reported an enthusiastic approval in Iowa. Farmers, he 
said, resented restriction which made food imports necessary.
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The danger was that farmers had gained "a taste for direct 
subsidy. 1,9 He feared that the "whole situation was changing 
rapidly" and that its complexity was becoming unmanageable.-1'® 
Samuel Crowther, preparing a book on the AAA, hoped that the 
attacks on FDR’s "ludicrous" farm policy would "blow the 
Administration out of the water."1-1' Other Hooverites were
12equally pleased at the ex-President's agricultural analysis.
Hoover's desire for GOP leadership dramatically sur­
faced in his Nebraska effort. He used sarcasm and ridicule
*| Oto a new degree in an effort to evoke debate. J He spoke of 
the 1930's as "the most critical period in United States 
history, since the Civil War."1^ In subsequent speeches, he
®Fess to Hoover, January 16, and February 1, 1936, 
K-36. Fess lauded the speech and H.H.’s proposal of a 
subsidy for new crops. He warned that the Democrats would 
deliberately pretend to misunderstand H.H.'s positive 
solution.
1®Hoover to Fess, January 19, 1936, K-36.
11Crowther to Hoover, January 18, 1936, K-25. 
Crowther was working with George Peek on a book extremely 
critical of FDR's agricultural policy.
^Justice Harlan Stone to Hoover, January 22, 1936, 
K-130, lauded the AAA speech and urged publication of "the 
unfortunate effect of the curtailment of production on the 
home market." Joslin to Hoover, January 18, K-66. Hyde to 
Hoover, January 25, 1936, K-61, although concerned with 
agriculture, was obsessed by the alarming permeation of the 
church by Communist leaders. He feared that many preachers 
were accepting Communist doctrine.
1-^Wolfe, Hoover. 367.
•^Hoover Collection, LXIVA (January 17, 1936), Item 
2256, 2258, and 2262.
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frequently used such phrases as "creeping collectivism,"
"dictated economy," "fascist tyranny," "nullification of
liberty," and the need for "equal justice." Such phrases,
however exaggerated, were clever political weapons. These
"weighted words" evoked strong emotions. Any political
speaker worth his salt employs the common currency of debate
15m  order to persuade. By 1936, Hoover, however belatedly, 
recognized the irrationality in modern psychology. In this 
sense he was a "new" Hoover.
Alan Pox, impressed by Hoover’s speeches, and con­
vinced that the politicians feared his chief's candidacy 
because they knew that he was the "best vote-getter," began 
promoting talk of the former President in New York.^
Hoover remained non-committal but told Pox that the speeches 
were directed at forcing "the candidates into the open"
where Hooverites could "form a better judgment as to their
1 7qualification. nJ- The New Yorker, remembering that "we" had 
considered Dickinson potential presidential material, con­
cluded that the senator had stressed some "good old points" 
but lacked "originality of thought or expression." Fox
^ H e r r i n g ,  politics of Democracy. 251-252.
l^Fox to Hoover, January 18, 1936, K-39.
•^Hoover to Fox, January 24, 1936, K-39. Since Fox 
was an intimate and trusted lieutenant, H.H.'s letter implied 
that he was still looking for a Hooverian candidate. 
Admittedly, he did not reprimand Fox's aggressive activity, 
but H.H., at the least, wanted friendly delegates who might 
defer to his advice.
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believed that the time had come to test public sentiment for
1 ffHoover through the use of opinion polls. °
When, in January, the Landon organization kicked out 
William Allen White, the colorful editor had second thoughts 
about Landon's capability for the presidency. Hoover, pur­
suing a dual policy, urged White to promote the election of 
uninstructed delegations from the Midwestern states at the 
same time that he wrote Landon advising him to disavow all 
Hearst connections if he was a serious candidate.^-®
Despite his own setbacks, the irrepressible Alan Fox 
continued to promote a Hoover candidacy. He urged some 
concessions to lukewarm factions, demanded an exposure of 
Landon's obvious mediocrity, and pushed for a public poll
which would prove Hoover's popularity with rank and file 
onRepublicans. His Chief, remaining calm, analyzed the 
situation thusly, "The main trouble with our army is that we 
have a great number of privates and officers but as yet no
O 1general has emerged."
18pox to Hoover, January 30, 1936, K-39. Fox, recently 
defeated in his efforts to be named a delegate to the 1936 
convention, contended that his defeat had nothing to do with 
his devotion to the Chief. The argument is extremely 
dubious. Harold Ickes, The Secret Diary of Harold L. Ickes 
(New York, 1953), 548, reported rumors that H.H. had stopped 
the Landon express and was leaning toward Dickinson.
-*-9Hoover to Hyde, January 27, 1936, K-61.
20f o x to Hoover, February 4, and February 6, 1936,
K-39. Fox was disturbed at the artificial Landon boom.
21noover to Fox, February, 1936, K*-39. Again H.H. 
seems to be looking for an Hooverian candidate.
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Nathan MacChesney, an old Hooverite, served as an 
intermediary between the Knox-Hoover camps. He had joined 
the Bull Mooser's forces with the pledge that, in the event 
of failure, Knox would not deliver his strength elsewhere. 
MacChesney, at Knox's request, solicited the aid of Walter 
Brown in heading off Borah in Ohio. ^ Hoover and Brown 
agreed that the best path was the "alignment of uninstructed 
delegations." To them, such a course would be "better for 
our friend than an actual fight, as that always leads to 
difficulties.
Knox, in an optimistic mood, decided to take the more 
hazardous course. He said, "I am putting my political 
future to the test by taking on Borah in Ohio." Knox 
acknowledged Brown's support and concluded that Illinois and 
Ohio would make or break his candidacy. He was amused at 
Landon's predicament concerning the Hearst maneuver which 
had placed the Kansan in the California primary.^
Hoover, stumping the country in defense of his ideas, 
arrived in Portland, Oregon, for a Lincoln Day Address to
^MacChesney to Hoover, February 6, 1936, K-86. Ickes 
Diary, I, 463, discusses the MacChesney-Knox relationship.
^Hoover to MacChesney, February 11, 1936, K-86, dealt 
with Knox and the Ohio situation and concluded that a fight 
could be the best move in spite of the obvious dangers.
^^Knox to Hoover, February 15, and February 27, 1936, 
K-72, admitted that Illinois was posing a tight race. Brown 
to Hoover, February 24, 1936, K-16, indicated the proba­
bility that Knox and all aspirants but Borah would bypass 
the Ohio primary. Taft would head a "favorite son" delega­
tion.
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a state GOP conference. The press noted Hoover's new 
buoyancy, cheerfulness, and geniality. After conferring 
with Oregon political leaders, the ex-President promised to 
"continue fighting the New Deal as long as it existed.
On February 12, he spoke of "The Confused State of 
the Union, 1 an obvious rebuttal to FDR's recent State of the 
Union message. After noting the grave times in which they 
lived, Hoover launched into an attack on New Deal methods.
His intended purpose was to expose the unprecedented debt, 
inflation, centralization, regimentation, and abridgement of
liberty.26
To him, the New Deal meant "planned deficits and 
planned politics." He listed the abuses of NRA and AAA and 
the subsequent confusion. He lamented the restricted produc­
tion, the elimination of competition, the price fixing, the 
increased costs, higher prices, strikes, the plowing under 
of crops, the slaughtering of animals, the decline in food 
consumption, and the "economy of scarcity." He said that 
the waste and inefficiency of the New Deal were unsurpassed.
He charged that relief was administered by political bat­
talions under the most costly spoils system in history. To 
him, the facts and figures told the story. During his own
2^Hoover Collections, LSIVA (February 12-13, 1936), 
Item 2267, 2269.
26xbid., Item 2270. New York Times, February 13, 
1936. "Towers of Babel," Vital Speeches. II, February 24, 
1936, 332-335; Hoover, Addresses on the Road. 114-116.
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Administration, eighty-one per cent of the government 
employees had been under civil service, whereas under the 
New Deal only fifty-seven per cent w e r e . ^ 7  Despite the New 
Deal assaults on the Constitution, the Supreme Court had 
recently checked the excessive violations. Nonetheless, the 
fallacious policies enacted had led the nation to a new
O Qstate of confusion. °
Again, Hooverites applauded what to them was their 
Chief's penetrating analysis and his logical presentation 
of the f a c t s . C r o w t h e r ,  convinced that Hoover's efforts 
were forcing New Dealers into a defensive position, hoped
o nthat other GOP speakers would "get down to brass tacks.,IJ 
Ted Joslin reported a growing esteem among the press corps
O 1for the former President. A
The Boston Globe described Hoover as the Administra­
tion ' s "most versatile opponent." Too, he was displaying a 
"new resourcefulness" and strength.32 There was increasing
^Hoover, Addresses on the Road, 116-119.
28Ibid.. 121-125.
29crowther to Hoover, February 12, 1936, K-25; Joslin 
to Hoover, February 18, 1936, K-66. Strauss to Hoover, 
February 19, 1936, K-130, said that "everyone" was impressed 
by his biting speech.
30Crother to Hoover, February 12, 1936, K-25.
3^joslin to Hoover, February 18, 1936, K-66. See the
San Francisco Chronicle. January 29, 1936, 1.
32BoSton Globe, March 9, 1936, D-245.
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talk of a "new" Hoover. Even the New Republic, eternally 
critical of the "great engineer," was compelled to discuss 
the "new” Hoover. In a devastating attack, "Who's Hoover?" 
the magazine answered its own question by calling him "an 
attractive package with a misleading label." All the 
Hollywood arts, it said, were utilized in dressing up the 
"old" Hoover. It pointed out that in 1931, a "new" Hoover, 
the happy engineer, had been promoted. However, the 1935 
edition, it said, was a "new" effort aimed at inflating the 
"old" balloon before the 1936 convention.
Speculation on presidential candidacies remained the 
most popular topic of conversation. Following the Lincoln 
Day Dinners across the country, Vandenberg informed Fox that 
Borah delegates were planning to endorse the Michigan 
Senator "at the proper time." Everyone was certain that the 
Borah effort had stalled.^ Senate leaders were amiable to
33Fort to Hoover, February 28, 1936, K-39. Fort and 
other Hooverites, encouraged by the increasing impression of 
the "new" Hoover, wondered "whether the movement could be 
sufficiently accelerated between now and June." Fort believed 
that Edge was after the vice-presidential spot on the Landon 
ticket.
■^"Who's Hoover," New Republic, XLLLVI (March 11,
1936), 137-138. Despite H.H.'s depression handicap, he 
remained politically significant. No one could ignore him 
or the fact that he commanded a large coterie of supporters 
who wanted another nomination for him, with or without his 
consent.
■^Fox to Hoover, February 13, 1936, K-39. Fox thought 
that Vandenberg's disclosure sounded "screwy but . . . accord­
ing to Vanderberg, Landon was only after the Vice-Presidencyl" 
Hoover to Fox, February 25, 1936, K-39, admitted that Borah
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a Vandenberg candidacy, and as the "leading conservative 
Republican in Congress," as an isolationist on foreign 
policy, and as a compromise possibility, Vandenberg received 
increasing attention. Interestingly, both Hooverites and 
Senate progressives liked the Michigan leader.^6 Rumors 
even flew that Hoover was "more intent upon the nomination 
of Vandenberg on a strong anti-New Deal platform" than an 
effort for his own renomination.^  If the ex-President was 
determined to seek the nomination, he showed an atypical 
canniness in playing off one aspirant against the other, and 
in convincing each candidate that he would receive the 
ultimate blessing. Whatever Hoover's actual intentions, by 
the time that the convention assembled, Mills, Knox, Dickin­
son, and Vandenberg were purported to have received the 
Hoover endorsement.
The former President, anxious for Landon's reprimand 
of Hearst, and an avoidance of a primary fight which would 
splinter the California Party, decided to visit the
was finished, but he thought that Landon was in ascendancy. 
When the Literary Digest poll of January, 1936, showed 62% 
opposed to the New Deal, the GOP nomination's attractiveness 
increased. San Francisco Chronicle, January 17, 1936.
36James T. Patterson, Congressional Conservatism And 
The New Deal (Lexington, 1967), 102-103. George Wolfskill,
The Revolt of the Conservatives (Boston, 1962), 203-204. 
Patterson states that despite Vandenberg's overall popularity, 
he had liabilities. As Oregon's Senator McNary noted, he 
symbolized "vacuity, vaccilation, and Vandenberg."
•a 7Wolfskill, Revolt of the Conservatives. 201.
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K a n s a n . O g d e n  Mills, having defected to the Landon camp 
in spite of his Chief's comeback, assured Hoover that the 
Governor, regardless of the Hearst maneuvers, would not 
permit his name to be filed in the California primary.^9
Ed Schorr, Chairman of the Ohio Republican Party, 
wrote Hoover that "under election laws of Ohio" a prospective 
candidate’s consent was necessary in order for delegates to 
file his name for the Republican National Convention.^7®
Hoover was adamant in his refusal to permit his name to be 
entered in the primaries. Walter Brown informed the Chief 
that Knox, Vandenberg, Dickinson, and even Landon had agreed 
to bypass the Ohio primary. Thus, the state committee had 
readily endorsed Robert A. Taft as a "favorite son." How­
ever, Borah, uncooperative as usual, planned an Ohio 
battle.^ But then the "Idaho lion" had always been a "porcu­
pine .
Hoover, strongly believing that a party "not in power 
has an obligation to scrutinize every act that will oppose
^Hoover to W. Brown, February 28, 1936, K-16.
^^Hoover to Henry Allen, February 20, 1936, K-2.
Drew Pearson, "Merry-Go-Round," Washington Star, February
22, 1936. Pearson, after the sensational, spoke of a 
split in the Hoover ranks.
^®Schorr to Hoover, February 19, 1936, K-16.
41-w. Brown to Hoover, February 24, and February 28, 
1936, K-16.
42jRobert Bendiner, Just Around the Corner (New York, 
1967), 149. Borah, "in practice was not so much a lone wolf 
as a lone porcupine."
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the welfare of the p e o p l e , u r g e d  Spangler to investigate 
the character of loans made by the government. The ex-Presi- 
dent was convinced there were several "unusual loans.
Spangler, encouraged by the progress of his Midwestern 
organization, decided to open a West Coast branch. He hoped 
that the chief would designate a leader.^ Hoover recom­
mended Chester Rowell, the editor of the San Francisco 
Chronicle
On March 7, Hoover addressed the Colorado Young 
Republican League on "True Liberalism.1 The ex-President, 
agitated at the efforts of some politicians to label the New 
Deal as liberal, defined the American System, individualism, 
"equality of opportunity," and liberty, as the only true 
liberalism. Regarding economics, the supreme test of 
liberalism, he defined three avenues which governments could 
take: an unregulated economy, a government-regulated economy,
and a government-dictated economy. To Hoover, the American 
System had traditionally embraced the middle course.^
Hoover accused the New Deal of taking the third 
avenue. The New Deal, he said, had disrupted competition,
^ C h r i s t i a n  science M o n i t o r , F e b r u a r y  15, 1936.
^Hoover to Spangler, January 30, 1936, K-127.
^ ^ S pangler to Hoover, F e b r u a r y  12, 1936, K-127.
^ H o o v e r  to Spangler, telegram, F e b r u a r y  20, 1936,
K-127.
^Hoover, Addresses on the Road, 126-134. New York 
Times, March 8, 1936, 1.
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e n c o u r a g e d  mon o p o l y ,  e n c o u r a g e d  a w a s t e  o f  n a t u r a l  resources, 
n e g a t e d  l a b o r ' s  r e s p o n s ibility, and s t i f l e d  "eq u a l i t y  of 
o p p o r t u n i t y . "  He  b l a s t e d  the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s  seizure o f  
b r o a d e r  r e g u l a t o r y  p o w e r s  w h i c h  rightfully, h e  thought, 
b e l o n g e d  to t h e  states a n d  local g o v e r n m e n t s .  T o  him,
A m e r i c a  w a s  t h r e a t e n e d  b y  a m a n a g e d  currency, a m a n a g e d  
credit, a d e b a s e d  currency, a " d e b a u c h e r y  of the civil 
s e r v i c e , " an u n e x c e l l e d  p o l i t i c a l  o p p o r t u n i s m ,  an d  a d e n i a l  
o f  f u n d a m e n t a l  liberty. T o  him, no r e a c t i o n a r y  g o v e r n m e n t  
h a d  ever d r e a m e d  of su c h  b u r e a u c r a t i c  control. D i d  anyone 
d a r e  call s u c h  a s y s t e m  " l i b e ralism"? W a r m i n g  to h i s  attach, 
t h e  e x - P r e s i d e n t  d e m a n d e d  a r e s t o r a t i o n  of l i b e r t y  and r e a l  
l i b e r a l i s m . 48
B e f o r e  the end o f  the month, Hoover, r e s p o n d i n g  to 
t h e  q u e s t i o n s  o f  the C h i c a g o  press, o u t l i n e d  t h e  four m a j o r  
t a s k s  of h i s  p a r t y  as: r e p u d i a t i o n  o f  the N e w  Deal, p r o p o s a l
o f  a c o n s t r u c t i v e  alternative, n o m i n a t i o n  of the b e s t  q u a l i ­
f i e d  man, a n d  c o n s o l i d a t i o n  o f  the p a r t y  f a c t i o n s . 49
As t h e  K n o x  c a n d i d a c y  be g a n  to lose steam, several 
H o o v e r i t e s  h o p e d  for a d r a f t - H o o v e r  m o v e m e n t  t h r o u g h  p u b l i c  
d e m a n d . ^ ®  W h a t e v e r  h i s  o w n  attitude, H o o v e r  i n f o r m e d  K n o x  
t h a t  Cal i f o r n i a ,  Nevada, Utah, and C o l o r a d o  w o u l d  p r o b a b l y
48Ibid.; Hoover, Addresses on the Road, 134-138.
49H o o v e r  C o l l ections, I X I V A  (March 29, 1936), I t e m
2281.
^Strauss to Hoover, February 19, 1936, K-130.
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send unpledged delegations to the convention.^ Walter 
Newton made a cross-sectional survey of public attitude 
toward the GOP candidates, and disclosed a Landon, Knox, and 
Borah order prevailing everywhere. Hoover sentiment, he 
noted, was strongest in the South. Georgia could deliver 
eighty per cent of its delegation to a Hoover standard. He 
found that Kentucky showed some Hoover and Dickinson flavor. 
Two West Virginia delegates were openly supporting the ex- 
President. The Alabama delegation, although friendly, 
doubted Hoover's availability.^ Obviously, the Alabama 
reasoning was widespread.
Walter Edge's endorsement of Landon reflected the 
growing strength of the Kansan in the East.53 California
primary loomed larger as it was the one obstacle in the 
Landon path. In New Jersey, Frank Fort, in an effort to 
reach the Republican Convention, ran as a delegate-at-large 
and as a Landon delegate. He hoped to encourage "some of the 
weak-kneed brethren to think in terms of winning on principle 
rather than expediency. Fox, still hoping for a draft-
^Hoover to Knox, February 24, 1936, K-72.
52jgewton to Richey, March 18, 1936, and Newton to 
Hoover, March 21, 1936, K-97.
530 'Laughlin to Hoover, March 21, 1936, Box 44,
0 'Laughlin Papers. Edge, Jerseyman1s Journal. 243, reasoned 
that the East had dominated presidential conventions long 
enough. He was "an enthusiastic Landon supporter."
34port to Hoover, April 4, 1936, K-38. Hoover to Fort, 
April 9, 1936, K-38, replied that "whatever you do is 
alright with m e . "
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Hoover Committee, thought that the California primary could 
enable loyalists to boost Hoover stock through public polls 
following a California victory. The New Yorker was con­
vinced that the Chief, Dickinson, or Vandenberg could be 
nominated. Hilles, obviously hoping to line up with the 
eventual winner, remained uncommitted.55
Samuel Crowther, a loyal Hooverite, expressed dis­
satisfaction with the front runners: “Knox has the informa­
tion and the backbone of a jolly fish and . . . is a mental 
mess." To him, Landon was no better.55 On the tariff, he 
said, Landon did "not know what it is about, while Knox, in 
his New York speech, showed that he did not even know enough 
to keep quiet.,l5̂
On April 4, speaking at Fort Wayne, Indiana, Hoover 
asked, "Has the New Deal Solved Our National Problems?'1 
Answering his own question in the negative, the ex-President 
stated that the "phantasmagoria of propaganda" by the New 
Dealers was "leading to a corruption of clear thinking" 
which was "far more insidious and destructive" than all the 
dangerous violations of freedom.58
In an effort to construct the "true picture," Hoover
55Fox to Hoover, March 31, and April 1, 1936, K-39.
55Crowther to Hoover, April 1, 1936, K-25.
5^Crowther to Hoover, April 17, 1936, K-25.
58Hoover Collection, LXIVA (April 4, 1936), Item 2283. 
Vital Speeches, II, April 20, 1936, 444-449. Hoover, 
Addresses on the Road, 142-146.
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reiterated his depression efforts, their success, the brutal 
interruption of recovery due to the 1932 election, the 
induced bank panic, the disastrous New Deal methods and 
their consequent setbacks, and the need for retrenchment.
He str o n g l y  denied t h a t  h e  “w a s  the father o f  the N e w  Deal." 
His m o n e t a r y  p o l i c i e s  h a d  be e n  reversed, his cons t i t u t i o n a l  
m e t h o d s  ignored, an d  his p o s i t i v e  solutions rejected. H o o v e r  
r e c o u n t e d  the n u m e r o u s  N e w  Deal sins: regimentation, b u r e a u ­
cracy, inflation, r e s t r i c t e d  production, d e b a s e m e n t  o f  the 
currency, economic scarcity, monopoly, and u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  
me t h o d s .  The N e w  D e a l  was a p r o v e n  failure, he said, and it
* C Qw a s  time for change.
To a C a l i f o r n i a  con v e n t i o n  o f  y o u n g  Republicans, he 
sent a me s s a g e  i m p r e s s i n g  u p o n  them "The D u t y  of the R e p u b ­
lican Party." As leaders o f  the future, he ca l l e d  theirs a 
t r e m e n d o u s  responsibility. He th o u g h t  that t h e y  m u s t  ra l l y  
the p e o p l e  to a r e a f f i r m a t i o n  of p r i n c i p l e  and that the GOP 
w a s  the o n l y  tool for reform. He u r g e d  them to d i s p l a y  "open 
m i n d s , "  "fresh i d e a l i s m , 11 and "determination.
A l though the e x - P r e s i d e n t  r i g h t l y  sensed "that an 
open p u r s u i t  of the n o m i n a t i o n  w o u l d  be b o t h  u n s e e m l y  and 
impolitic," he p r o b a b l y  h a r b o r e d  h o p e s  of a d r a f t . ^  in
59Ibid., 148-157.
^Hoover Collection, LtXIVA (April 16, 1936), Item
2287. New York Times, April 19, 1936, 1.
^ B e n d i n e r ,  J u s t  A r o u n d  the C o r n e r , 149.
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April, the Knox candidacy collapsed. The Kentucky delega­
tion switched from the Bull Mooser to the "Kansas Coolidge."^2 
The Illinois primary dealt the Knox forces the fatal blow. 
Although the Chicagoan outpolled Borah, 490,000 to 420,000 
votes, the minuscule nature of the victory underlined Knox's 
weakness.^ California remained the only obstacle to a 
Landon sweep. The Kansas City Star charged the ex-President 
with blocking the Landon drive.^4
William Allen White, appraising the situation, wrote 
Landon that the Hearst endorsement was a "kiss of death" and 
that the Governor should disassociate himself from the power­
ful and controversial publisher.65 Hearst and the Landon 
managers were affronting the ex-President, which could weaken 
Landon's presidential bid.^® Ogden Mills tried to prevent
620 'Laughlin to Hoover, April 4, 1936. Box 44,
O  ' L a u g h l i n  P a p e r s .  T h e  H o o v e r  aide a l s o  n o t e d  t h a t  N e w  
J e r s e y  w a s  s o l i d l y  f o r  La n d o n .
k^Mayer, The Republicans, 437, 440. W. Brown to 
Hoover, April 18, 1936, K-16.
®^Hyde to Hoover, April 8, 1936, and Hoover to Hyde, 
April 15, 1936, K-61, denied the charge. Hoover to White, 
April 14, and April 17, 1936, K-147, expressed disgust at 
the insinuations of the Landon managers.
^ W h i t e  to L andon, A p r i l  21, 1936, S e l e c t e d  L e t t e r s , 
362-364.
66Ibid.; Hoover to A. Brown, April 22, 1936, K-15. 
Hoover to Henry Allen, April 21, 1936, K-2. Hoover to White, 
April 14, and April 17, 1936, K-147, warned that the Hearst 
endorsement and the splintering of the Bear State Party 
would assure a November defeat for Landon, if he gained the 
nomination.
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/■ *7the filing of the Hearst slate in California.
California Republicans “liked and respected Hoover." 
Their hopes for a deadlocked convention were matched by 
their hatred for Hearst, the Landon promoter. Consequently, 
Earl Warren, a Hoover disciple, who had worked his way up 
from a Hoover delegate of 1928 to the state chairmanship by 
1934, drew up a list of the top names in the state party and 
announced that he would head an uninstructed delegation to 
the 1936 convention. Warren so deftly outmaneuvered Hearst 
that Landon even disclaimed his own slate in California's 
May primary. Despite the difficulties in voting for an 
uninstructed delegation, Warren and his independent colleagues 
scored a major upset in their victory.®®
Although Hoover claimed that he had tried to prevent 
any criticism of the Kansan by the California press, and had 
only wanted "an uninstructed delegation" for the purpose of 
influencing the platform and maintaining the unity of the
®7W . B r o w n  to Hoover, April 18, 1936, K-16. White to 
Landon, April 21, 1936, S e l e c t e d  L e t t e r s , 362-364, assured 
the Governor o f  Mills' l o y a l t y  and of t h e  N e w  Y o r k e r ' s  d i s ­
i n t e r e s t  in the vice-pres i d e n c y .  W h i t e  said that the H e a r s t  
b a c k i n g  h a d  even scared o f f  Hilles. Too, Cong r e s s i o n a l  
Rep u b l i c a n s  w e r e  lining u p  for Vandenberg.
®®Leo Katcher, E a r l  Warren: A  P o l i t i c a l  B i o g r a p h y
(New York, 1967), 83-85. K a t c h e r  says H o o v e r  d e s p e r a t e l y  
w a n t e d  to "challenge R o o s e v e l t  again." The W a r r e n  slate w a s  
inde p e n d e n t  as m u c h  as pro - H o o v e r .  Ho w e v e r ,  it d i d  pr o v e  
t h a t  L a n d o n  wa s  n o t  "in" as the nominee.
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C a l i f o r n i a  GOP,®^ H o o v e r i t e s  saw the p r i m a r y  as a check to
70the Landon momentum.
W i l l i a m  Al l e n  W h i t e  conferred w i t h  Lewis Strauss and 
apo l o g i z e d  for "the n e c e s s i t y  of s u p p o r t i n g  Mr. Landon w h o m  
h e  des c r i b e d  as ideal in ev e r y  r e s p e c t  'except h e  ha s  no 
exp e r i e n c e  in national affairs and n o t  even an a c q u aintance 
w i t h  international a f f a i r s . ' ”^
Creager, although personally favoring the ex-President, 
and inclined to accept the possibility of another Hoover 
campaign, doubted GOP chances in November. Too, he thought 
that Hoover's depression image would be an additional problem. 
The Texan did agree with Brown that the best poll would ask, 
"Whom did you vote for in 1932 and for whom would you vote
^Hoover to H. Allen, April 21, 1936, K-2, Hoover to 
Allen, April 24, 1936, K-2; and Hoover to A. Brown, April 22, 
1936, K-15. Hoover to White, April 17, 1936, K-147.
^®W. Brown to Hoover, April 18, 1936, K-15. Strauss 
to Hoover, April 23, 1936, K-130. Joslin to Hoover, April
11, 1936, K-66, said that a California victory would stall 
the Landon express. He assumed that the Chief was more 
receptive to a nomination now. If not, then Knox or Vanden­
berg were probably Hoover's favorites as rumors reflected. 
Newton to Hoover, May 7, 1936, K-97, spoke of H.H.'s great 
personal victory in California. Ben Allen, H.H.'s phrase- 
maker, wired Strauss, "We have won by a handsome majority." 
Ben Allen to Strauss, telegram, May 5, 1936, K-130. In a 
letter to A. Brown, H.H., still angered at the personal 
insult of Hearst and Landon, was pleased with their "over­
whelming" defeat. Hoover to A. Brown, May 7, 1936, K-16. 
Frank Fort thought that the door was wide open and hoped to 
have "influence with the Maryland and Pennsylvania delega­
tions." Fort to Hoover, May 9, 1936, K-38.
^Strauss to Hoover, April 23, 1936, K-130, admitted 
that Larry Richey's presence may have encouraged White to 
temper his remarks.
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now if the same candidates were running?"^2 Ogden Mills, 
again pessimistic about Republican chances, was amazed at 
FDR's "ignorance or dishonesty" and feared the incumbent 
would be returned to office.^3
Mills 1 doubts were hardly altered with the California 
primary, or the Who's Who Poll which showed Hoover outgaining 
Landon by a 2381 to 2294 vote total.^ The Chief, referring 
to his scheduled Philadelphia speech, said it would be his 
"last speech" and would deal "mostly with moral issues."^ 
Enroute to Philadelphia, the ex-President told the Chicago 
press that the GOP would win in November regardless of their
c a n d i d a t e .
On May 14, Hoover spoke in the Quaker city on "An 
American Platform." His speech was the most direct personal
7^Fo x to Hoover, April 23, 1936, K-39. Fox reported 
that the Chief had drawn even with Landon in the incompleted 
W h o ’s Who Presidential Poll. W. Brown to Hoover, April 18, 
1936, K-16.
^Mills to Hoover, April, 1936, K-92.
^ F o x  to Hoover, May 1, 1936, K-39, disclosed the 
final poll results.
^Hoover to Mills, May 2, 1936, K-92.
76Hoover Collection, LXIVA (May 10, 1936), Item 2290. 
Although H.H.'s constant predictions of victory were used to 
prove his lack of realism, he was playing a political role 
and like the far more able politicians he sometimes imitated, 
he was reassuring his party workers of the possibility of 
victory. In private, however, he showed realism which 
greatly contradicted his public predictions of 1932, 1934, 
and 1936. At times he failed to anticipate the depth of 
defeat, but throughout the lean years he informed his closest 
lieutenants that the GOP would lose, and by a decisive 
margin.
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attack that he had ever made on Roosevelt. He noted the 
President's advice to young people "to dream dreams and see 
visions." Hoover advised them "to wake up." He warned that 
America was further down the road to collectivism than she 
realized. The time had come, he said, for "a restoration of 
morals in government" and for "courage in the destiny of 
America.
To Hoover, the Administration had pursued false 
economic and social policies. As usual, he cited its unpar­
donable sins. The Republican Party, he said, must restore 
the American System with its "regulated business and compul­
sory competition" minus the government dictation and 
regimentation. To him, the states must regain their inde­
pendent powers. He said that only the Supreme Court had 
checked efforts to create a fascist state. To him, "our 
trouble today is moral as well as economic." He pleaded for 
a revitalization of traditional "virtues of thrift and honor 
and hard work" which could lead the nation forward once
70again.‘°
Hoover, in his Philadelphia speech, stigmatized the 
New Deal as being as progressive as a slow-motion film run 
backward." He referred to it as the "Five Horsemen of the 
Apocalypse: Pork Barrel, Poppycock, Privilege, Panaceas,
^Hoover collection, LXIVA (May 14, 1936), Item 2293. 
Vital Speeches, II, June 1, 1936, 555-559.
^Hoover, Addresses on the Road, 162-171.
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and poverty. N This speech and the California primary gave 
him a "freshened political p r e s t i g e . T o o ,  letters to 
the editor in the Christian Science Monitor, the New York 
Herald Tribune, and the Chicago Daily News, as well as other 
metropolitan newspapers, indicated the overwhelming rank and 
file support for him.®® Nonetheless, party leaders con­
tinued to doubt his availability or his November chances.
Everyone remained friendly toward the ex-President
81but few expressed enthusiasm for his nomination. Hoover- 
ites continued to hope that "the Convention will muddle 
around awhile and then wind up tied to the only pier strong
Q  Oenough to hold the ship of state."0'1
On May 18, the ex-President met with the press. He
issued the following statement:
It should be evident by this time that I am not a 
candidate. I have stated many times that I have 
no interest but to get these critical issues before 
the country. I have rigidly prevented my friends 
from setting up any organization and from presenting
^®"Brisk Hoover," Literary Digest. CXXI (May 23,
1936), 6.
®®D-245, Hoover Presidential Library, contains politi­
cal newspaper clippings and some 400 letters to the editor 
of major newspapers urging H.H.'s nomination in 1936 as the 
logical and necessary step.
8-*-Fo x to Hoover, May 25, 1936, K-39. Fox still hoped 
for a Hoover-Landon ticket. He admitted that Knox and 
Vandenberg had no chance for a nomination.
®^Fort to Hoover, May 23, 1936, K-38. Fort admitted 
that "everyone" was shocked at his defeat, by some 40,000 
votes, for convention delegate.
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my name in any primary or to any convention.
. . . My concern is with principles.83
Hoover denied that any delegates were committed to him.
0 'Laughlin and other Hooverites continued to hope for
a draft. The Washington adviser wanted the Chief to speak
to the convention. To him, a personal appearance and a
O/dynamic speech by the Chief might set off "a spark.'
Borah's attempt to smear Landon with oil, as well as the 
Kansan's obvious mediocrity, provided, in 0 'Laughlin's
p Cmind, a glimmer of hope.03
As Hooverites desired, the ex-President was invited 
to address the Cleveland Convention.88 He reiterated his 
belief that the GOP could win in November with "a candidate 
who can arouse the moral and spiritual instincts of the 
country."®^ Privately, anticipating his Cleveland appearance, 
Hoover told Hyde, "I wish X had a divine inspiration to 
present this issue to them in such a way as to carry
88Hoover Collection, LXIVA (May 18, 1936), Item 2294. 
Even conscious of the past and the Coolidge experience, H.H. 
knew well that only a determined fight could stop the Landon 
bandwagon. Like his presidential predecessor, he did not 
want the nomination badly enough to dispute it.
®^Port to Hoover, May 23, 1936, K-38, hoped for a 
dramatic change. 0 'Laughlin to Hoover, May 11, and May 23, 
1936, Box 44, 0 'Laughlin Papers. 0 'Laughlin informed 
General Douglas MacArthur that the Chief would accept a draft.
85Ibid.
SSjjoover Collection, LXIVA (May 29, 1936), Item 2295.
^Hoover to Kellogg, May 23, 1936, K-67.
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c o n v i c t i o n . 1,88
As the R e p u b l i c a n  C o n v e n t i o n  approached, m a n y  m e n  
e x p e c t e d  the L a n d o n  p u s h  to fall short.8 ® R a y m o n d  M o l e y  saw 
H o o v e r  as a m a n  of "massive conv i c t i o n s  and intelligence" 
and the o n l y  "alternative to the N e w  D e a l . " ® 0 F D R  h i m s e l f  
wa s  c o n v i n c e d  that the ma s s  of R e p u blicans p r e f e r r e d  Hoover, 
an d  at the least, Vandenberg. Yet, h e  n o t e d  that "Landon
Q1
wa s  b e i n g  r a m m e d  down their throats" as available. x 
By the time the GOP con v e n e d  in Cleveland, the 
E a s t e r n  establishment, the p e r e n n i a l  P r e s i d e n t i a l  selector, 
s e n s i n g  a N o v e m b e r  defeat, dec i d e d  on a "sop to the West." 
The J e r s e y  boss and "dapper m i d g e t "  Da n i e l  P o m e r o y  joined 
the C o n n e c t i c u t  boss, H e n r y  R o r a b a c k  in a Landon endorsement. 
E v e n  "taciturn, thin-lipped" C h a r l i e  Hil l e s  of N e w  York 
i n d i c a t e d  h i s  w i l l i n g n e s s  "to fall in line." Ba s c o m  Slemp,
88Hoover to Hyde, May 30, 1936, K-61. In almost iden­
tical letters, Hoover wrote Fort and Bascom Slemp that he 
had no desire to be a "hanger-on at the convention" and that 
he had completed the job which he "set out to do." Hoover 
to Fort, May 26, 1936, K-38. Hoover to Slemp, May 23, 1936, 
K-124.
8®Crowther to Richey, June 3, and Crowther to Hoover, 
June 3, 1936, K-25. The writer agreed with Henry Ford that 
the GOP could not deny their sole leader. Landon’s campaign, 
he said, was pusillanimous.
®°Moley, 27 Masters of Politics, 26-27. According to 
Moley, the President, contrary to popular myth, feared H.H. 
of all the possible GOP candidates. FDR thought H.H. capable 
of offering an alternative program. He also bet his former 
adviser that H.H. would be the nominee.
91f d R; His Personal Letters (New York, 1945), 585-
586.
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"the wily politician who for years had dealt out the
Southern delegations like so many black-and-tan packages of
coffee across the counter" gave the Kansas Governor the nod.
"One of the most masterly jobs of creative journalism"
resulted in a presidential n o m i n a t i o n .
While the Ohio group shoved Walter Brown from power
in his own baliwick, ex-Senator Dave Reed, of the Mellon
barony of Pennsylvania, watched in awe and helplessness as
the Landon bandwagon rolled toward victory despite the
uncommitted status of the large Pennsylvania and New York 
93delegations.
On June 6, Hoover blasted the "minimum wage laws" as 
a violation of state authority. He pointed to the success 
and exemplary nature of California's minimum wage laws and 
questioned the constitutionality of a federal measure.^ 
Hoover remained the obvious GOP candidate if his ideas were 
accepted. Hence, the struggle over the platform became 
crucial in the minds of Hooverites.
Despite the usual ambiguity, the GOP platform was 
mild in its tone. Significantly, there were no demands for
®2Stokes, Chip Off My Shoulder. 422-426,* Raymond 
Clapper, Watching the World {New York, 1944), 136, says that 
the Eastern clique traditionally nominated Presidents while 
the Western wing dominated Congress. Schlesinger, Politics 
of Upheaval, 539-541, credited the Eastern bosses and 
business politicians such as Mills with the Landon selection.
®^Stokes, Chip Off My Shoulder. 423.
94noover Collection, LXIVA (June 6, 1936), Item 2296. 
New York Times, June 7, 1936.
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repeal of any major New Deal laws, and it even encouraged 
the expansion of unemployment relief and farm benefits.
Hoover was pleased with the gold plank of the platform and 
probably encouraged by Landon's disavowal of several minor 
planks.^ The Governor was grandstanding in an effort to 
appear more independent of the bosses.97 Roosevelt, in his 
normal jocosity, said that the Republicans had declared "in 
favor of the Ten Commandents, proclaiming from housetops 
that the Democratic Party wished a) to amend the Ten Com- 
mandments, b) to add to the Ten Commandments, and c) to 
scrap the Ten Commandments. On this issue they are confident 
they can sweep the country."98
On June 10, Herbert Hoover appeared before the GOP 
Convention and spoke of "The Road to Freedom." As expected, 
it was one of Hoover's most moving and moralistic speeches.
He spoke of the "greatest responsibility . . .  in three 
generations." To him, this convention would "determine the
95pendleton Herring, The Politics of Democracy (New 
York, 1940), 235-236, says that platforms inevitably force 
compromise on sectional, ethnic, and economic views. The 
platform fell short of Chet Rowell's proposed "positive 
program" in its agricultural plank and its failure to defend 
H.H.'s achievements. Chester H. Rowell, "A Positive Pro­
gram for the Republican Party," Yale Review, XXXV (Spring, 
1936), 443-457.
96noover Collection, LXIVA (June 11, 1936), Item 2299. 
New York Times, June 12, 1936, 1.
9^Herring, Politics of Democracy, 236.
98j^3Xer, Presidential Wit, 136.
fate o f  those ideals for w h i c h  this n a t i o n  w a s  f o u n d e d . " ^
"There is," h e  said, "a m o r a l  p u r p o s e  in the u n i v e r s e .  
T o  him, n a t i o n s  h a d  souls. W h e t h e r  from s t u p i d i t y  a n d  sheer 
opportunism, or  a " c o l d - b l o o d e d  attempt b y  s t a r r y - e y e d  boys, 
the N e w  Deal, h e  charged, had, in its c o l l e c t i v i s m ,  r e g i m e n ­
tation, and immorality, led A m e r i c a  t o w a r d  "a gr i m  p r e c i ­
p i c e "  w h i c h  w a s  c r i p p l i n g  a n d  m i g h t  d e s t r o y  "the f r e e d o m  of 
m e n . "  N e v e r  before, he no t e d ,  h a d  the n a t i o n  be e n  e x p o s e d  
to so m u c h  h a t r e d  and g r e e d  f o r  p o w e r . 1°°
U n f o r t u n a t e l y ,  he said. N e w  D e a l e r s  s h o w e d  "little 
i n d i c a t i o n  o f  r e p e n t a n c e . "  T o  him, a c o u r a g e o u s  press, the 
S u p r e m e  Court, and a few o p p o s i t i o n i s t  s p e a k e r s  w e r e  all 
that h a d  s a v e d  the people. R e p e a t e d  v i o l a t i o n s  o f  n a t u r a l  
e c o n o m i c  laws, h e  said, h a d  t a k e n  a "few h u n d r e d  t h o u s a n d  
e a r n e s t  p a r t y  w o r k e r s  to the P r o m i s e d  L a n d .  " To him, the 
n a t i o n  as a w h o l e  c o n t i n u e d  t o  suffer. Too, he t h o u g h t  that 
t h e r e  were c e r t a i n  "moral l a w s  w r i t t e n  i n  a Great B o o k  
[which a m o u n t e d  to] a gospel o f  b r o t h e r h o o d . "  H o wever, h e
^ T w e n t y - F i r s t  R e p u b l i c a n  N a t i o n a l  C o n v e n t i o n  (New 
York, 1936), 115-125. H o o v e r ,  A d d r e s s e s  o n  the R o a d , 173- 
174. Hyde to Hoover, M a y  23, 1936, K-6, m a d e  s e v e r a l  s u g ­
g e s t i o n s  for t h e  C l e v e l a n d  address. F o r  Hyde, there w a s  
"one issue a n d  o n l y  one: l i b e r t y . "  H e  d o u b t e d  GOP c o u r a g e
a n d  feared t h e i r  failure to d e f e n d  l i b e r t y  w o u l d  r e s u l t  in 
a n o t h e r  W h i g  fiasco. It w o u l d  b e  better, h e  said, "to r i s k  
the hu s k s  o f  v i c t o r y  for a c r u s a d e  w h i c h  s h a l l  d e t e r m i n e  the 
future of the n a t i o n . "  P r i n c i p l e ,  to him, w a s  m o r e  e n d u r i n g  
He  said th a t  t h e r e  "must be n o  c o m p r o m i s e  o n  the i s s u e  of 
h u m a n  l i b e r t y . "  He c o n t i n u e d  to hope for H.H. 's d r a f t  as 
th e  nominee.
lOOyital Speeches, II, 570-573. Hoover, Addresses on
the Road, 173-174.
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found that the New Deal had bred class hatred, fear, and
destruction.-*-0̂-
"We have arrived at the hour [when] the New Deal may
be a revolutionary design," he charged. Too, he thought
that it was "poisoning Americanism. " To him, the New Deal
had delayed recovery long enough, and the GOP had a duty, a
moral obligation, to restore "freedom in the economic
2field." There were eternal inviolable principles. u 
He continued:
Here in America, where the tablets of human freedom 
were first handed down, their sacred word has been 
flouted. Today the stern task is before the Repub­
lican Party to restore the Ark of the Covenant to 
the temple in Washington. . . . Shall we keep the
faith? There are some principles which cannot be 
compromi sed.10 3
In his attempt to give his party the issue, liberty, 
Hoover urged the convention to courageously face the prob­
lem. "Ideals and character," he said, were the essence of 
man. To him, man must be free to plan, to think, to act, 
and to succeed. Questioning the convention, he asked:
Is the Republican Party ready for the issue? . . .
Will you for expediency's sake, also offer will-o- 
the-wisps which beguile the people? Or have you
^•°^Hoover, Addresses on the Road, 175-178.
102Ibid.. 178-181.
-^^Ibid., 181. The religious imagery and H.H.’s 
moralism were seldom more evident than in his Cleveland 
speech. Rarely and never more sincerely did he speak from 
his heart. Modern demonstrators have frequently used his 
language and expressed his emotion. To his followers he 
undoubtedly had "soul."
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determined to enter in a holy crusade for liberty 
which shall determine the future and the perpetuity 
of a nation of free men? . . . Republicans and 
fellow Americans, this is your C all. 1-04
Pandemonium broke loose as the crowd wept, stood on 
its seats, shouted, cheered, and sang "Onward Christian 
Soldiers." The big prune-faced man at the podium was 
receiving the greatest political ovation of his career. 1-̂ 5 
He had released their "pent-up evangelism" and called them 
to "a holy crusade." Their hearts belonged to him.^-0^ In a 
crescendo of personal tribute they recognized his fidelity, 
his patience, his sportsmanship. The Hoover ovation was
also due to a "guilty conscience." The ex-President had 
labored for the party. "With a far more adept hand than he
lQ4Ibid.. 182-183.
lO^Edwin P. Hoyt, Jumbos and Jackasses (Garden City, 
1960), 350. Bendiner, Just Around the Corner, 154. 
Schlesinger, Politics of Upheaval, 545-546. Clapper, My 
World, 143-145. San Francisco Chronicle, June 11, 1936, 1; 
Philadelphia Public Ledger, June 11, 1936, 1, said that 
"Hoover came and saw and conquered for a night." Minne- 
apo1is Tribune. June 11, 1936, 1, said that "the night gave 
him the last full measure of vindication." Los Angeles 
Times, June 11, 1936; Requa to Hoover, June 21, 1936, K-108; 
and Oliver Street to Mrs. C. C. Morgan, June 29, 1936, K- 
132, are of value. Street said, "I never saw anything like 
it at a National Convention. An almost religious, spirit 
pervaded it. . . . Tears and love shown in every eye."
106gencli.ner, Just Around the Corner, 3, 154. Bendiner, 
who once saw Hoover as having "no more flair than an assis­
tant funeral director, "thought he now owned the hearts and 
souls of Republicans." For expedience, they passed over 
their true favorites in every convention from 1936 to 1964.
l°^Clapper, Mv World, June 11, 1936, 143-145.
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showed in his greater political days,” he had provided the 
issue. 1-08
Despite their disavowals, the Landon managers must 
have felt uneasy at the ex-President's ovation and the 
hearty chants of J,we want Hoover."-'-®9 Landonites were con­
vinced of an eleventh-hour attempt by Hoover to gain the 
nomination. They reasoned that the emotional ovation led 
him to believe a stampede was in the making. Snell, the 
temporary chairman, they alleged, announced Hoover's departure 
for New York while the ex-President actually returned to his 
hotel and pressed Vandenberg and Knox for an endorsement.
The two leaders apparently informed him that it was too
-*-®®Ibid. Clapper thought that H.H. skillfully used 
history, imagery, and nuance in his discussion of GOP 
tradition as espousing liberty from the slavery days of the 
nineteenth century to the new tyranny of the 1930's. It was 
the ex-President's swan song, a dramatic finish. Street to 
Mrs. C. C. Morgan, June 29, 1936, K-13 2, expressed disgust 
with GOP cowardice, and admitted that the GOP convention had 
been "like a good old fashion Methodist camp-meeting."
-'-"stokes, Chip Off My Shoulder, 428. Schlesinger, 
Politics of Upheaval, 541-546, 616, credits Republicans with 
buying off Borah with a few platform planks, and H.H. with 
an ovation. Schlesinger thinks that Hoover captured "the 
mood of the Republican Party" and its "hysterical certitude 
that the Republic was on the verge of collapse."
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l a t e . W h a t e v e r  the case, Landon was nominated the next 
morning.-*- -*-■*-
Hoover was “highly gratified" at his reception at the 
convention. Following the nomination of a Landon-Knox ticket, 
the former President said: “Every ounce of energy I have is
at the call and command of my party. " H 2  jn ^  effort to 
display unity, Vandenberg, Knox, Dickinson, and Robert A.
Taft made seconding speeches for Landon.•*■*-■̂ Many Hooverites 
burned at the thoughtless rejection of their hero.-*-**-4
110jv[ayer, The Republicans, 440-442, says Chester 
Rowell, the chairman of the California delegation, served as 
an intermediary. The only scrap of corraborating evidence 
in the Hoover Papers is a Fox to Richey letter of June 3, 
1936, K-39. Fox was informed by Edgar Rickard of the pro­
gram "to use Lowden to head off Landon." This could easily 
mean the platform instead of the nomination. H.H. made no 
serious effort to collect delegates in 1936, aside from the 
California primary. On the other hand, his correspondence 
shows a marked receptivity in 1940. Although he could have 
destroyed letters proving a 1936 attempt, why did he not 
tamper with the 1940 letters? At no time did he express any 
belief that he could be nominated in 1936. See his Memoirs, 
II, 194-195, for a realistic approach on the belief that 
anyone who wants a nomination must fight for it. To him, a 
movement only went as far as its leader would take it. The 
riddle of his 1936 efforts will never be cleared despite his 
obvious wish for vindication.
Hlwolfe, Hoover, 370.
-*--*-̂ Hoover Collection, LXIVA (June 11, 1936) , Item 
2301. New York Times. June 11, June 13, and June 21, 1936, 
1.
-*-•*•-^Wolfskill, Revolt of the conservatives, 201-205.
114port to Hoover, June 28, 1936, K-28. 0 'Laughlin
to Hoover, June 13, 1936, Box 44, 0 'Laughlin Papers, was 
dismayed at the convention’s failure to recognize brains and 
character. Dawes to Hoover, June 25, 1936, K-28, regretted
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Privately, Hoover expressed disgust at "the funeral 
eulogies . . . by all the press. As a last flower on the 
grave, they have elected me Elder Statesman." He hoped to
lieorganize the job and "chagrin the funeral directors."
The press probably sensed a Hoover finale because of Walter 
Brown's failure to be returned to the National Committee.
The Ohio lieutenant's defeat undercut Hoover's chance of 
holding "a high card or two in 1940.
H o o v e r ' s  c o n v e n t i o n  add r e s s  h a d  s e r v e d  as a c l a r i o n  
call to t h e  d i s e n c h a n t e d .  To  m a n y  R e p u b licans, h e  h a d  given
the s p i n e l e s s  R e p u b l i c a n s  w h o  i g n o r e d  "the lo g i c a l  c a n d i ­
da t e  . . . the l e a d e r  o f  t h e  p a r t y  in its d a r k e s t  a n d  m o s t
d i s c o u r a g i n g  da y s . "  R i c k a r d  to Mills, J u n e  13, 1936, Box 
53, M i l l s  Papers, sa i d  t h a t  Hoo v e r i t e s ,  in general, u n d e r ­
st o o d  t h a t  "but for [ M i l l s ’] i ntervention, the N e w  Y o r k  
d e l e g a t e s  w o u l d  h a v e  p o s t p o n e d  their c a u c u s  u n t i l  after Mr. 
H o o v e r  m a d e  h i s  spe e c h . "  R i c k a r d  w a n t e d  Mills' version. 
M i l l s  s e r v e d  as a L a n d o n  a d v i s e r  and w a s  l o o k e d  o n  as a 
"traitor" by  H o o v e r i t e s .  T h e  C h i e f  w a s  h u r t  and the close 
H o o v e r - M i l l s  r e l a t i o n s h i p  w a s  n e v e r  r e s t o r e d  a l t h o u g h  the 
two m e n  c o r r e s p o n d e d  i n f r e q u e n t l y  d u r i n g  the r e m a i n i n g  years 
o f  Mills' life. F o x  to Hoover, June 23, 1936, K-39, said 
t h a t  "everyone" r e a l l y  w a n t e d  a H o o v e r - L a n d o n  ticket.
T h e r o n  Bronson, a C o n n e c t i c u t  R e p u blican, and f a i t h f u l  H.H. 
admirer, l i k e n e d  h i m  to Lincoln, "one o f  the g r e a t  saviors 
o f  the re a l  l i b e r t i e s  of  m e n . "  B r o n s o n  to Hoover, J u n e  13, 
1936, K-15.
H 5H o o v e r  to Brown, J u n e  23, 1936, K-16. H o o v e r  to 
Hyde, J u n e  22, 1936, K-61, e x p r e s s e d  the d e s i r e  to o r g a n i z e  
"a m i l i t a n t  ba n d "  to d i s p r o v e  the o b i t u a r i e s .  H o o v e r  to 
Dawes, J u n e  29, 1936, K-28.
H 6B r o w n  to Hoover, June 29, 1936, K-16, admitted 
that his main purpose in trying to maintain his seat on the 
committee was to aid Hoover. Too, he foresaw that the 
Chief’s "restless spirit will find no satisfaction in the 
role of Elder Statesman."
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117the campaign "a tone of high purpose and resolve. ' In
the months ahead John Hamilton, the National Chairman, and 
Frank Knox, the vice-presidential nominee, would echo the 
Hoover line.-*--*-®
According to one historian, Landonrs "colorless per­
sonality and inadequacy as a speaker" hamstrung his efforts 
against the dynamic Roosevelt.-*--*-® The "dull" Governor was 
the very antithesis of the suave, sophisticated, colorful 
incumbent. Landon1s "halting, labored midwestern twang" and 
"homespun simplicity" were underlined by FDR's contrast.-*-2® 
The President was reassured by the Kansan's nomination, for
1 1 7 H a m i l t o n  to Hoover, June 16, 1936, K-46. Mac- 
C h e s n e y  to Hoover, June 16, 1936, K-86. L owden to Hoover, 
June 11, 1936, K-78.
-*--*-®Hoover to Hamilton, July 14, 1936, K-46, was 
pleased that the chairman was following the anti-New Deal 
lines suggested. Eaton, Presidential Timber, 362, notes 
Knox's denunciatory approach to the New Deal. Hyde to 
Hoover, July 13, 1936, K-61, noted Hamilton's approach. In 
the New York Times, September 24, 1936, columnist Arthur 
Krock thought that the Republicans had given FDR his best 
issue: Hoover and the depression.
-*--*-®Rauch, N e w  D e a l , 260. D o n a l d  Bruce Johnson, T h e  
Rep u b l i c a n  P a r t y  and W e n d e l l  W i l k i e  (Urbana, 1960), 9, sp o k e  
of a "rather c o l orless s t andard be a r e r . "
l^Eaton, Presidential Timber, 362.
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Landon lacked experience, had a vulnerable record, and "was
171unknown to most people."
The Republican nominee isolated Old Guard Republicans 
and Hooverites during the early weeks of the campaign. Yet, 
the "specter of Hoover" remained obvious. Landon head­
quarters feared the ex-President's public appearances as
1 77much as a plague.
William Allen White, recognizing the bleakness of GOP 
chances, thought that the Governor might "crumble or crystal­
lize" under the pressure. As the nominee was "a decent, 
square, kindly, courageous" individual, White urged Hoover 
"to help him all you can."-1*23 The former President con­
tinued to hope for "considerable fireworks" in the 
12dcampaign.
■*-2^James A. Farley, Behind the Ballots (New York, 
1938), 305-308. Farley and FDR thought that Landon1s weak­
nesses were so obvious that he would never be nominated.
"His flat and uninspired acceptance speech" hastened his 
downward spiral. Farley notes that Landon1s great achieve­
ment of balancing the budget was possible because of New 
Deal loans and works projects. Moreover, many of the 
Governor1s acts were declared unconstitutional by the Kansas 
courts, thus depriving the GOP of some of the best issues. 
Too, he was "unacquainted with federal affairs."
22Schlesinger, Politics of Upheaval, 605. Tugwell, 
The Democratic Roosevelt.; 428. D. R. McCoy, "Alfred M. 
Landon and the Presidential Campaign of 1936," Mid-America, 
XLII (October, 1960), 213-214.
123White to Hoover, July 1, 1936, Selected Letters, 
365-366.
-*-2%[oover Collection, LXIVA (July 5, 1936), Item 
2306. Hoover, in Oregon, spoke with the press.
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Although Landon and Ogden Mills were convinced "the 
tide" was running with the Republicans, Hyde and his 
Chief were despondent over the political outlook. Confi­
dential Congressional Digest polls showed thirty-one per 
cent of the Republicans defecting to Roosevelt, while only 
eight per cent of the Democrats favored Landon.^ 6  
ex~President decided that it was time to act. He asked 
Lewis Strauss to go to Topeka and press Landon for a change 
in strategy.127
Numerous Republicans were agitated at the "tepid 
campaigner. 1 Even Hamilton was disturbed at the Topeka 
strategy and thought that the ex-President should take part 
in the campaign. Hoover, sensitive to the Landonites1 
embarrassment at his efforts, reiterated that his "purpose 
in life was to see that the New Deal was put out of Washing­
ton, " but he refused to campaign without Landon1s request.1^8
^-^Mills to Landon, J u l y  2, 1936, and L a n d o n  to Mills, 
J u l y  6, 1936, B o x  52, M i l l s  Papers. L a n d o n  a n t i c i p a t e d  
v i c t o r i e s  in the M i d w e s t  and farm belt.
126noover to Hyde, July 9, 1936, K-61. Hoover to Fort, 
July 9, 1936, K-38. Throughout the campaign 0 'Laughlin 
blasted Landon's timidity and ineptness. O 'Laughlin to 
Hoover, July 4, July 11, July 18, July 25, and August 29,
1936, Box 44, 0 'Laughlin Papers. H.H. predicted that the 
Democrats would carry California by over a million votes. 
Hooverites were not as realistic as their Chief. Fort saw 
the East as Landon country and predicted Lemke would poll 
enough votes on the third-party ticket to give Landon several 
Midwestern states. Fort to Hoover, July 17, 1936, K-38.
i27jjoover to Strauss, July 17, 1936, K-130.
128Hoover to Shaw, August 18, 1936, and Shaw to Hoover, 
August 27, 1936, K-119. The Chicagoan assured his Chief of
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The nominee's role was superseded in the last months
of the campaign by Knox, Hamilton, Hoover, and even Al
S m i t h . S e v e r a l  Republicans felt that Landon1 s "double-
dealing" and the Hearst endorsement explained his poor
l -30showing in the polls. Arthur Hyde was so infuriated at
Landon's posture that he considered a public condemnation of 
the "platform and the candidate.
Hoover tried to bolster GOP morale. He wrote John 
Hamilton that in spite of the chaotic feeling, progress was 
notable and that "the organization will begin to jell in 
September."132 a Republican rally in San Francisco, the
ex-President introduced Hamilton. In his introductory 
remarks, Hoover blasted "New Deal Collectivism" and warned 
that "the leopard cannot change his spots even when he runs 
for o f f i c e .  shortly, Hamilton and Knox became more
Hamilton's sincerity in wanting him to campaign. Schlesinger, 
Politics of Upheaval, 605, 612-618.
129lbid. McCoy, "Landon and the Campaign of 1936," 
213-214, noted the deep fragmentation in the campaign and 
"the personalized speaking campaigns" of those Landon could 
not control. See Schlesinger, Politics of Upheaval, 616, 
618-619, 623-624, and Rauch, New Deal. 238, 260.
130fjy3e to Hoover, July 13, 1936, K-61. 0 'Laughlin
to Hoover, July 4, July 11, July 18, and July 25, 1936, Box 
44, 0 'Laughlin Papers. In Landon's defense, Mayer, The 
Republicans, 436-439, 442-443, says that the Governor was a 
good strategist, a "superior man," who "concealed his shrewd­
ness . "
^■^Hyde to Hoover, September 3, 1936, K-61.
^■^Hoover to Hamilton, August 14, 1936, K-46.
133Hoover Collection, LXIV (August 13, 1936, Item 2308.
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aggressive in their campaign. In a most belligerent tone, 
Knox said, “Today no life insurance policy is secure; no 
savings account is safe.'1̂ 3^
Republicans in New England took heart. George Moses, 
anxious to return to the Senate, wrote the ex-President 
asking for a public endorsement and letters to influential 
state leaders.^33 Ted Joslin reported that New England's 
November vote would be Republican. In a revealing statement, 
the former press secretary said: “Opposition to the New
Deal, although strong at the top, has not sifted down to the 
everyday people who work with their hands."136
Until September, Landon maintained his containment 
policy concerning Hoover's participation in the campaign. 
Landon headquarters in Chicago even snubbed the ex-President 
in a "chilled reception." Nor did the nominee's failure to 
mention Hoover in his addresses go unnoticed.
^-34schlesinger, Politics of Upheaval. 616, 618-619, 
623-624. Wolfskill, Revolt of the Conservatives, 205-215, 
saw Hamilton as more conservative than Landon despite the 
fact that he was Landon's manager. As Schlesinger notes, 
even Landon adopted the hard line by October and riddled 
Roosevelt as directing "the nation down the road to 
dictatorship."
135jv[OSes to Hoover, August 31, 1936, K-95. H.H.,
pleased that his endorsement was still coveted, readily 
replied in the affirmative. Hoover to Moses, September, 
1936, K-95. Akerson to Hoover, August 31, 1936, K-l, anti­
cipated a Republican sweep in the East.
136josiin to Hoover, September 1, 1936, K-66.
^^Schlesinger, Politics of Upheaval, 605. Mayer, 
The Republicans, 442.
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After considerable backstage maneuvering and with 
definite awkwardness, Landon, with obvious reluctance, asked 
for Hoover's aid in the campaign. The ex-President was eager 
to help but insisted that Landon inform other Republicans of
TOOthe request. On September 4, following the official
request, Hoover announced that he would campaign.2-39 He 
released a barrage of press statements exuding confidence in 
the Republican nominee and his election c h a n c e s . ^
Hoover's silence during the following weeks created a 
certain anxiety in the Landon camp. Actually, the former 
President was in seclusion, working on his speeches.2-42- On 
September 23, he addressed a New York Herald Tribune Forum 
concerning "The Administration of Relief. "2-42
The ex-President stated that the two objectives of 
relief were to prevent hunger and suffering and to minimize 
waste and needless sacrifice on the part of those providing 
relief. He viewed all bureaucratic relief as inefficient,
i38Landon to Hoover, telephone conversation, September 
2, 1936, 12:40 PST time, K-74, and Hoover to Landon,
September 2, 1936, K-74.
2-3®Hoover Collection, LXIVA (September 4, 1936) , Item
2311.
^^Ibid. (September 5, September 6, and September 10,
1936), Items 2312, 2313, 2314.
'^■''Newton to Hoover, September 26, 1936, K-97.
2-42noover Collection, LXIVA (September 23, 1936),
Item 2317. New York Times, September 24, 1936, 1; Hoover, 
Addresses on the Road, 186-190.
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costly, and political? he also held that relief should be 
only on an emergency basis.14^
Hoover stated that local relief agencies were more 
effective, efficient, inexpensive, and apolitical. Federal 
relief, he thought, ruined man's "self-respect." Its 
encouragement of unemployment, to him, was obvious from the 
growing relief rolls. Aside from the spiritual loss, he 
noted that infant mortality statistics were the highest in 
the nation's recent history. He demanded reform and a 
return to local relief.144
The ex-President accelerated his tempo towards the 
close of the campaign. He addressed the Metal Mining Con­
gress at Denver, Colorado, on September 30. The subject of 
his talk was "Reform in Some Federal Taxes." Although his 
speech was intended as non-political, he inevitably broached 
economic issues in his defense of balanced budgets, federal 
and state powers, and related topics. He upheld "the 
principle of making people pay according to their means" as 
right but denounced the use of taxation to "effect social or 
economic ends."14^
At a convention of GOP women in Pennsylvania, Hoover
143Ibid., 186-188.
144ibid., 188-190. Despite the truth of H.H.'s facts, 
he ignored the possibility that under the acute circum­
stances of the depression, infant mortalities would have 
been even higher but for federal intervention.
14^New York Times. October 1, 1936, 1.
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spoke of "New Deal Morals in Arithmetic." His October 16 
speech was one of the most vituperative of his career. It 
evolved around the "intellectual dishonesty" of the Adminis­
tration. He pointed to FDR's 1932 campaign promises con­
cerning spending, the budget, and recovery. According to 
Hoover, the Supreme Court had removed the most obvious 
impediments to recovery: the Roosevelt measures. The Presi­
dent, Hoover said, reminded one of the story about "the old 
gentleman that was surreptitiously pushed off the dock in 
order that the hero could gain the plaudits of the crowd as 
a life s a v e r . " ^
The ex-President was amazed at the dishonesty in the 
New Dealer's bookkeeping. Despite the attempts to cover 
the truth, he found that expenses in many areas had increased 
as much as 500 per cent. "If an income taxpayer or any 
corporation kept books like this administration," he said, 
"that is if they showed similar morals in juggling their 
accounts, they would be put in jail." Hoover urged a reduc­
tion in expenses and the return of the purse to Congressional 
control.
At Denver, Colorado, on October 30, Hoover, preparing
146Hoover Collection, LXIVA (October 16, 1936), Item 
2322. V i t a l  Speeches, November 2, 1936. Hoover, Addresses 
on the R o a d , 201-204.
^-^Ibid. t 204-215. H.H. noted the juggling of figures, 
the mislabeling of expenditures and credits, the transfer of 
extraordinary regular expenses to the "emergency" column, 
and other budgetary deceptions.
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to deliver his closing campaign address, told the press 
that Landon was gaining ground every day and would carry New 
York, Pennsylvania, and Ohio.^® Addressing the Young Repub­
lican League on "The Challenge to Liberty," Hoover returned 
to his favorite t o p i c . T o  a degree, he recaptured "the 
ideological tone . . . characteristic of his long trek across 
the stage of American politics."150
Repeating the importance of the election, Hoover 
bemoaned the "shadow boxing of political campaigns." To 
him, the real issue of 1936 was liberty. "The spirit of 
liberalism," he said, "is to create free men; it is not the 
regimentation of men.” He thought that coercion, central­
ization, and government dictation were at odds with American 
liberty. He demanded an end to "economic planning," ineffi­
ciency, human suffering, government competition with business, 
and encroachment on individual rights.
He called for the restoration of the American System, 
with its spiritual tone, its freedom from coercion. He 
doubted that material welfare was enough. "What," he said, 
"is the nation profited if it shall gain the whole world and 
lost its own soul?" To him, the time had come to reestablish
1^8Hoover Collection, LXIVA (October 30-31, 1936), 
Items 2323 and 2324.
149jjew York Times, October 31, 1936, 1. Hoover, 
Addresses on the Road, 216-227.
ISOm q o s , The Republicans, 375.
151Hoover, Addresses on the Road, 216-222.
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truth and morals in public life. To him, the transcendent 
issue was freedom. He closed by saying: "We must recover
these spiritual heritages of America. . . . We shall battle
it out until the soul of America is saved.
On November 2, Hoover, made some final remarks about 
the campaign. He reiterated his belief that the New Deal 
threatened liberty, that this was the most important politi­
cal campaign of the century, and that a restoration of the 
American System was an economic and moral necessity. In a 
revealing, although unintended, election prognosis. Hoover 
said: "No matter what comes from this election, . . . we
will and must continue to fight. "153
On November 3, as the ex-President and many of his 
followers anticipated, Roosevelt swept Landon into oblivion, 
but "the size of the majority" was incredible. The fact 
that Republicans had lost almost four million votes since 
1932 raised doubts as to the value of a coalition with
J e f f e r s o n i a n  D e m o c r a t s ,  L i b e r t y  Leaguers, a n d  T o w n s e n d i t e s .
*1
T h e r e  w a s  m u c h  t h a t  w a s  "worth c o n t e m p l a t i o n . 11X3 ̂  M a n y
152Ibid., 222-227. Spangler, elated' with H.H. 1s 
speeches, said "when the underbrush is cleared away, your 
message will always live." Spangler to Hoover, November 2,
1936, K-127.
■^■^Hoover Collection, LXIVA (November 2, 1936,) , Item 2325.
^^Hoover to Reed, November 11, 1936, K-107. Fort to 
Hoover, November 7, 1936, K-38, blamed Landon's campaign and 
pointed to H.H.'s greater appeal as a candidate. Moses to 
Hoover, November 24, 1936, K-95, and Hyde to Hoover, November 
21, 1936, K-61, concluded that "the pusil animous Landon" 
was responsible for the disaster.
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Republicans felt that "money was spent as if the crew of
drunken sailors from a battleship had it in their pockets."
Hooverites thought that the administration had aroused class
feeling and used demagogic tactics.^55 Too, they felt that
the L a n d o n  outfit h a d  ignored p r i n c i p l e s  and the p o s s i b i l i t y
of witnessing "a resurrection; they [sought] only to cast
lots for a garment o f  Republicanism."-1-®® However, the GOP
could take comfort in "the unanimous support of the educated,
157thoughtful element of our population." J
Theron K. Bronson, a Connecticut Republican, revealed 
a great deal of the Republican problem in his post-election 
analysis. Obsessed with the idea that New England was the 
"Cradle of Liberty,” the intellectual community of the 
nation, and the most responsible electoral area, Bronson 
"knew" that Hoover's ideas were popular. All the businessmen 
and farmers whom he talked to were Hoover Republicans. As 
men of sobriety, they "always" voted Republican. They were, 
he said, of the "best New England stock.1 But in recent 
elections, he noted, the Irish and especially the Italians
ISSMoses to Hoover, November 24, 1936, K-95. Reed to 
Hoover, November 5, 1936, K-107.
■'■^Hyde to Hoover, November 21, 1936, K-61. 0 'Laugh­
lin to Hoover, November 7, 1936, Box 44, 0 'Laughlin Papers, 
bemoaned the failure to defend principle. Hyde to Hamilton, 
November 4, 1936, K-46, lamented the GOP failure to defend 
the Hoover Administration. He speculated that such a display 
of cowardliness led to the 1936 fiasco.
■*"^Reed to Hoover, November 5, 1936, K-107. Bronson
to Hoover, November 5, 1936, K-15.
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had swelled the totals of radical candidates in every New 
England city. "Old time America, 1 he said, was besieged.
To him, R o o s e v e l t ' s  " l e veling o u t  p r o c e s s "  w a s  c r e a t i n g  a 
p o l i t i c a l  r e v o l u t i o n .  Like Hoover, h e  "knew" t h a t  l i b e r t y  
w a s  e n d a n g e r e d .  B r o n s o n  also b l a m e d  R o o s e v e l t  for a c c e l e r a t ­
i n g  the "gap b e t w e e n  the y o u n g  p e o p l e "  a n d  t h e i r  elders. To 
him, th e  y o u n g e r  g e n e r a t i o n  d i d  n o t  k n o w  the m e a n i n g  of 
d i s c i p l i n e .  He n o t e d  that the crime r a t e  in the c i t i e s  w a s  
r e a c h i n g  an a l a r m i n g  p r o p o r t i o n .  H e  h o p e d  that H o o v e r  c o u l d
1 CQsave the country before it was too late.
T h e  B r o n s o n  a n a l y s i s  p o i n t e d  to the s i g n i f i c a n t  c a u s e s  
o f  R o o s e v e l t ' s  o v e r w h e l m i n g  sweep. Y o u n g  p e o p l e  w e r e  l o o k i n g  
f or a n e w  i d e o l o g y  as a r e s u l t  o f  the D e p r e s s i o n .  T h e y  w e r e  
less c o n c e r n e d  w i t h  H o o v e r ' s  a b s t r a c t  p r i n c i p l e  o f  A m e r i c a n  
I n d i v i d u a l i s m  an d  its " e q u a l i t y  of o p p o r t u n i t y . "  T h e y  w e r e  
i m p r e s s e d  w i t h  the N e w  D e a l ' s  r e a l i s m  in p r o v i d i n g  job
1 cqsecurity, guaranteed payments, and government assistance.J3
Businessmen and farmers were no longer a majority even 
when they combined. Metropolitan pluralities were decisive 
in every election of the 1930‘s and 1940's. As Bronson 
noted, Italians and other ethnic groups were voting Demo­
cratic and throwing the urban majorities to FDR and his
158t . Bronson to Hoover, November 5, and November
8, 1936, K-15. Bronson was concerned about good government, 
political influence, responsible citizens, and morality.
He often quoted Hoover's speeches.
159Adrian and Press, American Political Process. 188.
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coalition.
The most decisive change in Roosevelt's 1932 and 1936 
totals, however, was due to the Negro vote. For the first 
time in history, a Democratic Presidential nominee garnered 
a majority of the black vote. Whereas Hoover had polled 
seventy-one per cent of the Negro vote in 1932, Landon 
received only thirty-five per cent. A political revolution 
had occurred in the Negro wards.
Finally, as one Republican precinct captain observed, 
by 1936 Roosevelt had "become one of the family." His was a 
personal victory as far as Negroes, labor, and the so-called 
middle class were concerned.-*-®^
^6C>Samuel Eldersveld, "The Influence of Metropoli­
tan Party Pluralities in Presidential Elections Since 1920," 
American Political Science Review, XLIII (December, 1949), 
1195-1199. Viorst, Puritan Ethic. 166-169, notes FDR's 
sweep of Negro, Italian, Jewish, and labor votes.
161grnest M. Collins, "Cincinnati Negroes and Presi­
dential Politics," Journal of Negro History, XLI (April, 1956), 
132-133. Elmer W. Henderson, "Political Changes Among 
Negroes in Chicago During,the Depression," Social Forces, XIX 
(May, 1941), 538-546. Richard S. Kirkendall, "The Great 
Depression: Another Watershed in American History?" re­
printed in Braeman, Change and Continuity, 170-172. See 
Degler, Out of Our Past. 396. Despite Negro disappointment 
with FDR, and their realization that he often played politics 
at their expense, they saw some improvement, even 200,000 jobs 
in the CCC. They hoped for even more and therefore supported 
him in 1936. See John A. Salmond, "The Civilian Conservation 
Corps and the Negro," Journal of American History, LII (June, 
1965), 75-88. Also see Leslie H. Fishel, "The Negro in the 
New Deal Era," Wisconsin Magazine of History, XLVIII (Winger, 
1964), 111-126.
162GOsnell, Grass Roots Politics. 132. With the 
changes in the middle class, the ethnic, racial and urban 
vote insured FDR's heavy margin of 1936.
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With the final tabulations recorded, Republicans were 
a decimated species. The Hartford Daily Courant described 
the party as too weak to prevent further centralization and 
bureaucratization. Its principles were all that the Party 
had saved. Pointing to the future, however, the newspaper 
expressed a belief that Republicans could demand "efficiency 
and a minimum of expense" regarding impending New Deal 
policies. The reorganization of the government and the 
extension of civil service were positive goals that the 
Party might promote.-^3
Lewis Strauss cautioned his Chief's silence as his 
supporters were the obvious "nucleus around which any recon­
struction will have to be made." Hooverites even anticipated 
Governor Landon asking the ex-President "to assume leader­
ship. " Mills was relieved that the Chief had not been the 
nominee, since the certain defeat, although unavoidable, 
would have blamed on Hoover personally.
Several Republicans feared that Hamilton lacked the 
broad understanding and political skill necessary for recon­
structing the party along acceptable lines. The chairman 
had an "intense energy, a somewhat brilliant personality, 
but a rather superficial grasp of matters." A
■^^Hartford Daily Courant, November 6, 1936.
164Strauss to Hoover, November 6, 1936, K-130. The 
New York loyalist thought that "Ogden is truly repentant and 
very much bewildered.1 Mills wanted "bygones to be by­
gones." Mills to Hoover, November 16, 1936, K-92.
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reorganization of the Party was the most important issue in 
the months ahead.-*-65 Before Hoover would undertake the 
enormous task of reorganizing the party, he wanted a recon­
naissance of the election, the issues, potential leaders, 
their loyalties, and a mass reaffirmation of principle.
•^^Spangler to Hoover, November 21, 1936, K-127.
Moses to Hoover, November 24, 1936, K-95, thought "Hamilton 
should be' unhorsed1 and could assure E d ge^ cooperation in 
that specific endeavor. Hyde to Hoover, November 21, 1936, 
K-61, urged the Chief to draw up a list of key men in several 
states who shared their opinions. Through such a skeletal 
organization, Hyde hoped to rebuild a party of principle.
CHAPTER VII
R E C O N N A I S S A N C E
The 1936 election shattered the GOP. As National 
Chairman John D. M. Hamilton admitted, Republicans had "lost 
the pulse of the people." The Party must be reorganized and 
the job would be anything but easy.'** The greatest question 
was "who" should lead the revival? Despite his disastrous 
defeat, the 1936 nominee Alf Landon had a legitimate claim. 
Hamilton, as National Chairman and a communicant with all the 
factions, had a theoretical claim. Senator Arthur Vandenberg, 
the Congressional leader of an anti-New Deal coalition of 
Republicans and Democrats, received much publicity. The 
ex-President, as the last official spokesman for his party, 
and the leader of a loyal band of lieutenants, was eager for 
a return to center stage. Mutual distrust complicated the 
problems of the leaders and the reorganization of the party.
F r a n k l i n  F o r t  spoke o f  a "floundering" party, le a d e r -  
less, and drifting. To the Jerseyite, his C h i e f  was the only
•^-Donald Bruce Johnson, The Republican Pa r t y  and W e n d e l l  
W i l l k i e  (Urbana, 1960), 13. H e r e i n a f t e r  c i t e d  as Johnson, 
W i l l k i e .




p o s s i b l e  l e a d e r .  H o o v e r ,  in d e e p  m e d i t a t i o n ,  p o n d e r e d  t h e  
a p p r o p r i a t e  action. H e  soon d e c i d e d  that t h e r e  w e r e  two 
a l t e r n a t i v e s  for him. T h e  role o f  a C i n c i n n a t u s  h a d  l i t t l e  
a p p e a l .  H o w e v e r ,  t h a t  o f  an " e v a n g e l i s t  in a w o r l d  t h a t  
d o e s  n o t  w i s h  to l i s t e n "  b e c k o n e d  h i m .  In v i e w  o f  t h e i r  
1936 b l u n d e r ,  H o o v e r  t h o u g h t  t h a t  R e p u b l i c a n s  s h o u l d  p u b l i c l y  
d e m a n d  h i s  r e t u r n  to t h e  n a t i o n a l  p o d i u m . ^
As the ex-President reflected on Republican strategy 
of 1936, he became convinced that Landon tactics were respon­
sible for the loss of every state except Maine and Vermont. 
Any idiot, he concluded, could see that an aggressive anti- 
New Deal approach was the only path to a Republican future. 
Hoover, on the verge of challenging Landon for party control, 
was convinced that the Kansan was, at best, "a mediocre,
Cprairie politician,,IJ
^Fort to Hoover, January 7, 1937, K-38. Hyde to 
Hoover, January 8, 1937, K-61. The Missourian thought that 
someone must call back the nation "to her original faith."
^Hoover to Norman Beasley, December 29, 1936, K-9. 
Hoover to Hyde, January 1, 1937, K-61. The two letters were 
identical in tone and thought. Beasley to Hoover, January 5, 
1937, wrote H.H. that "no cause is lost so long as there are 
those who believe in it enough to fight for it. But to 
fight they must have a leader . . .  a leader from whom they 
can draw strength and to whom they can give strength." The 
historian agreed with Hyde that the GOP had only one such 
man.
^Mayer, The Republicans, 448. San Francisco Chron­
icle , August 24, 1937, expressed anger over the fiasco 
brought about by the "me-tooers." Robinson, Roosevelt 
Leadership, 191, notes that many New Deal opponents thought 
that Landon's nomination had muddled the issues. Too, the 
conservative South had voted for FDR.
207
For his part, Landon thought of Hoover as "a stuffy 
egotist and a perpetual Presidential candidate." Undoubtedly, 
the ex-President and his record were an albatross for Repub­
licans.® The 1936 nominee, however, wanted a closer 
alliance with anti-New Deal Democrats, and even proved
7receptive to the idea of a new party.
Aside from the maneuvering of aspirants for the GOP 
leadership position, the party itself had to choose a direc­
tion from four options. Basically, these were again the 
four possible roads of 1935. Hoover, becoming more and more 
the voice of conservatives, pointed to an anti-New Deal 
route which would defend individualism, states rights, con­
servative fiscal policies such as the gold standard and a 
balanced budget, and less federal regulation. He wanted a
Qresponsible opposition.
®Mayer, The Republicans, 448.
7Johnson, Willkie. 14-15. Patterson, Congressional 
Conservatism, 255-259, notes that the proponents of a coali­
tion party all but won Landon and Vandenberg. The 1936 
nominee had even approved of a move to nominate Senator Byrd 
or another Southern Democrat as his running mate.
8Johnson, Willkie. 14. The American Political Science 
Association, Toward A More Responsible Two-Party System (New 
York, 1950), made an eloquent plea for ideological parties.
It quoted H.H.'s statement that J,if a man from the moon, who 
knew the essentials of representative government came as a 
total stranger to the United States, he would say some 
obvious things within the first week or two. . . .  He would 
say that in all this ideological tumult, if there cannot be 
a reasonably cohesive body of opinion in each major party, 
you are on a blind road where there is no authority in the 
ballot or in government."
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Progressives demanded a liberal move which would go 
further leftward than the New Deal. The obvious weakness of 
such a course was its alienation of many Republicans with 
their moderate to conservative philosophy. Moreover, Pro­
gressives composed a very small faction of the GOP in the 
1930's.9
A third group preferred to see the Republican Party 
die and thus free its members to form a new party, hopefully 
along ideological and economic lines, and with a Southern 
flavor. Men of diverse views favored this approach. Several 
Senate leaders including McNary and Vandenberg leaned in 
this direction, and Landon showed a surprising receptivity 
to the idea.-*-®
The GOP, suffering an accelerating fragmentation,
chose the fourth option and "muddled along" as a "loyal 
11opposition." At the darkest moment in the party’s recent 
history, the President announced his Court Plan. The 
February 5, proposal amounted to an attempt to pack the 
court.12 It gave the Republicans an issue on which to unite,
^Johnson, Willkie, 15. New York Times. January 6, 
January 17, January 31, February 7, March 5, and March 10, 
1937, 1, pushed for a liberalization of the party.
1 ®Johnson, W i l l k i e . 15-16, 26-27. Fo r t u n e  M a g a z i n e . 
XV (February, 1937}, 67-71, ar g u e d  this line. A l s o  see 
Patterson, C o n g r e s s i o n a l  C o n s e r v a t i s m , 255, 259-260.
11Johnson, W i l l k i e , 16.
12New York Times, February 6 , 1937, 1.
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13albeit m  opposition.
On the very day that Roosevelt announced his judi­
ciary maneuver, the ex-President held a press conference.
In an unmistakable tone, Hoover attributed the Judiciary 
Reorganization Bill to the Court's invalidation of "pet" New 
Deal programs. The President's bias, he held, was undeniable, 
but the method of bypassing a constitutional amendment and 
openly attempting to destroy the independence of the court 
was unpardonable. The proposal, he noted, would subordinate 
the court "to the personal power of the Executive." To 
Hoover, this would nullify "the greatest savior of liberty.
Several Republicans applauded Hoover's public state­
ment on the Court Plan and thought that he had added strength 
to the opposition side.^ The majority of GOP leaders, how­
ever, preferred Senator McNary's strategy of silence. To 
Senate politicos, the defeat of the Roosevelt scheme was 
possible only if Democrats led the fight against the Court
1-3Johnson, Willkie, 17-19.
1-^New York Times, February 6, 1937, 1. Hoover, 
Addresses on the Road, 228.
l%orman Beasley to Hoover, February 27, 1937, K-9, 
expressed his and Wendell Willkie's admiration for the ex- 
President 's effort to show Republican character. Theron 
Bronson to Hoover, February 10, 1937, K-15, thought that 
sane men must defend constitutional government and principle 
from FDR's onslaught. O 'Laughlin to Hoover, February 22, 
February 23, February 27, March 6, March 9, March 13, March 
20, and March 27, 1937, Box 44, 0 'Laughlin Papers, showed 
an obsession with the court plan. Of GOP officeholders, only 
Governor John Bricker of Ohio endorsed a public repudiation 
of the President's plan. Bricker to Hoover, February 24, 
1937, K-14.
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Plan. M c N a r y  an d  Bo r a h  c o n v e r t e d  V a n d e n b e r g  to th e i r  p o s i ­
tion, thus p r e s e n t i n g  a solid front on the p r o p e r  tactic.
C o n g r e s s i o n a l  leaders, however, h a d  to res t r a i n  
Landon, Hamilton, and e s p e c i a l l y  Hoover. A r t h u r  V a n d e n b e r g  
h e l d  a series of con f e r e n c e s  w i t h  the e x - P r e s i d e n t  and 
b e g g e d  for s i l e n c e . ^  in the long run McN a r y ' s  s t rategy 
p r o v e d  vic t o r i o u s  as the Dem o c r a t s  divided, the C o u r t  Plan 
wa s  defeated, and R o o s e v e l t  was p l a c e d  on the defensive.^-®
Although Hoover reluctantly acquiesced in the McNary 
policy throughout the spring of 1937, he took one last blow 
at the packing plan in his Chicago address of February 20.
He d e m a n d e d  "Hands Off the Supreme Court." He d i s c u s s e d  the 
w i d e s p r e a d  con c e r n  over the court p l a n  on the p a r t  of m e n  
from e v e r y  party, class, and profession. H e  r e i t e r a t e d  his 
m o d e r a t e  stand b e t w e e n  O l d  Guard and "radical" extremes. 
A l t h o u g h  m a n y  men, h e  said, were u r g i n g  h i m  to ac c e p t  the 
role o f  "elder statesman," he w a s  n o t  ready for retirement. 
He d i d  r e cognize "the e r a  in m y  life has gone b y  w h e n  p a r t y
16Boskin, "Politics of an Opposition Party," 93-96. 
James D. Patterson, Congressional Conservatism, 101-106, 108 
110, 331. "Leadership in congress," Review of Reviews, XCV 
(January, 1937), 47-51, described McNary as a "shrewd 
politician.1
^ B o s k i n ,  "Politics of an O p p o s i t i o n  P arty," 93-96. 
Patterson, C o n g r e s s i o n a l  C o n s e r v a t i s m . 101-106, 108-110,
107, 331. Also see Mayer, The R e p u b l i c a n s . 447, for an 
a d m i s s i o n  that r a n k  and file Rep u b l i c a n s  favored an a g g r e s ­
sive d e n u n c i a t i o n  of the C o u r t  Plan.
■^Patterson, c o n g r e s s i o n a l  C o n s e r v a t i s m . 105-106,
331.
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asp e c t s  of such an issue c oncern me . "  But h e  spoke, he said, 
as an A m e r i c a n  c o n c e r n e d  w i t h  the threat to liberty, and far 
r e m o v e d  from any p o l i t i c a l  t h o u g h t s . H o o v e r ,  as usual, 
w a s  c l a i m i n g  an apo l i t i c a l  posture, w h a t e v e r  the reality.
Hoover denied that the Supreme Court was behind in 
its work. He pointed to the historical precedent which 
allowed John Marshall and Oliver Wendell Homes to serve the 
nation long after their seventieth birthdays. He denied 
partisanship on the part of the Court, and pointed to its 
unanimous decisions on the "greater issues" such as the 
NRA.20
Hie ex-President accused Roosevelt of trying to 
revolutionize the constitution and abolish an independent 
judiciary. No executive, he said, had ever asked for such a 
blank check. He questioned the need for a court of "Presi­
dent's judges." To him, such a proposal violated logic, 
rights, and the Constitution. He urged the maintenance of 
an independent judiciary.2
Despite the ex-President's assured public silence, he 
continued to maneuver backstage regarding the Court Plan.
At the least, he encouraged 0 'Laughlin to undercut Roosevelt 
by bringing about the resignation of a liberal judge. In 
the past, James Clark McReynolds, one of the most conserva­
tive judges on the Supreme Court, had shown an admiration
l^Hoover, Addresses on the Road, 229-230.
20Ibid., 230-232. 21Ibid.. 232-236.
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for Hoover. 0 'Laughlin approached McReynolds and persuaded 
him to ask Chief Justice Hughes to encourage the retirement 
of Judge Louis Brandeis. Although McReynolds complied with 
the request, Judge Brandeis enjoyed good health and decided
9 pto remain on the banch.  ̂ Since "everyone" knew that 
Senator Joseph T. Robinson of Arkansas, notwithstanding his 
conservatism, had been assured the next vacancy, the embar- 
rassment to the President could have been considerable. J 
With Hoover's hearty approval, Ben S. Allen helped 
organize a League for Supreme Court Independence. Financial 
support was easily found and the organization rapidly 
expanded.^4 Another group, the National Committee to Uphold 
Constitutional Government, proved to be the most effective 
propaganda agency in the Court fight. Publisher Frank 
Gannet, editor Edward Rumley, and the "political pamphleteer" 
Amos Pinchot were the buiding lights of this organization. 
They distributed a pamphlet entitled The Assault on the 
Supreme Court. They made a positive contribution to the
^Hoover to 0 'Laughlin, February 26, 1937, Box 44,
0 'Laughlin Papers, reiterated that "everyone" wanted a 
public denunciation of FDR's court-packing plan. 0 'Laughlin 
to Hoover, February 22, February 23, February 27, 1937, Box 
44, 0 'Laughlin Papers, dealt with the McReynolds efforts 
and the court plan in general.
23ibid.
2^Allen to Hoover, April 5, 1937, K-2.
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President's setback.^ Walter Lippmann, the widely read
columnist, condemned the President’s lack of respect for the
Constitution and questioned the basic integrity of the
Administration as well as its political wisdom in proposing
the Court Plan.2®
As opposition to Court-packing accelerated, the Senate
Committee on the judiciary held extensive hearings on the
Reorganization Bill. Although the ex-President did not go
before the Committee, his views were represented in the
testimony of economist John Flynn. The embittered New Deal
critic lamented the challenges to liberty manifested in the
97attempt to destroy judicial independence. In a similar 
vein, Odgen Mills published his book. The Seventeen Million, 
which noted the "menace of collectivism" and its "ever- 
lengthening shadow." Individual freedom was dying as the 
government became master of the people.2®
Although the ex-President was concerned with the Court 
Plan and its repudiation, he devoted much energy to pure
^Richard Polenberg, "The National Committee to Uphold 
Constitutional Government, 1937-1941," Journal of American 
History, LII (December, 1965), 582-598. These men, Polenberg 
said, hoped that the GOP was dead since they despised H.H. 
as "a fool . . . always misinformed."
2®New York Herald Tribune, March 25, 1937, 1.
27y. s. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 75 Cong.,
1 Sess., Hearings; Reorganization of the Federal Judiciary 
(Washington, 1937), 915-924, 22-23.
2®Ogden Mills, The Seventeen Million (New York, 1937), 
1-16, 142-143.
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politics. His l i e u tenants k e p t  h i m  i n f o r m e d  of local p o l i ­
tical developments, divisions, strife, o p portunities, and
oq
relative matters. A t  an early date, H o o v e r  c o n c e i v e d  the 
idea of a R e p u b l i c a n  C o n f e r e n c e  to di s c u s s  leadership, 
principles, and the future. He asked his close fri e n d  Ra y  
W ilbur to discuss the p l a n  w i t h  W i l l i a m  A l l e n  White. The 
Kansas ed i t o r  thought that it w a s  too soon to r e a s s e m b l e  the
O A
dis c o r d a n t  and fragmented party.
Hoover, ignoring the leaders' rebuffs, t u r n e d  to a
g r a s s-roots c a mpaign and w r o t e  hun d r e d s  of letters to local
leaders u r g i n g  a c o mmittee to discuss the Party's future and
31to e n u n c i a t e  R e p u b l i c a n  principles. if a R e p u b l i c a n
29Crowther to Hoover, January 21, 1937, K-25, dis­
cussed New Hampshore political trends. 0 'Laughlin to Hoover, 
March 27, April 3, April 12, 1936, Box 44, 0 'Laughlin Papers. 
Ben S. Allen to Hoover, April 5, 1937, K-2.
30W h i t e  to Wilbur, J a n u a r y  29, 1937, K-14S. Th i s  
letter u n d e r l i n e d  the true aut h o r s h i p  of the p l a n  a n d  d i s ­
c losed its ea r l y  c o n c e p t i o n  as w e l l  as its p r o m o t e r 1s e a g e r ­
ness for the titular lea d e r s h i p  o f  hi s  party.
■^Mayer, The R e p u b l i c a n s . 448, 453, n o t e s  L a n d o n ' s  
d e t e r m i n a t i o n  to thwart a H o o v e r  comeback. D e s p i t e  the 
charges of  a p o w e r  bid, H. H . ' s  p r i m a r y  concern, a c c o r d i n g  to 
Johnson, W i l l k i e , 20, w a s  for a "statement o f  p r i n c i p l e s . "
H.H. h o p e d  that a c o n f e r e n c e  of leaders w o u l d  call for a 
na t i o n a l  con v e n t i o n  and n o t e d  the 1919 h i s t o r i c a l  p r e c e d e n t  
in w h i c h  W i l l  Hays and O g d e n  Mi l l s  h a d  d r a f t e d  a set o f  p r i n ­
ciples to w h i c h  R e p u b l i c a n s  h a d  rallied, p r i o r  to the 1920 
election. H o o v e r  to Hamilton, c o n f i d e n t i a l  letter, A p r i l  15, 
and A p r i l  23, 1937, K-46, a d m i t t e d  that h e  h a d  w r i t t e n  thirty 
leaders c o n c e r n i n g  a d e c l a r a t i o n  o f  pri n c i p l e s .  H.H. i n t e n d e d  
to let a separate council discuss specific po l i c i e s .  He  
w a n t e d  the p a r t y  to end o r s e  his p r i n c i p l e s . He t h o u g h t  that 
the Grass Roots C o n v e n t i o n s  of 1934 h a d  d e v e l o p e d  to the 
p o i n t  t h a t  a p a r t y  con f e r e n c e  w a s  no t  feasible. He feared 
that the two - p a r t y  system w o u l d  e n d  if the GOP d i d  n o t  take 
a p o s i t i v e  action at once.
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politico proved amiable, Hoover's correspondence with him 
accelerated.^
The ex-President wanted other GOP leaders to openly 
push for a party conference. He was disappointed at Governor
O  OLandon’s failure to cooperate. Hyde, on his Chief's behalf, 
pressed Senator Dickinson to move for a declaration of party 
principles through a conference of GOP leaders. Although 
the Iowan approved the general idea, he feared any person­
alized attempt by Hoover, Borah, or Mills to reorganize the 
Party. In vain, Hyde tried to convince Dickinson that Hoover 
alone had the leadership qualities, the principles, and the 
press coverage necessary for Republican revival. Hyde even 
thought that the public should demand Hoover's return to 
politics.^ Crowther reported that New Hampshire politicos 
were anxious for a declaration of principles and were waiting 
for leadership.^
The ex-President, at last, recognized that his per­
sonal intervention was necessary. Consequently, he called 
on Governor Lowden at "Sinnissippi." Both men expressed
32noover to Governor John Bricker, March to November, 
1937, K-14. Hoover to Governor Wilbur Brucker, June to 
November, 1937, K-14.
-^Hoover to Bricker, March 12, 1937, K-14, urged the 
Ohioan to aid in the move. Hoover to Hamilton, April 23,
1937, L-128, MacChesney Papers.
o a Dickinson to Hyde, May 7, 1937, and Hyde to Dickin­
son, May 10, 1937, K-29, reflected agreement on principles 
but a difference on leadership.
^^Crowther to Hoover, May 22, 1937, K-25.
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alarm at the hostility between the Hoover and Landon camps.
The Illinoian also agreed to support the idea of a party
3 ftconference.
By late spring, Hooverites were confident of a partial
victory in the court Plan fight. The Hughes letter to
Senator Burton K. Wheeler had pointed up the efficiency of
the tribunal and undermined one of FDR's main arguments for
reorganization. Yet, 0 'Laughlin and others feared that the
37President would agree to a compromise proposal of some typer' 
Justice Van Devanter's resignation, as well as the decision 
upholding the Wagner Act, dispelled the half-hearted support
3 Qfor the President's plan. Hooverites rejoiced at the outcome.00
Before the Court fight faded into the background,
Hoover renewed his efforts to evoke a party conference.
■^Hutchinson, Lowden, II, 724.
370 'Laughlin to Hoover, April 3, and April 12, 1937, 
Box 44, 0 'Laughlin Papers. George H. Haynes, The Senate of 
the united States (Boston, 1938), I, 1097-1100. Robert S. 
Allen, "Hughes Checkmates the President," Nation, CXLIV (May 
20, 1937), 610-611. 0. R. Altman, "First Session of the
Seventy-fifth Congress," American Political Science Review, 
XXXI (December, 1937), 1085-1088. Hoover Papers, Q-223, 
contains hundreds of articles, letters, and notes on the 
court plan, its repudiation, and related materials.
3^lbid. Robert S. Allen, "Hughes Checkmates the 
President," Nation, CXLIV (May 20, 1937), 610-611. Robert
S. Allen, "Roosevelt Fights Back," Nation, CXLV (August 28,
1937), 187-188, sees FDR as the victor in the Court fight 
because of the court's subsequent decisions on the New Deal. 
FDR, he says, suffered defeat only through the palace revolu­
tion which split his party. Hoover to MacChesney, June 1, 
1937, C-15, MacChesney Papers, shows relief that the plan 
was defeated.
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Aware of Governor Bricker1s enthusiasm for the idea, the 
ex-President expressed desire for a Bricker-Lowden-Landon- 
Vandenberg conference to discuss reorganization. Again the
•a qOhio Governor agreed to cooperate. J Hoover, already 
agitated at the constant "chatter1 about a GOP corpse, 
became incensed at the press charge that he was promoting 
the conference. It was, he said, a grass roots idea which 
many leaders favored.^
Arthur Hyde, perturbed at "the masterminds of Kansas" 
and their rejection of a Hoover comback, took to the road 
and urged Republicans to draft the ex-President as their 
leader and reorganizer. Hyde reiterated his belief that 
Hoover alone has the "intellectual and spiritual leadership" 
necessary for a revival of the p a r t y . D e s p i t e  Hyde's 
efforts, the old "inner circle" was dissolving. On June 20, 
Jerseyite Franklin Fort died of cancer.^ Four months later, 
Ogden Mills also died.^
•^Bricker to Hoover, June 1, 1937, K-14. Hoover to 
Bricker, June 21, and Bricker to Hoover, June 28, 1937, K-14.
^Hoover to Spangler, June 24, 1937, K-127.
^Hyde to Hoover, June 14, 1937, K-61, blasted the 
"liberalizers, compromisers, wobblers and defeatists" of the 
Party. New York Times, June 27, 1937, 1. George Akerson to 
Hoover, August 18, 1937, K-l, thought that the Chief was "the 
only one in the country, on the horizon, who can furnish the 
leadership." Ashmun Brown to Hoover, August 23, 1937, K-16, 
saw Hoover as "a guide to clear thinking."
42Hoover to Mrs. Frank Fort, telegram, June 21, 1937, 
K-38, lamented the passing of "our greatest friend."
^%ew York Times, October 12, 1937, 1.
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At Charles Dawes' request, Hoover agreed to meet with 
a "number of state political heads" in the Northwest during 
August.^ Hyde soon reported that the Young Republican 
Clubs were determined to witness a declaration of principles. 
They were, he said, "the only group that can save America.
Hoover continued to make forays into enemy country in 
an effort to win converts to his idea of a party conference. 
At Buffalo, Wyoming, in early August, the ex-President 
admitted that he had "heard of a proposed 1938 rally of 
Republican Party leaders" but denied knowledge of its con­
firmation.^® A week later, he denied any attempt to bypass 
Governor Landon and Chairman Hamilton. He noted that the 
Chairman had suggested the idea of a party conference to the 
Executive Committee and that numerous state leaders were 
urging a Party Convention.
Spangler, looking toward the September meeting of the 
Executive Committee, agreed to press for the convention and 
expected Earl Warren and Ralph Williams to support his
^Hoover to Dawes, July 22, 1937, K-25.
^5Hyde to Hoover, July 10, 1937, K-61.
^®Hoover Collection, LXV (August 10, 1937), Item 2368.
47New York Times, August 21, 1937, 1. Hoover to 
Spangler, August 21, 1937, K-127, could not understand 
Hamilton's disavowal. Lowden had arranged a Landon-Hoover 
parley at Sinnissippi.
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AQefforts. Governor Bricker and Ohio State Chairman Ed 
Schorr were drumming up support, too.^9 Western leaders 
were anxious for an aggressive organization, and Jacob Allen, 
a Grass Roots founder from Chicago, thought that Hoover's 
idea of a declaration of principles was a brilliant sug­
gestion .
The New York Herald Tribune leaked Hoover's Conference 
efforts in August. It failed to credit other leaders with 
authorship or support of the idea. The ex-President was 
greatly embarrassed and feared that personalization of the 
idea might jeopardize its chances.^ Hoover, obviously 
aware of his precarious position in the party, knew that 
opposition to the plan would accelerate if it was credited 
as his idea.
Hoover's future hopes now rested on the National
^^Spangler to Hoover, August 25, 1937, K-127, dis­
cussed the coming Executive Committee session. Hoover to 
Spangler, August 28, 1937, K-127, reaffirmed the support of 
Warren and Williams.
^Bricker to Hoover, August 30, 1937, K-14.
^Hoover to Bricker, August 24, 1937, K-14. Jacob 
Allen to MacChesney, August 30, 1937, C-13, MacChesney 
Papers. Hoover to Wilbur Brucker, August 24, 1937, K-16, 
hoped that the Michigan Governor could sway state party 
leaders to the idea. He admitted that he had avoided a 
conference with Vandenberg but still hoped all the party 
leaders would support the conference. Vandenberg's attempts 
to curry favor with anti-New Deal Democrats, according to 
Patterson, Congressional Conservatism. 259, 253, 200-210, 
had raised doubts in some quarters as to his Republican 
steadfastness.
5^-Hoover to Brucker, August 24, 1937, K-16. Hoover
to Bricker, August 24, 1937, K-14.
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Committee's issuing a call for a general conference. He 
accepted the necessity of a broad base including the Young 
Republicans, delegates to the 1936 Convention, state chair­
men, and candidates for office. Significantly, he was not 
concerned about the inclusion of the Congressional
c 9leaders. He recognized that the "wobblers" would be of 
little aid in drafting a declaration of principles. To him, 
the party needed intellectual inspiration, not more oppor­
tunism.^
Following a conference with Paul Saxon, a Hoover 
secretary, Chairman Hamilton informed the ex-President that 
everything was clear. The Executive Committee would meet on 
September 23. A Hearst minion, he said, had broken the 
story about Hoover's authorship of the Conference plan. 
Hamilton had refused to comment in order to prevent charges 
of disloyalty from the Landon camp.^
Governor Brucker of Michigan reported enthusiasm for 
the conference. He thought that the public was waiting "for 
the kind of leadership" Hoover could e x e r t . S p a n g l e r  and
52noover to A. Brown, August 28, 1937, K-16.
53lbid. American Political Science Association, 
Toward A More Responsible Two-Party System. 41, 69, quotes 
H.H. 's belief that ideological parties were needed, for "if 
there cannot be a reasonably cohesive body of opinion in 
each major party, you are on a blind road where there is no 
authority in the ballot or in government."
^Hamilton to Hoover, September 2, 1937, K-46.
S^Brucker to Hoover, September 3, 1937, K-16.
221
George Ball of Indiana were to meet the ex-President in 
Chicago prior to the Executive Committee c o n c l a v e . Hoover's 
hopes improved to the point that he wrote Knox that rank, and 
file Republicans were demanding a party conference. He urged 
the Chicagoan to aid in drafting a declaration of princi­
ples . ̂
Throughout 1937, the ex-President continued to dabble 
in local politics. He worked with Earl Warren in promoting 
Hooverish Republicans in the California party, and advised 
the national committee man concerning the party conference 
and related matters. Hoover and Warren enjoyed the whole­
hearted support of Justus Cramer, the chairman of the 
California Republican Central C o m m i t t e e .
Hoover also continued to assert his leadership on the 
national level. In September, he published an article on 
"The Crisis and the Political Parties" in the Atlantic 
Monthly. Hoover reiterated his belief in the need for ideo­
logical parties and a strong two-party system. A party out 
of office, he said, must always provide alternatives and
S ^ S p a n g l e r  to Hoover, September 2, and September 15, 
1937, K-127.
^Hoover to Knox, September 13, 1937, K-72.
5 ® W a r r e n  to Hoover, September 20, October 6, and 
October 13, 1937, K-145. Cramer to Hoover, June 11, 
September 9, and October 28, 1937, K-24. Cramer generally 
discussed the intricate details of California politics.
play the "loyal opposition.
The ex-President lamented the abridgement of liberty, 
the increased federal direction and coercion, the patronage, 
excessive spending, and the attempts to undermine the checks 
and balances of a three-branch government. The New Deal, he 
said, "like all drugs, required increasing doses."^
To Hoover, the worst aspect of the New Deal was its 
economic policy which led to "price fixing, wage fixing, 
managed production in farm and shop, managed currency, 
managed credit, managed interest" and coercion. The 
American spirit of enterprise was in eclipse. He cited a 
long list of economic ills.®^
Hoover charged 1936 campaigners with blurring issues; 
parroting Roosevelt; and using outmoded labels such as 
reactionary, conservative, and liberal which were now inap­
plicable, intellectually dishonest, and defaming. He noted 
that both parties had an Old Guard and a lunatic fringe. It 
was time, he said, to concentrate on issues and ignore person­
alizations.^ He charged New Dealers with abetting "vicious 
political machines," currying favor with public money, and 
using corporate and union funds for campaigns.
Hoover noted the GOP's opportunity for a revival of
^Herbert Hoover, "The Crisis and the Political Par­




their organization. The fidelity of some Party members, he 
said, "is second only to their religion." He thought that 
Republicans should defend their record and reassert their 
principles. Although there was talk of a new third party 
through a realignment, such a move, to him, would be "slow 
and difficult." He used historical examples to prove the 
improbability of success. Time, he said, was too precious 
to encourage a continuation of the New Deal by splitting the 
opposition. He doubted that many Republicans would ever 
leave their party with its history and its commendable 
record.
Hoover wanted the party to enunciate its principles 
and let the chips fall where they might. He proposed a 
creed: "I believe," he said, in liberty, the bill of rights,
economic freedom, a balanced budget, equality of opportunity, 
and other traditional principles. His creed was individual 
but he hoped that the party would convene and draw up a plat­
form of principles which would rouse the public to a defense 
of liberty.^
Confident that the party could not resist his pro­
posal much longer, the ex-President traveled to Sinnissippi 
for a meeting with Lowden and Landon. The three men reached 
accord on a Republican Conference and the need for a broad 
base in determining the delegates. They also consented to 
the National Committee's creation of a "committee to draft a
64Ibid., 264-266. 65Ibid., 266-267.
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declaration of fundamental principles." In turn the draft 
would be submitted to a spring conference of party leaders.®® 
Following the Sinnissippi conclave, Hoover spoke with 
Knox and pushed for a "positive, courageous" declaration 
"free from personal politics." Despite Hoover's request, 
Vandenberg declined to serve on the Committee because of 
Congressional opposition.®^ The ex-President was chagrined 
at Landon's demand for Congressional inclusion.®® Although 
reports circulated of Landon's encouragement of Congressional 
rejection, the Kansan wrote Senator John Townsend of Dela­
ware and urged Congressional participation on the basis that 
they would have to run on the platform adopted.®®
Several newspaper columnists interpreted the Hoover 
push for a party conference as the best indicator that he
^Hutchinson, Lowden, II, 724-725. The ex-Governor 
saw through the surface amiability of H.H. and Landon, and 
recognized that they misunderstood each other on several 
points. The basic difference concerned the composition of 
the conference. H.H. wanted National Committee figures to 
dominate, whereas Landon favored the Congressional leaders. 
Too, Landon wanted specific policy proposals, whereas H.H. 
wanted a declaration of principles. H.H. conceded the 
latter point after much suasion by Vandenberg. Hoover to 
Hamilton, September 14, 1937, K-46, exaggerated Lowden's 
enthusiasm for the convention. Hoover to Hamilton, October 
5, 1937, K-46, was a key letter explaining H.H.'s views of 
the Sinnissippi conclave.
®*^Hoover Collection, LXV (October 4, 1937), Item 2378; 
New York Times. October 5, 1937. Hoover to Spangler,
October 7, 1937, K-127, discussed the Hoover-Vandenberg 
exchange.
®®Hoover to Lowden, October 8, 1937, K-78.
®9Landon to Senator Townsend, October 6, 1937, C-15, 
MacChesney Papers.
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was “definitely running for nomination in 1940." The Old
Guard, anxious for control of the party machinery, pretended
enthusiasm for Hoover's ideas. The various factions were
pulling in every direction. The fact that many Committee
members would be ousted in 1938 underlined the importance of
Hoover's drive while he still controlled the largest
70personal faction.
While Republicans discussed the pros and cons of a 
party conference, certain labor leaders approached Hoover 
regarding a change in tactics concerning Republican labor 
views. Robert Littler, a San Francisco attorney and fre­
quent defender of labor, noted the increasing dissatisfaction 
with bureaucrats. The New Deal, he said, was an artificial 
stimulant which created internal dissention and was fomenting 
labor's dependency on the federal government. Littler urged 
a GOP reconciliation with labor.^ Hoover, intrigued with 
the possibilities, made several inquiries.
Raymond Bellany, an A.F. of L. representative, assured 
Hoover that a labor-Republican alliance was possible. Labor 
leaders, he said, lamented the paternalism of the government. 
For Hoover's use, Bellany enclosed a list of friendly A.F. of
70Hill Blackett to Boake Carter, October 8, 1937, L- 
128, MacChesney Papers. Blackett estimated that H.H.'s 
faction comprised less than twenty per cent of the party. 
Although he failed to define them, Blackett spoke of six 
major factions.
^Littler to Hoover, October 13, 1937, PPS 141,
Labor.
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L. leaders who were loyal to the GOP. Bellamy urged their
inclusion in party councils and all well-advertised national 
7 2functions.
With the labor situation in mind, Hoover proved 
increasingly receptive to the idea of specific planks for 
the party conference. Disturbed over the failure of Landon 
to communicate with the National Chairman, Hoover accelerated 
his public activities. He informed the press that Republi­
cans would present a united front concerning the declaration 
of principles and that they would "reorient the Party to the 
problems of the times. "73
On October 23, Hoover urged a "national crusade." He 
spoke of an overwhelming public support for a National Con­
vention to enunciate definite policy alternatives to the New 
Deal. Polls, he said, showed that ninety-four per cent of 
the Republican rank and file favored a party rally. He 
hoped that the public would soon have all the facts con­
cerning the New D e a l . ^ 4
^^Bellamy to Hoover, October 27, 1937, and Hoover to 
Bellamy, October 18, 1937, PPS 441, Labor. The Bellamy list 
included Matthew Woll, Vice-President of the A.F. of L., 
William Hutchenson, President of the Carpenters and Joiners, 
and John Coefield, President of the Plumbers Association. 
Aside from these staunch Republicans, Bellamy included a 
list of others.
^Hamilton to Hoover, October 14, 1937, K-46. Hoover 
Collection, LXV (October 19, 1937), Item 2381.
^4Ibid., 2385. New York Times, September 26, 1937, 
showed the Spangler poll of 6000 Republicans reflecting a 
ninety-four per cent endorsement of a party conference.
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Three days lacar, in Boston, the ex-President 
addressed the Massachusetts Republican Club. He spohe on "A 
Program of American Ideals." He discussed the role of an 
opposition party, the need for constructive alternatives, 
fresh blood, principles and ideas. He lamented the loss of 
morality in the political profession and repeated his own 
disinterest in "any public office." He also reaffirmed his 
devotion to principle.7^
In urging change in methods to solve current problems, 
he stated that "Collectivism and Planned Economies never 
achieve recovery." He doubted that the New Deal could ever 
raise "real living standards." Revealingly, he noted that 
the public would join Republicans only "if they hnow where 
we are going."
Ben Allen praised the Chief's speech as the "greatest" 
and "most effective in delivery" of his career. Young Repub­
licans, Allen said, were stirred to the point of refusing to 
compromise on the idea of a party conference. Allen thought 
that the Young Republicans would hold their own party con­
ference if the National Committee failed to issue the call.77 
Ashmun Brown described the Chief's speech as "a gust of fresh 
air in a night club at 4 a.m." It was, he said, "good to 
have someone tahe us out of the intellectual slums in which
7^Hoover, Addresses on the Road. 264-266.
76Ibid., 266-274.
77Allen to Hoover, October 28, 1937, K-2.
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we have been dwelling so long." He thought that Hoover had 
shown that honor, decency, and integrity were not entirely 
archaic words.
Hoover wrote Spangler that the National Committee 
must call a policy conference.^9 On November 5, the Repub­
lican National Committee sanctioned the creation of a policy 
committee of one hundred. Lowden was named chairman.8®
Yet, the victory was tarnished by the rejection of a party 
convention. The ex-President, making the best of the situa­
tion, spoke with the press and lauded the creation of a 
Committee of 100 as a sound approach to contemporary prob­
lems. Its membership, he said, would include every profes-
8Xsion and pose unlimited possibilities.
•?8A. Brown to Hoover, October 27, 1937, K-16.
^9Hoover to Spangler, October 29, 1937, K-127. The
ex-President insisted that Lowden be named chairman.
8®Spangler to Richey, November 8, 1937, K-127. Hutch­
inson, Lowden, II, 726. Lowden's illness negated his active 
role. Landon's reluctance turned into open opposition. 
Hamilton to Landon, November 1, 1937, and Hamilton to Hoover,
November 2, 1937, K-127. As Hamilton mediated between the
two camps, he received two resolutions from H.H. The one 
calling for a policy committee was adopted, whereas the one 
calling for a party convention was rejected.
8^Hoover was distressed at Hamilton's inability to 
sway the National Committee to the idea of a 1938 convention. 
All H.H.'s opponents ganged up on him in Chicago. Joe 
Martin, Knox, and the Washington crowd had struck a death 
blow at his plan. MacChesney noted that H.H. "tapped every 
political, financial and industrial mogul who was under 
obligation to him in any way" and might have won with a dis­
avowal of his 1940 candidacy. Landon, still a rival for the 
titular leadership of the party, joined in the narrow defeat 
of the ex-President. MacChesney memo, PPS, 163, MacChesney
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Although Hoover won a partial victory in the creation 
of a Committee of 100, he remained unhappy at Congressional 
opposition. in a series of exchanges with Spanger, he dis­
cussed the possible selections for chairman in view of 
Lowden's continued illness. With Lowden out of the picture, 
Hoover had no strong preference for the post. He vetoed any 
selection of Knox but thought that ex-Senator Otis Glenn of
Papers. (The authorship of the memo is speculative, but it 
is objective enough that it came from an insider who recog­
nized the reality and who sympathized with H.H. but not to 
an extreme point. Johnson, Willkie. 20-22, credited Landon, 
Knox, and Borah with the defeat of H.H.'s plan. They forced 
a compromise in the form of the Committee of 100. It should 
be noted, however, that H.H. retained control of the member­
ship because of his influence with the Executive Committee 
which would appoint all members. Spangler, a most loyal 
lieutenant, ran the Executive Committee. For his own view, 
Hoover to Spangler, December 2, 1937, K-127, lamented the 
"general conspiracy" fanned by Landon, Knox and Martin, which 
prevented the policy conference. H.H. was confident that 
Creager and Spangler could overcome the obstacles in their 
creation of the Committee of 100. Its membership, he 
assumed, would include men of ideas. Joseph Boskin, "Poli- . 
tics of an Opposition Party," 228-230, showed H.H.'s strength 
within the party hierarchy. Knox, on November 5, 1937, 
wrote that the "party is in danger of being Hooverized." He 
recognized that H.H. controlled sixty of the 100 committee 
members. Boskin's study underlined what contemporary Repub­
licans knew so well: Hoover, despite his 1932 defeat and
depression image, remained a formidable force in the party 
and a definite political threat, see Hamilton to Hoover, 
November 2, 1937, and Hamilton to Landon, November 1, 1937, 
K-127, for the difficulty in working with both camps con­
cerning party resolutions.
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09Illinois would be a wise choice.
On November 8, at Waterville, Maine, Hoover spoke on 
"Free Speech and Free Press." He cited several historical 
examples in which dictators had organized propaganda machines 
to color the news, discredit the previous regime, promise 
new panaceas, foment hate, and violate liberty. He warned 
of a controlled press in America and urged a tenacious 
defense of free speech and a free press.
Four days later, at Syracuse University, Hoover spoke 
on "Training for Public Service." He noted that "the major 
purposes of our universities outside of football" were "to 
train minds and strengthen character." He applauded the 
training for public service but warned that the spoils 
system was destroying the chance for public service. He 
cited recent proposals for abolishing the Civil Service 
Commission and warned that partisan politics was incom­
patible with public service. He urged the young to accept
^ C o n g r e s s m a n  joe Martin ignored public opinion and 
encouraged Congressional opposition to the party conference 
according to Spangler. Spangler to Hoover, November 3, 1937, 
K-127. Hoover to Spangler, November 6, and November 11,
1937, and Spangler to Richey, November 8, 1937, K-127. The 
Hoover-Knox split concerning the party conference and its 
implications for Hoover1s future was amplified in the per­
sonal exchanges between the two men. Hoover to Knox,
November 6, 1937, expressed disgust with Knox's misrepresen­
tations. Knox to Hoover, November 9, 1937, K-72, stated 
that "everyone" believed the ex-President wanted a National 
Convention as his lieutenants fought for it to the last 
minute. Knox expressed innocence as far as some of H.H.'s 
charges were concerned.
®^Hoover, Addresses on the Road, 276-278.
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the duties of citizenship as well as its opportunities.®^1 
By the end of the month, Spangler asked for the 
Chief's recommendation of a Negro, and of labor and agricul­
tural leaders for the Committee of 100.®® Hoover suggested 
the appointment of "Dr. Moton or his successor at Tuskegee" 
to represent the Negro community.®® Hoover also asked for 
the inclusion of Samuel Crowther of New Hampshire on the 
list and noted the availability of Glenn Frank as a possible
07Chairman.0
A week later, the ex-President sent Spangler a list 
of “the backbone of the committee." Hoover regretted Lowden1s 
inability to serve as chairman. He reiterated the impor­
tance of seeing that the "right men" served on the Committee.®® 
On December 16, Hoover addressed the Chicago Economic
®^Hoover Collection, LXV (November 12, 1937), Item 
2392. Hoover, Addresses on the Road, 281-286.
®®Spangler to Hoover, November 23, 1937, K-127, 
thought a Negro's appointment would "inspire confidence in 
the colored race." Spangler to Hoover, November 29, 1937, 
K-127.
®®Hoover to Spangler, November 25, and December 2, 
1937, K-127. According to one observer, ”Dr. Moton was on 
more intimate terms with Herbert Hoover than was any other 
colored citizen— more intimate, in fact, than many outstand­
ing whites." Claude A. Barnette, "A Southern Statesman," in 
William Hardin Hughes and Frederick D. Patterson (eds.), 
Robert Russa Moton of Hampton and Tuskecree (Chapel Hill, 
1956), 200. H.H. corresponded with Moton from 1925 onward. 
For example, see Hoover to Moton, January 23, 1925, 1-1208, 
Hoover Papers.
®^Hoover to Spangler, November 25, and December 2, 
1937, K-127.
88Hoover to Spangler, December 9, 1937, K-127.
Club on "Economic Security and the Present Situation." He 
doubted that economic security was possible with future 
opportunity. Fear, anxiety, and insecurity, he said, were 
the trademarks of the 1930's. To Hoover, talk of a reces­
sion might soften the pain of reality, but it would not cure 
the problem. Industry had stagnated, home construction had 
halted, the planned economy had spread confusion, and the
o qgovernment was competing with business.017 Hoover lamented 
the debasement of currency, the repudiation of debts, the 
abandonment of the gold standard, the acceleration of 
inflation, and the "obvious violation of common sense." He 
said that the American System was the only sound economic 
approach and that history had proven its contribution, 
despite minor abuses and weaknesses.98 He called for a 
reform in methods, a new attention to labor problems, and 
the cooperation among all interest groups. He accepted the 
idea of collective bargaining and hoped that labor recognized 
its responsibilities as well as its rights. He insisted on 
greater protection of small wage earners. To him, all true 
standards of conduct emanated "from the sermon on the Mount." 
The time, he said, had come to heal differences and cooperate 
for the betterment of all men.9^
Ashmun Brown reported an increasing "Hoover sentiment"
89Hoover, Addresses on the Road, 287-290.
90Ibid., 290-294. 91Ibid., 294-299.
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Q 9as a result of the Chief's recent oratorical efforts.^ 
Hoover, gravely concerned over Brown's declining health, 
urged the editor to take care of himself, for "such good 
soldiers" as Brown were scarce. J
As 1937 drew to a close, the ex-President was acutely 
aware of his deteriorating political position. His bid for 
party leadership had fallen flat although the Committee of 
100 might salvage part of his reputation and principles.
Age, death, and political defeat, were taking toll on his 
political influence. Walter Brown and Alan Fox had lost 
their positions of power. Ogden Mills and Franklin Fort were 
dead. Age and illness crippled Dawes, Lowden, and Ashmun 
Brown. Aside from Spangler and Hyde, the Chief's main sup­
port v/as in his California fiefdom where Earl Warren was in 
the saddle. Vandenberg, despite his renewed efforts against 
the New Deal, remained unreliable. 1938 was uncertain. The 
ex-President began to think that the Committee of 100 held 
the card to his political future.
Brown to Hoover, December 20, 1937, K-16.
^-^Hoover to A. Brown, December 29, 1937, K-16.
CHAPTER VIII
A MIXED VERDICT
Republicans of all factions were determined to alter 
their party's image and to revitalize the organization 
during 1938. Glenn Saxon, a professor of economics, served 
as Director of the Research and Editorial Division of the 
party. He analyzed topics, collected statistics, and with 
the aid of other researchers suggested party proposals.
Under Chairman Hamilton's direction, the national head­
quarters published the Republican Reporter and a propaganda 
pamphlet entitled Promise and Performance. Both works were 
partisan.'1'
By January, 1938, the Program committee crystallized. 
Dr. Glenn Frank, a former President of the University of 
Wisconsin, was named Chairman. Although his selection pro­
vided little political glamour, he enjoyed the support of 
several factions. For his own part, Frank promised that the 
Committee would make an honest audit of New Deal policies, 
restate Republican philosophy as it related to contemporary
-*-C. A. H. Thomson, "Research and the Republican 




problems, and suggest a comprehensive program.
On January 5, Hoover accepted a seat on the Republi­
can Program Committee.3 Its membership embraced a diversity 
of opinion. Laborites, business leaders, lawyers, newspaper­
men, politicians, ethnic and racial minorities, liberals and 
conservatives served.^ Within two months, rumors circulated 
that a compromise platform had been accepted. Although 
voluntarism and individual initiative were praised, and 
responsible government demanded, the Committee endorsed 
government action in numerous areas. Although many writers 
noted a "liberal" tone and a rejection of Hooverism in the 
Committee's proposals, liberal Congressmen, significantly, 
delayed its publication until long after the November 
election.
Reports continued to circulate that Hoover was 
attempting a 1940 comeback. Columnist Roger Babson charged 
the ex-President with seeking an illusive goal. He thought 
that Hoover should be satisfied with the vindication already 
received "from thinking people." Any effort to regain the
2Johnson, Willkie, 22-25.
^Hoover Collection, LXVI (January 5, 1938), Item
2404.
^Ronald Bridges, "The Republican Program Committee," 
Public Opinion Quarterly, III (April, 1939), 299-305. 
Johnson, Willkie. 22-25.
5lbid.; Bridges, "The Republican Program Committee," 
Public Opinion Quarterly, III (April, 1939), 299-305.
presidency, he said, was doomed.^
Landonites, confident that Hamilton had defected to 
the ex-’President's camp, urged a change in the chairmanship. 
They promoted Governor Kohler of Wisconsin for the job.^
The National Chairman, aware of the pot-shots from his Kansas 
colleagues, was equally dismayed at the attacks from the 
conservative wing of the party. Hamilton, ever trying to 
steer a middle course between the various factions, was 
growing weary at the constant attacks on himself. To Hoover, 
he wrote, "I have battled the intrigues of the man who[m] I 
nominated as President of the United States and of Colonel 
Knox. I cannot fight you too and have no desire to do so."
He pleaded for Hoover's acquiescence concerning the appoint­
ment of Pranklyn Waltman as Director of Publicity. He 
realized that Waltman had attacked both of them in the past 
but contended that the reporter's anti-New Deal bias could 
prove an asset to the party. Attempting to sweeten the 
bitter pill, Hamilton noted Landon's opposition to Waltman's
^"Babson's Confidential Forecasts, 1 March 28, 1938,
K—130.
^Johnson, Willkie, 25-27. O'Laughlin to Hoover, 
December 13, 1937, Box 44, O 'Laughlin Papers, had warned 
H.H. that Landon, Knox, and Vandenberg were trying to take 
over the party organization and were pushing for a new 
chairman and the emasculation of the national committee.
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appointment.®
Speaking to the San Francisco press. Hoover blasted 
Roosevelt's reorganization bill as a "power grab." It would 
mean, he said, "the reintroduction of the spoils system" and 
would give executives control of the civil service. On the 
following day he spoke of "The Challenge to Liberty." His 
greatest concern remained a "planned economy."9
Although Hoover's attention focused more and more on 
foreign policy in 1938 and afterward, he remained attuned to 
local political developments and even courted the favor of 
certain state governors. The ex-President particularly 
tried to develop close ties with Michigan's Wilbur Brucker. 
The Governor, independent of the Vandenberg mantle, con­
tinually expressed admiration for Hoover's efforts to revive 
the Republican Party.
On May 15, in Oklahoma City, Hoover enunciated an 
eleven-point program for recovery. It embraced his tradi­
tional ideas of a balanced budget, deflation, reduction of
^Hamilton to Hoover, April 2, 1938, and April 9, 1938, 
K-147. Hamilton sent a portfolio of information on Waltman 
to H.H. and continued to hope H.H.'s opposition was dis­
solving. Hamilton disclosed some backstage maneuvers by 
Landon to force a change in the chairmanship. Hamilton to 
Hoover, June 29, 1938, K-147.
^Hoover Collection, LXVI (April 7, 1938), clipping 
from the San Francisco Hews. Article, Newsweek, XI (April
11, 1938), 11.
-^Brucker to Hoover correspondence, 1937-1938, K-16.
Of special interest, see Brucker to Hoover, April 30, 1938, 
and Hoover to Brucker, May 4, and May 9, 1938, K-16. Hoover 
even invited Brucker to Palo Alto for a visit.
relief, and his usual assortment of remedies. Concerning 
the forthcoming November election, he predicted Republicans 
would gain seventy-five Congressional seats.^
By the summer of 1938, Republicans, gaining confidence 
in their November chances, perceived a certain uneasiness in 
the Democratic camp. Aside from the President's attempts to 
purge his own party of its conservative congressmen, the 
federal government accelerated its PWA and WPA activities on 
the economic as well as the political front. Lester Dickin­
son, attempting a senatorial comeback in Iowa, expressed 
amazement at the new six million dollar PWA allocation for
Iowa which, he said, was recovering as rapidly as any of the 
12farm states.
To many men, the worst example of federal intervention 
in a state election was in Kentucky. According to one 
astute political observer, Roosevelt, anxious for the re- 
election of his Senate Majority Leader, Alben Barkley, 
exploited WPA funds and workers to an unprecedented extent 
in securing Barkley's renomination in a tight primary fight. 
More than any other case, Kentucky, he said, underlined the 
need for the Hatch Act which would restrict the political 
activity of federal employees.
•^Hoover, Further Addresses, 349-353. Time. XXXI 
(May 16, 1938), 13. New York Times, May 22, 1938, 1.
^Dic^inson to Hoover, June 11, and June 23, 1938,
K-29.
■^Stokes, Chip Off Mv Shoulder, 534-539.
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Despite the many Democratic mistakes, the Republican 
Party remained so bitterly divided that it was uncertain if 
it would rally by November. Even in Kansas, Landonites 
fought several other factions over candidates and issues.
John D. M. Hamilton, fresh from a re-endorsement by the 
National Committee, was anything but upset at the defeat of 
a Landonite for the Kansas Senatorial nomination. ^
Hyde wrote his Chief that an amazing revelation had 
occurred at a recent Chicago party. He spoke of a Knox 
manager, somewhat inebriated, who had informed the gathering 
that Frank Knox was taking "pot-shots" at the ex-President 
because they would be leading rivals in 1940. Knox, he said, 
apparently enjoyed Landon's support and now wanted a Hoover 
disavowal concerning any future nomination.-*-®
Hooverites were perturbed at Congressional failure to 
place new government jobs under the civil service. They 
noted that the percentage of federal employees under the 
codes had declined from eighty-one to fifty-seven per cent.-*-® 
Ashmun Brown informed Hoover that Roosevelt would probably 
succeed in buying enough votes to keep a decisive margin in
^Hamilton to Hoover, June 29, 1938, K-47, informed 
the Chief of the Committee's endorsement of his handling of 
the Chairmanship. Hamilton to Hoover, August 15, 1938, 
K-47, discussed the factionalism in the Kansas GOP
l^Hyde to Hoover, June 1, 1938, K-61.
-*-®Literary Digest, July 8, 1938, 5.
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1the new Congress. Hoover, however, remained optimistic 
about the party's chances although admitting that economic 
conditions would greatly effect the totals. Like Brown, he 
was shocked at public apathy and the lack of indignation at 
the "moral degeneration and demagogery" evidenced at the
1 Onational level.
In July, Will Irwin, on behalf of Liberty Magazine, 
interviewed the Chief on "What America Must do Next."
Hoover seemed to show a new dimension in his concern over 
the fourteen million unemployed, the "new depression," and 
the "rubber-stamp" congress. To Hoover, it seemed clear 
that a Republican victory in November was necessary for the 
nation’s future.'1'®
Republican finances remained short throughout 1938 
despite the feverish activities of the national headquar­
ters.^® The ex-President attributed the scarcity of funds 
to the nomination of so many "me-too" candidates. None­
theless, Hoover attempted to search for contributions to the
Brown to Hoover, July 13, 1938, K-16.
**-®Hoover to A. Brown, July 28, 1938, K-16.
■^®Will Irwin, "What America Must do Next," Liberty 
Magazine, July 16, 1938, Hoover Collections, LXVII (unnum­
bered) .
^Hamilton to Hoover, July 21, 1938, K-47.
2^Hoover to Hamilton, August 27, 1938, K-47.
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campaigns of the more attractive candidates.^2
The ex-President displayed a special interest in the 
efforts of two Hooverish candidates in Montana. John G.
Brown, Hoover's Montana leader during the late 1930's, 
assured his Chief that the election of the two congressional 
candidates would provide "a foundation for 1940.
Hoover, campaigning in Montana in August, urged a 
radical change in Congressional membership as a necessary 
step in the restoration of an independent legislature. He 
predicted that a Republican congress would regain the 
traditional powers over the purse, offer responsible legisla­
tion, and halt federal bureaucratization.^
Reporter Larry Sullivan researched many issues for 
Hoover. After analyzing the 193S primaries, Sullivan 
asserted that anti-New Deal Democrats posted forty-five per 
cent of the totals. Many of these voters, he reasoned, were 
convertible if the Republicans capitalized on New Deal
? cmistakes and flaws. The Sullivan report reinforced Hoover's 
own conclusions.
22Hoover to John G. Brown, September 14, and October 
8, 1938, K-16.
23noover to Brown, September 14, and October 8, 1938, 
K-16, noted the shortage of funds at the national level and 
urged the Montana leader to secure more local contributions 
for the two congressional candidates. J. G. Brown to Hoover, 
September 16, and September 27, 1938, K-16, reported progress 
and optimism for November.
^Hoover Collection, LXVI (August 6, 1938), Gallatin 
Gateway, Montana press comments.
25gullivan to Hoover, August 13, 1938, K-132.
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On September 28, the ex-President spoke in Kansas
City concerning "Morals in Government." Hoover, in complete
sincerity, announced that it was time "to take the gloves
off." He blasted New Dealers for their attitude that "the
end justifies the means." He charged them with using a
double standard in their political and private morality. For
six years, he said, they had practiced "an alphabetical
moral: GEEAA— Get Elected Anyhow Anyway." To him, New
Dealers had encouraged a systematic degeneration in their
creation of over 400,000 political jobs, outside the civil 
26service.
Hoover scoffed at the idea that the Roosevelt Adminis­
tration was the first to recognize human misery and seek to 
alleviate it through public works and relief. Admittedly, 
he said, it had concentrated all activities in Washington, 
expanded relief activities during every six months prior to 
a national election, and made unprecedented use of relief 
funds and workers in a Kentucky election, but this did not 
entitle it to two more years at the trough. Never before, 
he said, had political machines enjoyed so much license.
26Hoover, Further Addresses Upon the American Road, 
1938-1940 (New York, 1940), 3-6. Hereinafter cited as Hoover, 
Further Addresses. As Richard Hofstadter, Age of Reform,
310-3 25, notes, the old Progressives were deeply disturbed 
at the New Deal methods— its lack of concern with monopoly 
and political machines, its neglect of moral tones, its 
attack on sacrosanct institutions such as the Courts, its 
very opportunism. Like Hoover, the old Progressives were 
concerned with such fundamentals as citizenship, conscience, 
morals, service, and duty.
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Never before, he contended, had the national government 
acted in such dishonesty as to tinker with the currency, 
abandon the gold standard, repudiate debts, and stir class 
hatred.^
The ex-President urged the adoption of a positive 
program which would encourage honest government, re-estab­
lish moral methods, localize relief even if federally 
financed, and end the patronage system. He called for the 
passage of the Hatch Act which New Dealers, he contended, 
were emasculating.^®
By mid-October, Hoover, enroute to New York, per- 
chanced on former brains-truster Raymond Moley. While the 
two men were talking, a steward, recognizing the ex-Presi­
dent, volunteered to tell the latest FDR joke. Hoover, 
"glowering at [him], rumbled 11 don11 like stories about
p  QPresidents. 1 "4,3 Despite his aversion to jokes about his 
successor, he continued his aggressive attacks on Roosevelt's 
policies.
On October 17, the ex-President spoke at Hartford, 
Connecticut, on "Undermining Representative Government."
For the most part, the Hartford speech was a repetition of
^Hoover, Further Addresses, 6-17.
2®Hoover, Further Addresses, 17-18. Larry Sullivan 
wrote H.H. that the Kansas City address gave "back-bone" to 
the GOP. L. Sullivan to Hoover, September 29, 1938, K-132.
^Moley, After 7 Years. 301.
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his "Morals in Government" effort of September. He called 
the 1938 election a "conflict between two ideas of life."
He spoke of a "creeping collectivism that is steadily eating 
away the vitalities of free enterprise." He reiterated the 
need for an independent legislature which would check the 
accelerating executive powers. He warned of "sinister aggres­
sions of personal power," and of the President's efforts to 
stuff the courts, purge honest men from their jobs if they 
dissented, and control elections through government doles 
and employees. Hoover urged the election of an independent 
Congress if democracy was to be maintained.
The Hartford speech underlined the fact that Hoover 
had not deviated from his traditional opinions concerning 
the depression and recovery. He blamed the planned economy, 
bureaucracy, and regimentation for the "new" depression 
following Roosevelt's recovery acts. Again Hoover employed 
weighted words which evoked strong emotions.31 Other 
Republican leaders followed his line of reasoning. Even 
Landon, George Aiken, and McNary began using more and more 
of the Hoover line.^
Public opinion polls reflected the growing reaction
SOnoover, Further Addresses, 21-37.
^ Ibid.; Herring, Politics of Democracy, 251-252.
•^Boskin, "Politics of an Opposition Party," 150-153, 
173-174. Many GOP leaders attempted to label FDR as a 
dictator. Their confidence in their attack accelerated as 
his political mistakes surfaced.
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to Washington policies. Fifty-three per cent of the people 
claimed that they were conservative, forty-seven per cent, 
liberal.^ Silas Strawn anticipated the defeat of six or 
seven "New Delirium" Congressmen in Illinois alone.^
Winding up his campaign activity, the ex-President 
addressed the Joint Republican Organizations at Spokane, 
Washington, on November 5. He returned to one of his favorite 
areas: "The Economic Consequences of the New Deal." He
reiterated the need for a restoration of free enterprise, 
the one alternative to planned economy. Only free men, 
choosing their calling, acting on their own initiative, and 
securing the just rewards of their efforts, he maintained, 
could revitalize the American economy, solve unemployment, 
and raise living standards. He vigorously defended the
■3 r:American System.
Again Hoover admitted that limited regulation was 
necessary, that reform and correction of minor abuses were 
inevitable. Too, he reiterated his belief that "we do not 
need to sink the ship just to drown the rats." He praised 
the American System and its achievements up to 1929. The 
system, he said, was sound. To him, it only needed minor 
adjustments. In a revealing moment he stated: "It is
■^Hadley Cantril (ed.). Public Opinion, 1935-1946 
(Princeton, 1951), 576.
*^S. Strawn to Hoover, October 24, 1938, K-132.
•^Hoover, Further Addresses, 38-41.
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recognized by every authority that depression was overcome 
and recovery begun the world over in the early summer of 
1932." He continued to believe that America's surge forward 
had been halted by the election.3®
As the ex-President berated Roosevelt's hodgepodge 
recovery efforts and a multitude of New Deal "sins," he said: 
"It mixes all the stimulating drinks on the bartender's 
shelf. This does not make for sobriety." FDR's Court plan, 
his party purge, and his election tactics had "a faint odor 
of totalitarian government." Hoover verbally destroyed the 
New Deal economic policies. Sarcastically, he said, "Santa 
Claus can reign throughout the year and never pay his 
bills." Yet, he noted that Europe had recovered while 
America floundered around with a "planned economy."3^
Since to Hoover, New Deal methods, whatever the 
humanitarian purpose, were faulty, he urged a return to the 
right road. The prerequisites to real recovery, he said, 
were the American System, constitutional methods, national 
morality, and an independent Congress. "Give us the election 
of a new Congress of independent men,1 he said, "and watch
-DOAmerica come back." Ashmun Brown praised his Chief's
3®Ibid., 41-43. H.H. was being loose with the facts 
at this point, for very few men outside his inner circle had 
accepted the 1932 recovery thesis.
3?Hoover, Further Addresses, 43-47.
OQ tIbid., 48-57. H.H. emphasized that his program
would not be a step backward, but a step in the right direc­
tion.
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address as a superlative effort. To Brown, it showed that
o Qsound reasoning and intellect the country so badly needed. 3 
Republicans were better organized in 1938 than at any 
election for a decade. Hamilton, as an aggressive Chairman, 
had assured an analysis of regional opinion. His glove- 
trotting tours had boosted party morale. Too, Roosevelt 
assisted the GOP cause in his attack on the Supreme Court 
and his attempted "purge" of his own party. Nor did the 
economic "recession," as Democrats called it, hurt Republi­
can efforts.^®
The November election was a stinging setback for the 
New D e a l e r s.41 Postmaster General Farley termed it "the
Ay , t ,great turnover." Republicans exceeded their own predic­
tions as they gained eighty-one new House seats, eight 
Senate seats, and fourteen g o v e r n o r s h i p s . 43
3^a . Brown to Hoover, November 7, 1938, K-16.
40Milton Plesur, "The Republican Congressional Come­
back of 1938," Review of Politics, XXIV (October, 1962), 
525-562. According to Plesur, Republicans would probably 
have regained the White House in 1940 except for World War
II.
4^-paul Y. Anderson, "What The Election Means," Nation, 
CXLVII (November 18, 1938), 527-528.
^^Miiton Plesur, "The Republican Congressional Come­
back of 1938," Review of Politics, XXIV (October, 1962), 
525-562.
43Ibid.; uew York Times, November 13-14, 1938, 1.
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Republicans were elated at the returns.^ Hoover was 
especially pleased with the re-election of Governor John 
Bricker in Ohio.^ Lester Dickinson lost in his bid for a 
comeback in Iowa but by such a close margin that he wired 
Hoover that the foundation for a 1940 campagin was laid.^ 
Hooverites across the country saw the November returns as 
vindication of their Chief and as a "personal victory.
Even Chairman Hamilton wired the ex-President that "no one 
man has done more" for the party. ^
Hoover found encouragement in his supporters' notes 
and was motivated "to keep in this battle." Encouraged by 
the November returns, he hoped that by 1940 they could "end 
this episode in American life in its destructive aspects."1̂9
^ R eed to Hoover, November 10, 1938, K-107; J. G.
Brown to Hoover, telegram, November 9, 1938, K-16, praised 
H.H.'s victory. "You are still our leader." Spangler to 
Hoover, November 11, 1938, K-127. Dickinson to Hoover, 
November 22, 1938, K-29. Broom to Hoover, November 7, 1938, 
K-15.
^Hoover to Bricker, telegram, November 9, 1938, K-14.
^Dickinson to Hoover, November 22, 1938, K-29. 
Although the Iowan referred to the party's 1940 campaign, 
his letter was worded in such a way that H.H. could and prob­
ably did read it to mean another Hoover campaign.
^^Spangler to Hoover, November 11, 1938, K-127. J. G. 
Brown to Hoover, telegram, November 9, 1938, K-16. Broom to 
Hoover, November 7, 1938, K-15, urged his Chief to continue 
his "courageous mission."
^Hamilton to Hoover, November 9, 1938, K-47.
^Hoover to A. Brown, November 12, and November 16,
1938, K-16.
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He thought that the returns necessitated a conference of 
Republican leaders concerning future policy.^
To Hooverites, the November election proved the
rightness of their cause and foretold the demise of the New
51Deal. Too, Republican victory negated any realignment of 
conservatives in a new coalition party. For the first time 
in his career, Franklin D. Roosevelt was faced by an almost 
viable "loyal opposition."^2 interestingly, despite its 
rejection of Hoover's leadership and even his depression 
thesis, the GOP adopted the Hoover line in its increasingly 
vigorous anti-New Deal attack. Republicans bemoaned the 
concentration of power in the executive office, the imbal­
ance of powers, the attack on the courts, the weakening of 
legislative power, the "purge" of the party, the planned 
economy, regimentation, bureaucracy, political machines, the 
destruction of the civil service, and other New Deal 
mistakes. Republican activity fanned the hopes of Hoover’s 
much coveted vindication and kept alive his glimmering poli­
tical desires. Grasping at every straw, the ex-President 
dreamed of a political resurrection.
^Hoover to Reed, November 14, 1938, K-107. Hoover 
to Spangler, November 14, 1938, K-127.
^Reed to Hoover, November 10, 1938, K-107; J. G. 
Brown to Hoover, telegram, November 9, 1938, K-16; Spangler 
to Hoover, November 11, 1938, K-127; and Broom to Hoover, 
November 7, 1938, K-15.
-^James T. Patterson, "The Failure of Party Realign­
ment in the South, 1937-1939,1 Journal of Politics. XXVII 
(August, 1965), 602-617.
CHAPTER XX
"GRAYNESS IN THE AFTERNOON"
Theodore Roosevelt once remarked, "We cannot expect 
to escape a certain grayness in the afternoon of life— for 
it is not often that life ends in the splendor of a golden 
sunset."-*- In many ways, the decade of the 1930's was the 
afternoon of Herbert Hoover's life. This became especially 
evident when the Republican revival of 1938 whetted his 
false hopes of a political resurrection. The ex-President, 
long isolated from political realities, genuinely believed 
that he was again available for public service. Ignoring 
the diminishing ranks of his personal legions, he misread 
every favorable Republican omen as a personal tribute.
He failed to see that many of the political letters 
he now received were courtesy responses. He refused to 
recognize that lieutenants such as Robert A. Taft and Earl 
Warren had completed their political apprenticeship, arrived 
at age, and wanted to try their own wings. Thus, when Taft,. 
after analyzing GOP congressional strength, informed the 
Chief that the GOP minority was strong enough to prevent any
I j o h n  M o r t o n  Blum, T h e  R e p u b l i c a n  R o o s e v e l t  (Cambridge, 




further radical legislation passing the Senate, Hoover 
anticipated Taft's continued deference to his old war-time 
chief. It soon became evident that Taft had his own 
ambitions and did not relish an indefinite subservient role.
As Lincoln's Birthday approached, Republican polit­
icos rolled out their most effective machinery. On February 
12, Hoover, returning to the stump, addressed the National 
Republican Club in New York City. He spoke on "The Real 
State of the Union." Again, he aimed at a rebuttal of the 
President’s State of the Union message.
As usual, Hoover lamented the confused state of the 
nation with its economic disorder, rising debts, accelerating 
class divisions, coercion, collectivism, immorality, and 
power politics. Yet, he sounded a new note of optimism. He 
said that elections no longer could "be controlled by govern­
ment subsidies." He perceived a growing independence on the 
part of the judiciary and the legislature. "Programs for 
the future," he said, "are rising daily from county and state 
organizations, from our youth and women's organizations, 
from our Republican leaders and our Program Committee."4
Hoover reaffirmed his principles and defended his 
record. Although he used the old stock phrases of
2Taft to Hoover, January 23, 1939, K-135. Signifi­
cantly, Taft said, "I am learning the ropes."




condemnation in describing the New Deal, his past bitterness 
was missing. Perhaps his new optimism resulted from a belief 
that the 1938 election had checked the radicalism of the New 
Deal. In the future, he would deal primarily with foreign 
policy. The New Deal, it seemed, was fading in political
importance. Of all the speeches Hoover made in 1939, only
cthree dealt primarily with domestic policy. Hoover's 
unusual silence was the best barometer in measuring New Deal 
activity.
Rank and file Hooverites continued to idolize their 
hero and encourage his "evangelistic efforts" to convert 
"the heathen in the East." Too, they hoped that the public
would recall to service "the one man capable of the leader­
ship" demanded by the critical times.®
By the spring of 1939, Hoover, conscious of the drive 
for convention delegates, sent friendly telegrams to every 
Republican conclave at the state and local level.? His Iowa
5Ibid. Aside from his Lincoln Day Address, H.H., on 
June 4, 1939, spoke on "The Clash of Economic Forces With 
Intellectual and Spiritual Liberty," and on June 12, 1939, he 
spoke on the "Confusion in Words and Public Action."
^Ashmun Brown to Hoover, March 28, 1939, K-16. Louis 
Fellhauer to Hoover, February to November, 1939, K-36, often 
used religious imagery and heavy moralism. Fellhauer saw 
Hoover as "a guiding spirit."
^Hoover Collection, LXVIII, telegrams, Hoover to A. 
Reed Millar, February 6, 1939, Hoover to Maurice Cole, Febru­
ary 6, 1939, Hoover to Mrs. Earl Moulton, February 6, 1939, 
Hoover to Theodore S. Turner, February 6, 1939, and Hoover to 
Mrs. Jeanne Carpenter, February 6, 1939. These leaders 
represented local or state conclaves in Idaho, Michigan, New 
Mexico, and Washington.
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leader, Harrison Spangler, wrote the Chief that a Dewey boom 
was underway and was even catching on in Iowa.®
In Ohio, Senator Taft was the apparent favorite 
despite Governor Bricker's popularity. New Hampshire's 
George Moses described Taft as "deficient in personality or 
oratorical ability." Moses regretted that his state would 
have "such a small delegation at the convention." The ex- 
President, in complete agreement with Moses, expressed fear 
that the party had a difficult task ahead of it.^ To 
Hoover, nominating the "best man" was the impossible task.
In June, Hoover made two public addresses on the con­
fused state of the nation, the dangers to liberty, and the 
necessity of defending America's traditional ideology. 
Although muted in their denunciation of the New Deal, the 
speeches afforded the ex-President some publicity and an 
opportunity to speak with Tennessee and Indiana Republican
leaders.^ He also forayed into Minnesota.H
►
Following Hoover's conference with Colorado GOP
®Spangler to Hoover, April 19, 1939, K-127.
®Moses to Hoover, April 28, 1939, and Hoover to Moses, 
May 5, 1939, K-95.
l°Hoover Collection, LXIX, June 4, 193 9, and June 12, 
1939. Palo Alto Times, June 5, 1939. Further Addresses. 
197-208, and 208-215. On June 4, H.H. spoke at Arrowgate, 
Tennessee, on the "Clash of Economic Forces with Intellectual 
and Spiritual Liberty." On June 12, at Richmond, Indiana, he 
spoke on "And What is Liberalism?"
^Hoover Collection, LXIX, Minneapolis Tribune. June
15, 1939.
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leaders in August, Drew Pearson, controversial news analyst 
and a sharp Hoover critic, broadcasted an incendiary speech 
from the University of Chicago in which he accused the ex- 
President of "buying Southern delegates to the 1940 Republi­
can Presidential Convention." An infuriated Hoover denied
12the charges and accused Pearson of vicious slander.
As speculation on another Hoover candidacy mounted,
Nathan MacChesney, the Chicago lawyer who had served as a
liaison between Hoover and Knox since 1935, agreed to survey
the situation. MacChesney kept Knox informed of Hoover's
political activity throughout the summer of 1939. The
lawyer assured Knox that Hoover was not "buying up delegates"
as Pearson had charged but that the Chief was "in touch with
leaders throughout the country." Apparently, Hoover was
reinforcing his position to the point that he would have "a
very large voice in the ultimate selection of a candidate,
if not a controlling one." MacChesney informed Knox that
Hoover was a "stronger candidate than Taft" despite their
1mutual weaknesses. -1 Within months, MacChesney endorsed a 
more available candidate— Senator Vandenberg.^
-̂2Hoover Collection, LXIX, Colorado Daily Sentinel. 
August 6, 1939.
2MacChesney to Knox, August 11, 1939, Box 43, Mac­
Chesney Papers, is especially important.
^ B y  December, MacChesney endorsed Vandenberg and 
agreed to serve as a political adviser and strategist to the 
Senator. See the MacChesney-Vandenberg correspondence, Box 
42, MacChesney Papers.
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As periodicals and newspapers printed an increasing 
number of articles on Hoover, his record, his role in shaping 
the New Deal, and certain disagreeable facts, the ex-Presi­
dent wrote ashmun Brown urging an exposure of the "smear 
efforts." To Hoover, the nation needed enlightenment on the
"whole art, theory and science of smearing" as practiced by
l rthe New Dealers.
By December, articles on Hoover abounded in a cross- 
section of magazines and newspapers. Speculation on his 
presidential ambitions increased. Newsweeh reported that a 
hundred delegates favored Hoover. His, it said, would be 
“the deciding voice" at the GOP convention.^-® Time noted 
the feverish activity of Ben S. Allen in organizing Repub­
lican cells of twenty or more members at the county level.
The cells spread Hooverian ideas among the youth of the 
party. They disseminated criticisms of the New Deal. Sig­
nificantly, Republican charges of bureaucracy, coercion, 
e;xploitation, inefficiency, and socialism gained wider 
acceptance. Although their hero remained "poison at the box 
office," his refusal to become an "Elder Statesman" was 
significant.^-7
By early 1940, Hoover and Vandenberg were the leading
l^Hoover to A. Brown, A u g u s t  16, 1939, K-16.
^®"Hats C l u t t e r  the GOP Ring,'1 N e w s  w e  e h . XIV 
{December 11, 1939), 15-16.
17Time, XXXIV (December 18, 1939), 14-16.
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candidates advocating "all-out war on the New Deal." The 
majority of Republicans, however, hesitated to embrace such 
a strategy.'*'® On February 12, Hoover addressed the Nebraska 
Republican Organizations on "Our Most Important Domestic 
Issue." To Hoover, unemployment was the crucial problem.
He said that relief could not go on forever, that free enter­
prise must be restored, and that only a free economy would 
lead to "genuine recovery.
To Hoover, there was a "border line in the activities 
of free government." He thought that the Administration had 
violated that border and thus abetted bureaucracy, coercion, 
and inefficiency. He charged the New Deal with promoting 
monopoly. To him, government policies were so contradictory 
that there was now an abundance of "sand in the gears."
Hoover called for a reversal of the "drift toward State-ism" 
and a "return to the American System. Lawrence Sullivan's
The Dead Hand of Bureaucracy popularized many of Hoover's 
arguments.^
As Congressman Joe Martin, the Republican House leader, 
noted, it was obvious that "Hoover would have welcomed the
-*-®Rauch, New Deal, 235. See "GOP Grooms Its Dark 
Horses as Third Term Bogs Democrats," Newsweek. XV (February
12, 1940), 15-16.
-’•^Hoover, Further Addresses. 69-75.
Ibid., 76-81.
^Lawrence Sullivan, The Dead Hand of Bureaucracy 
(New York, 1940), 30, 35, 162-163.
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nomination, but events did not shape the course that way."^
A California group urged a "draft Hoover" drive in 1940.
The anxious ex-President refused to sanction it. As four 
years earlier, he felt an open quest for the nomination would 
be undignified. Again, his hopes depended on a deadlocked 
convention. He continued to avoid reality.
By 1940 there were numerous attractive Republican 
candidates in the field. There were at least two serious 
contenders who represented the Hoover viewpoint. Despite 
his disavowals, the "canny" Senator Vandenberg was interested. 
Too, he adopted the Hoover strategy and hoped for a dead­
locked convention. Critics labeled him a sphinx, a chameleon,
a compromiser, and a man whose ideas changed "every twenty- 
24four hours." Willkie boosters scoffed at hrs disinterest 
and pointed to the Senator's repeated entries into presi­
dential primaries, as well as his quest for delegates at the 
state l e v e l . H o o v e r ,  too, later remembered Vandenberg's
22Martin, m v  First Fifty Years in Politics, .159.
23Johnson, Willkie, 82. Warren Moscow, Roosevelt and 
Willkie (Englewood Cliffs, 1968), 27-28.
2^Milton S. Mayer, "Men Who Would Be President,"
Nation, CL (May 11, 1940), 587-590.
Johnson, Willkie, 70. Moscow, Roosevelt and 
Willkie, 33.
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"endeavors in four Conventions to be nominated President."2® 
Whatever his liabilities, Vandenberg remained a constant 
possibility.
Senator Taft openly sought the nomination. He reached 
an accord with Governor Bricker and enjoyed the complete 
support of the Ohio delegation. He also gained support from 
Southern delegations. Many Hooverites drifted into the Taft 
camp by convention time. Sadly, the ex-President continued
97to advertise his own willingness. '
The only other major candidate in the early running 
was Tom Dewey, New York City's famous district attorney. By 
early spring, he had emerged as the J'front runner*
Although Dewey openly courted Hoover, he failed to get an 
official endorsement. The ex-President, however, did say 
that Dewey "had fired the imagination of the American 
youth.1,29
26inside the cover of his personal copy of the Private 
Papers of Senator Vandenberg1, H.H. wrote and signed the follow­
ing inscription: "This book is totally false to History. It
really a) starts after Vandenberg sold himself to the inter­
nationalists b) supresses his long and violent isolationism 
c) never mentions his relations with Herbert Hoover d) mis­
represents his endeavors in four Conventions to be nominated 
President." Hoover's copy of this book is found in the 
Hoover Presidential Library at West Branch, Iowa.
27Moscow, Roosevelt and Willkie, 26-28. Mayer, The 
Republicans, 454.
28Ibid., 453-454. Moscow, Roosevelt and Willkie. 26- 
28. "Primary Season Puts Roosevelt and Dewey Off to Good 
Start," Newsweek, XV (April 15, 1940), 15-16, stated that 
Dewey's Wisconsin victory eliminated Vandenberg.
29Joyner, The Republican Dilemma. 14.
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On February 16, 1940, the Republican Program Committee 
finally released its long-awaited report on A Program For A 
Dynamic America. The hundred-page paper offered an alterna­
tive policy to the New Deal.30 While it permitted a grass 
roots participation and expression, it was muted in its 
criticism of the New Deal. It accepted the necessity of 
relief and expressed hope that government intervention was 
temporary. The tract concluded, "If the understanding is 
right and if the people verify it, the party of opposition
O 1returns reinvigorated from minority to majority status."
The report was ominous in its search for a middle ground 
which would allow a broader base for the next Republican cam­
paign. Yet, it was to the right of Congressional thinking 
as evidenced by the solons' opposition to its publication 
until after the 1938 elections.
By the end of the month it was obvious that there 
must be another candidate for the nomination since all the 
leading contenders were non-interventionists in foreign 
affairs. The opening for an internationalist was soon filled 
by Wendell Willkie. He enjoyed the support of National
30$jew York Times, February 17, 1940, 1. Republican 
Program Committee, A Procrram For A Dynamic America (New 
York, 1940). Raymond Moley, "Perspective: The Glenn Frank
Report," Newsweek. XV (March 4, 1930), 56, saw it as an 
"impressive document," a realistic, objective, program.
3^A Program For A Dynamic America, 109. Boskin, 
"Politics of an Opposition Party, 1 247. Raymond Moley, 
"Perspective," Newsweek, XV (March 4, 1940), 56.
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Chairman Hamilton and thus readily gained control of the
32inside organization. As the convention approached it was 
obvious that the door was open.
Encouraged by the activity of so many candidates, 
Hoover became convinced of the probability of a deadlocked 
convention. Newspapers and periodicals repeatedly forecast 
a deadlock and the selection of a dark horse candidate. 
Although polls and delegates indicated that Dewey, Taft, 
Vandenberg, and Willkie were the favorites, Hoover consis­
tently headed the second c h o i c e s . ^3
The ex-President, determined to nurse such strength, 
stepped up his activity and sent his lieutenants out to look
^Moscow, Roosevelt and Willkie, 29, 64-67. "Willkie 
Boom," Newsweek, XV (May 13, 1940), 30. Raymond Moley, 
"Perspective: Willkie," Newsweek. XV (May 20, 1940), 72.
New York Times. May 1, May 3, 1940, 1, discussed a 
Dewey-Taft standoff. New York Times, May 17, 1940, 15, 
published the latest Gallup Poll which showed a Dewey, Taft, 
Vandenberg, Willkie, Hoover preference. New York Times,
June 3, 1940, 1, predicted a GOP deadlock with H.H. a dark- 
horse possibility. It pointed to his control of the Cali­
fornia delegation. New York Times, June 9, 1940, 2, carried 
the "draft Hoover" proposal of a Palo Alto group. The 
unauthorized move was led by educators who praised H.H.’s 
"sheer ability, organizing genius, and statesmanship." New 
York Times, June 12, 1940, 23, reported the latest Gallup 
Poll which showed a Dewey, Willkie, Taft, Vandenberg, and 
Hoover order. "GOP Puzzle," Newsweek, XV (June 17, 1940), 
40-41, forecast a tight race. Raymond Moley, "The Republi­
can Choice," Newsweek, XV (June 17, 1940), 72, anticipated 
a deadlocked convention and saw H.H. as a real possibility. 
Of H.H., he said, "He remains the best informed public 
figure" and "time has placed [him] in a kindlier light."
"GOP Moves on Philadelphia to Pick the Man and Issue, " 
Newsweek, XV (June 24, 1940), 31-32, after the big four, 
saw H.H. with his "unpredictable strength" as a definite 
candidate.
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for additional support. On May 1, Walter Newton sent Larry 
Richey a list of the Dakota, Wisconsin, and Minnesota dele­
gates. The Chief hurriedly sent all of them autographed 
copies of his Further Addresses Upon the American Road. He 
openly courted their good will.34 ^s late as June, Hoover 
acquired a confidential summary of delegate names, attitudes, 
and favorite candidates from the Georgia, Alabana, Kentucky, 
and Tennessee delegations. The ex-President had long 
enjoyed the support of Southern Republicans, and Carlyle 
Littleton reassured him of his widespread popularity among 
the Dixie delegations.35
Hoover was encouraged when Republican candidates 
adopted his tactic of denouncing New Deal methods. Even 
Wendell Willkie, the alleged liberal of the front four, was 
criticizing Roosevelt and endorsing certain Hooverian 
p r i n c i p l e s . 36 such tactics only reinforced Hoover's
34jjjewton to Richey, May 1, 1940, K-97.
35carlyle S. Littleton to Hoover, June 21, 1940, K-97. 
Littleton even advised H.H. how he should approach certain 
Southern delegates.
36willkie bemoaned the abandonment of "free enter­
prise, " the extension of bureaucracy, the decision making by 
"non-elected commissioners," and charged the New Deal with 
retarding recovery. He blasted FDR's promises and perform­
ance on inflation, deficit spending, and unemployment. New 
York Times. May 12, 1940, 2. Willkie charged the New Deal 
with an anti-business attitude, with bureaucratic restric­
tions, and the destruction of the economy. He said that the 
"Holy Order of the New Deal has set itself and the party 
above country." New York Times, May 25, 1940, 8. Willkie 
attacked FDR's power and concluded, "we have been unfaithful 
to liberty; we have confused liberty with license." To him,
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conviction that he was available in the event of the antic­
ipated deadlock.
As the convention opened, Hoover stock began to climb. 
John L. Lewis, addressing the NAACP, startled the nation 
with his endorsement of the Hoover depression-recovery thesis. 
The labor leader praised the Hoover Administration for its 
1932 efforts and lambasted the "chronic ills" of the New 
Deal which had retarded real recovery ever since. To Lewis, 
the depression would end only with a change of administra­
tions.^ The New York Times reported increasing Hoover 
support among the Empire State's delegation.3® In the final 
Gallup Poll, Dewey led with forty-seven per cent to Willkie1 s 
twenty-nine per cent, but Hoover's six per cent placed him 
close behind Taft and Vandenberg, who polled eight per 
cent.^ Although admitting that Hoover’s delegate strength 
was weak at the moment, U . S. News noted his influence in 
every geographical area. There was increasing speculation 
concerning his activity and possible candidacy.4®
the New Deal had created class conflict. New York Times, 
June 1, 1940, 7.
37New York Times, June 19, 1940, 16. Lewis, a strong 
Roosevelt booster in 1936, had fallen out with the Presi­
dent and openly supported the GOP.
3®New York Times, June 20, 1940, 20, concluded that 
H.H. ran behind only Willkie and Dewey.
3®Ibid., June 21, 1940, 17.
40U.S. News, VIII (June 14, 1940), 20. New York 
Times. June 22, 1940, 1, and New York Times, June 23, 1940, 
1-2.
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Any Hoover candidacy depended on a rousing address 
and a deadlocked convention. The "stop-Willkie move" which 
surfaced on convention eve could aid Dewey but, according to 
the New York Times, only underlined the fact that Herbert 
Hoover was "a decided threat to the candidates already in 
the field." At the least, it held, Hoover could determine 
the final candidate. California was openly working for a 
"blitzkrieg," and Nebraska and Pennyslvania were rumored to 
be accelerating the "move for former President Hoover."^
Although he did not recognize it, Hoover was in the 
"afternoon" of his political influence. He had suffered 
from the deaths of his more astute lieutenants, had lost con­
trol of the party's Executive Committee, and had consistently 
refused the post of elder statesman. Although other candi­
dates and factions paid the proper deference, they resented 
his interference and resisted his overtures for the nomina­
tion. Even a deadlocked 1940 GOP Convention would have a 
multitude of attractive, more available alternatives. Hoover 
refused to face reality. He sapped the last of his political 
strength in a futile effort at another nomination and elimi­
nated the last Hooverites from party councils. The remnants
^ Ibid., June 25, 1940, 1, IS. Also see Newsweek, 
XVI (July 8, 1940), 13, concerning the California efforts. 
U.S. News, VIII (June 21, 1940), 12-15, speculated that 
Joseph N. Pew, who controlled Pennsylvania's seventy-two 
votes, would lead the move to the Hoover standard after the 
preliminary balloting.
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42of his band joined Taft. The thirty-two votes the ex- 
President received on the third ballot at the convention 
served as his final curtain call.4^
As in 1936, Hoover was the "principal invited orator 
of the convention." As usual, he delivered a biting speech.
He warned that America was at the crossroads and that "upon 
this Party again rests the responsibility for the freedom 
and prosperity of men for the next two generations." Again, 
he defended his own record and denounced intellectual dis­
honesty. America, he said, "must summon reason to control 
emotion." To him, calm realism was what the nation 
needed.44
Urging a war against the New Deal, he told Republicans 
that they "must battle for the greatest cause entrusted to 
the government of mankind." Liberty, he said, was threatened. 
Too, he indicted the New Deal for delaying recovery, promot­
ing economic confusion, for dividing the country along class
46lines, and for obstructing equality of opportunity.
In calling for a "regeneration of America," the ex- 
President recalled traditional American mores and values, 
especially the "belief in God" and the "belief in the right
42Johnson, Willkie, 82. Moscow, Roosevelt and Willkie,
28.




to plan one's own life." Man, he said, had a soul and must 
seek its fullest expression. To Hoover, the GOP could 
restore ideals and "hold up the lamp of liberty." Hoover 
closed with a challenge: "Republicans! Are you prepared to
fight?"46 The ex-President's ovation was warm and enthus­
iastic but it lacked the emotion of 1936. There was no 
stampede to his standard. Although Hoover buttons surfaced 
to the floor of the convention, and although the ex-Presi­
dent, speaking through ex-Senator Dave Reed, voiced his 
willingness to accept a draft, the Hoover boom reminded one 
reporter of a "wet firecracker."47 To many delegates, 
Wendell Willkie was "the only winning candidate."48 The 
next evening, on the sixth ballot, Willkie became the
Republican nominee.49
Hoover's participation in the 1940 campaign was
46lbid., 131-133.
47New York Times, June 26, 1940, 1, 16, headlined, 
"Hoover Bids For Nomination to Fight New Deal." H.H. was 
the "new active contender." New York Times, June 27, 1940, 
3, carried Reed's disclosure of H.H.'s willingness to run. 
Newsweek, XVI (July 8, 1940), 7, 13-18, discusses "Anti- 
Hoover Tricks," which H.H.'s supporters disclosed. They 
found a plot to prevent the ex-President from "stampeding 
the convention” through the tampering of loudspeakers. 
Newsweek replied that it was the radiators which destroyed 
his effectiveness in the sweltering, over-heated convention 
hall. Time. XXXVI (July 8, 1940), 12-13, described H.H.'s 
address as his finest, most intelligent effort but thought 
that his mush-mouthed delivery had undercut it.
48Time. XXXVI (July 8, 1940), 12-13.
4% e w  York Times. June 28, 1940, 1. Moscow, Roose­
velt and Willkie. 93-95.
limited. His speeches dealt mainly with foreign policy. 
There were two exceptions. The first came on October 24, at 
Columbus, Ohio, where he spoke on "The Third Term." Hoover 
noted the "unwritten provision in our Constitution" which 
barred a third term. In a restrained voice, the ex-Presi- 
dent, while absolving Roosevelt from aspiring to a dictator­
ship, warned of excessive personal power and gigantic polit­
ical machines which threatened legislative and judicial
Kf)independence.J
Hoover repeated his charges concerning the Adminis­
tration's "intellectual dishonesty" in its talk of recovery, 
its effort "to pack the Supreme Court, 1 its purging of 
Congressional party members, and its minimizing the true 
extent of federal bureaucracy and power. Hoover urged 
change through the election of Wendell Willkie.-’-1-
On November 1, 1940, at Salt Lake City, Hoover made 
his final campaign address on "The Major Issues." He 
cleverly ridiculed the New Deal. He spoke of "Mr. Roosevelt 
lively crusade for bigger and better production of falsifica 
tion." He challenged the public to compare the President's 
promises with his performance. He lambasted New Deal 
propaganda, policies, and failures. He warned that the 
nation was moving toward National Socialism. ^
^®New York Times, October 25, 1940, 1. Hoover, 
Addresses Upon the American Road. 1940-1941, 224-239.
51Ibid., 230-239. 52ibid., 240-255.
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Referring to his own past experience, Hoover felt 
qualified to discern the type president America needed. 
Willkie, he said, was preeminently qualified. The time for 
change had arrived. American spirit, he concluded, must be 
restored. To Hoover, America needed "a man who is truly 
devoted to the American Dream."53 On Election Day, the 
voters again rejected Hoover's advice and reelected Presi­
dent Roosevelt.^
To Hooverites, the Chief, even in 1940, remained "the 
brainiest and ablest and most really patriotic figure of all 
the national figures.” He was the sane and sound commander. 
Ashmun Brown even speculated that "a wise Providence is 
sparing you for an even more important and responsible task 
in the service of all mankind . . .  in the dark days 
ahead.1,55
World War II submerged the emotion and political 
vituperation of the 1930's. It even quelled the New Deal. 
Yet the question of how an ex-President might escape a 
"certain grayness in the afternoon of life1' remains unsolved.
Most retiring Presidents have, for a time, sought
53Ibid., 254-255.
3i% e w  York Times, November 6-8, 1940, 1. 
35A. Brown to Hoover, July 9, 1940, K-15.
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seclusion.^6 Yet, as Theodore Roosevelt noted, "there is 
not one among us in whom a devil does not dwell; at some 
time, on some point, that devil masters each of us; he who 
has never failed has not been t e m p t e d . M e n  of energy, 
men whose record or convictions have been challenged, and 
men whose egos have suffered, have particularly found retire­
ment difficult.^® After leaving office, Roosevelt admitted 
that "an ex-President does not do enough good to counter­
balance the disadvantage of his taking any part as regards
59public questions." Yet, like the apolitical John Quincy 
Adams who had found that political activity had become "as
^ V 7illiam Howard Taft was relieved at his escape from 
office. Henry F. Pringle, The Life and Times of William 
Howard Taft, IX (New York, 1939), 843-847-852. Theodore 
Roosevelt tried, for awhile, to maintain silence. Blum, 
Republican Roosevelt, 146, 142. Grover Cleveland wanted the 
quiet life. Allan Nevins, Grover Cleveland (New York, 1932), 
738, 745, and Charles W. Stein, The Third Term Tradition 
(New York, 1943), 124. John Quincy Adams sought seclusion 
and tried to maintain public silence. Samuel Flagg Bemis, 
John Quincy Adams And The Union (New York, 1956), 154-155, 
185-195. Herbert Hoover, as noted in Chapter III of this 
work, at first sought sanctuary.
57Blum, Republican Roosevelt, 161.
COBlum, Republican Roosevelt. 142; George A. Lipsky, 
John Quincy Adams (New York, 1950), 44, discusses Adams as 
confident, egotistical, and inflexible. Bemis, Adams. 209, 
describes Adams as "set on some sort of political comeback, 
big or little." H.H.'s post-presidential career closely 
compared to that of Adams and Roosevelt. All three had 
strong personalities, certain psychological needs, boundless 
energy, and a devotion to a set of principles.
S^Blum, Republican Roosevelt. 146.
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much a necessary of life as atmospheric air,"^0 Roosevelt 
decided to pursue political activity after the presidential 
years. So it was with Hoover.
In contrast to the aggressive roles of Adams, Roose­
velt, and Hoover, other ex-Presidents lived an active but 
apolitical life. Grover Cleveland and William Howard Taft 
are the best examples. Although both men left Washington 
under a cloud of disfavor, and although both men were 
devoted to principles which were under steady attack, their 
personalities permitted them to find a happy, useful life 
outside politics. Interestingly, both men lived long enough 
to recover popular f a v o r . C o n c e r n i n g  the political 
activity of ex-Presidents, Taft wryly suggested the use of 
"chloroform or lotus fruit.
Most ex-Presidents, since the late nineteenth century,
^Lipsky, Adams. 40.
^Blum, Republican Roosevelt. 146-147.
6^in retirement, Taft returned to law practice, served 
as a professor of law at Yale, and fulfilled his life-long 
ambition by serving as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. 
Pringle, Taft. II, 847, 852, 856-868, 926-950. For his 
championing of judicial reform and independence see pp. 994- 
1029. Cleveland took on the role of educator and found con­
tentment as a family man. Yet, he maintained an interest in 
politics, privately criticized Roosevelt, and hoped that his 
party would "reaffirm old principles which the times demand." 
There were efforts to run him in 1904, but he resisted the 
pleas and stated that his decision was "unalterable and con­
clusive." Nevins, Cleveland, 745-747, 754-755. Also see 
Charles W. Stein, Third Term Tradition. 134-135, 138.
^Pringle, Taft. II, 845.
have written articles for periodicals during their early 
years of retirement.^4 Historian Thomas A. Bailey says that 
the former chief executives have attempted to "rig the 
record" with articles, speeches, memoirs, and personal 
records.®^ To Bailey, the three most active ex-Presidents, 
John Quincy Adams, Theodore Roosevelt, and Herbert Hoover, 
especially tried to write their own version of history. In 
trying to improve their own image, they also vigorously 
defended their records and exceeded good taste in criticizing 
their successors.
The three most active ex-Presidents had much in common 
Each witnessed a decline in his party's fortunes; each was a 
poor looser; each was stung by the criticism of his opponents 
each was hypercritical of his successor; each was confident 
of his own rightness; each desired vindication; each sought 
a political comeback; each had a sense of duty; each saw him­
self as a leader of the whole nation; and each used the
rhetoric of a moral teacher in his emphasis on soul, morality
fi 7conscience, duty, law, and justice.
S^evins, Cleveland, 737; Blum, Republican Roosevelt. 
143; Pringle, Taft. II, 847-868; Bailey, Presidential Great­
ness , 119-121, includes Coolidge and Hoover.
65Ibid., 119-121.
^Bailey, Presidential Greatness, 117-121. In this 
vein, Cleveland was also very critical of President Roose­
velt. Nevins, Cleveland, 754.
^Lipsky, Adams. 41-45; Bemis, Adams, 154-156, 196, 
209-210, 280-296, 474, 529; Blum, Republican Roosevelt. 142- 
161.
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Fortunately, time favored Hoover. He outlived that 
"grayness" of life and emerged as an elder statesman in a 
second post-war era. The last role was tailored for his 
abilities and interests. By putting aside politics, he 
devoted his talents, recalled his vast experience, and exer­
cised his administrative techniques in drawing up the guide­
lines for an extensive reorganization of the executive branch 
of government under Presidents Truman and Eisenhower. The 
Hoover Commission Reports served as a significant political 
contribution and a touching memorial to his deepest reform 
ideas.68
With age, Hoover mellowed. The cutting knife of his 
earlier bitterness proved less lethal. By the 1950's, 
Democrats as well as Republicans offered him accolades.
Even former New Dealers treated him kindly in their memoirs 
and journalistic accounts of the 1930's. Yet, the complex 
puzzle that was Herbert Hoover necessitates fitting in 
political pieces, long missing.
68Hoover Commission Report: U. S. Commission on
Organization of the Executive Branch of Government (New York,
1949), viii, includes an introduction by H.H. which states 
that the objective of the commission was "to assist those 
who work to make a lasting reality of . . .  a Government 
which will forever be the servant, not the master, of our 
people." Laurin L. Henry, Presidential Transition (Washing­
ton, 1960), 681-682, labels the second Hoover Commission as 
more conservative in its endorsement of government activity 
and administrative reform. According to Henry, it tried to 
remove government from the business field. Also see Neil 
MacNeil and Harold W. Metz, The Hoover Report, 1953-1955 
(New York, 1956), for an area by area analysis.
272
Hoover was sometimes a tragic figure, sometimes a 
ludicrous one, but always a political one. Although he 
preferred the role of "philosopher," he was capable of 
playing politics and was more political-minded than his 
critics or friends admit. As he often professed, he had a 
distaste for politics and never played the game with ability. 
Nor was his personality suited for such a role. Nonetheless, 
he carried on a copious correspondence— frequently with 
political aims— anxiously inquired into local politics, 
courted political power brokers, offered and sought advice, 
developed strategy and tactics at the local and national 
level, outlined a platform of principles, published political 
articles and books, sought jobs for political friends, kept 
tabs on congressional leaders, exerted pressure and some­
times control over the national party organization, rallied 
dissidents, fragmented his own party, defined issues, defended 
his own record, tried to lead his party, and eventually trans­
mitted most of his ideas to the largest bloc if not the 
majority of the party. He continually spoke of apolitical 
motives, ideas, and the nation's needs. He used the 
rhetoric and maneuvers of a politician.
Throughout the 1930's, Hoover made one last political 
effort. His personal frustration, his need for vindication, 
and his detailed philosophy of American Individualism moti­
vated his determined, often bitter, defense of his ideas and 
record. Possessing an extreme sensitivity to New Deal weak­
nesses or inconsistencies, he enjoyed the role of a Jeremiah.
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He wanted to persuade the public of his rightness. He looked 
forward to battle with his antagonists.
More than any other conservative leader, Hoover illus­
trates Richard Hofstadter's thesis that conservatives and 
reformers reversed their ideological roles in the 1930's.
Like reformers of the past. Hoover, as leader of the oppo­
sition, expressed concern over moral decay, malignant corrup­
tion, regimentation, the eclipse of liberty, and a dark 
future. However, he played the role for political as well as 
personal reasons. His attacks on the New Deal were per­
sistent, cutting, and shrill, although partly a reflex action 
to the attacks from his opponents. Too often, however, his 
own criticism was politically calculated, extravagant, and 
vituperatively personal.
There was a certain irony in his onslaught, for he 
sincerely believed many of his wildest charges. Perhaps he 
had lived abroad too long. Revolution, conspiracy, corrup­
tion, and other ’’evils1 evoked sharp images in his mind. He 
had a genuine fear of mass revolution. New Deal phrases 
evoked special nuances, even hidden meanings, in his intel­
lectual framework. Inevitably, his denunciation of the "new 
path" entailed emotion, bitterness, and panic. Much of his 
analysis was as biased and unobjective as that of his own
^Hofstadter, Age of Reform, 317-318, says that during 
the New Deal, reformers stressed the practical, the necessary, 
and the facts, whereas conservatives, shocked at the rapidity 
of change, focused on traditional ideas, sound principles, 
the constitution, morality, and liberty.
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critics.
In his better moments, he emphasized ideas. Many of 
his homilies concerning the duties of citizens (or "soldiers" 
as he called them) acquired a certain sacredness among his 
followers. His lieutenants shared his inspiration, character, 
moral values, and determination. They encouraged his "new 
crusade."
His political environment, his coterie of lieuten­
ants, and his isolation emasculated his realism, even his 
judgment. He failed politically, even by his own standards. 
The GOP defeats of 1932, 1934, 1936, and 1937 were personal. 
Too, the party rejected him in 1936, it rejected his 
lieutenants in 1938, and ignored his availability in 1940.
Yet, his own influence was considerable inside the hierarchy 
and with rank and file Republicans. He was a force to be 
reckoned with and his party rivals, his New Deal antagonists, 
and news analysts testified to his strength in their con­
stant recognition of his activity and possible leadership.
Although his criticism was often more embarrassing to 
his own stature than to his targets, it was frequently 
logical, sometimes realistic, and on occasions, positive.
He unmasked some dangerous flaws in the New Deal. He pointed 
to the need for a change in methods. Whatever the correla­
tion, many of his arguments were adopted by his party, and, 
on occasions, by the nation. He was an early critic of the 
NRA, the Court Plan, and electioneering by government 
employees. Although the Republican Program Committee was
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less than he hoped, it did provide a grass roots expression 
and participation in defining Republican ideas. Many 
successful GOP candidates of 1938 won because of an anti-New 
Deal campaign. Hoover continually maximized whatever politi­
cal strength he possessed.
If Hoover had used another strategy in the 1930 ' s 
would he have been more successful in fighting the New Deal? 
Given his personality and experience there was no other 
strategy possible. However, looking at other GOP figures, 
what strategy worked better? What Republican leader 
eclipsed Hoover 's influence in the 1930's? What Democrat 
except Roosevelt? What man, stigmatized as the architect of 
the Depression, and possessing such an elaborate ideological 
framework, could have scored a comeback? Nor can the per­
sonality of his chief antagonist and the popularity of the 
New Deal be ignored. Hoover's frustration and failure were 
unavoidable. In the "grayness of the afternoon" he proved 
to be a sore loser. As the 1930's closed, he withdrew from 
the political arena— permanently. The vindication he sought 
was unattainable.
With the passing of time, however, many of Hoover's 
theses have gained wide acceptance. Historians now accept 
the international nature of the Great Depression, the fact 
that unemployment remained around ten million throughout the 
1930's, and that only World War II led to the recovery which 
the New Deal had failed to foster. Even former New Dealers 
have questioned the wisdom of FDR's interregnum attitudes,
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the waste, corruption and inefficiency within New Deal 
agencies, and the expansion of executive power.
Today, as in the 1930's, bureaucracy is recognized as 
a Leviathan and political morality is debated, businessmen 
express concern over the coercion, regimentation, and the 
loss of a "free economy,” and the disenchanted speak, in 
Hooverian terms, of an individualism, "equal opportunity," 
and liberty. Again the words carry connotations and loaded 
meanings.
Hoover remains relevant because of the role of ideas 
in his political action. Environment and education gave him 
an acute sense of values. Because he saw all issues in moral 
terms, compromise was a sin. An unusual set of circumstances 
led him to the pinnacle of power at the very moment a man of 
his instincts was least capable of governing. Despite the 
change through which he lived, Hoover logically, but 
unrealistically, defended the past through the political 
media. At last he played to the emotional element in man, 
but denied he was so doing. At last he utilized the politi­
cal tools without comprehending the art. But then, like 
Thoreau's individualist, Hoover heard a different drummer 
and marched to the tune h§ heard.
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